

# **Translating Heidegger translating *Wesen***

## **(Part Two)**

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## PART TWO

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26 Part One of this [essay](http://www.archessenzenz.com/essays/) was first published at <http://www.archessenzenz.com/essays/> under the title “Translating Heidegger translating *Wesen* (Part One)”, Version 1 • 28 November 2018.



**§6. ... *Wesen* ≠ *essentia*, οὐσία  
[∴ ‘*Wesen(heit)* ≠ (*esse*)*ntia*, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ ?]**

The perhaps ill-advised undertaking to skate round the nub of the whole matter and over the questioning that is truly at stake—as outlined in Part One of this [essay](#)—is the bold conclusion drawn by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness*<sup>27</sup>, translating *Besinnung* (GA66)<sup>28</sup>, by Martin Heidegger. In their ascertainment [Feststellung; pp. xxxif]:

The next two keywords to be addressed in this foreword are *Wesen* and *Wesung*. In translating these being-historical words we took our bearings from the differentiation in sections 98 and 99 of *Mindfulness* between the metaphysical and being-historical question of being and the concomitant differentiation between metaphysical and being-historical thinking. We realized that if the English rendition of these words did not respect these differentiations, it would fail to retain and reflect the integrity of the original German of *Mindfulness*. If we were to name the centre toward which that integrity gravitates we would have to say that what concerns Heidegger’s non-metaphysical thinking above all is to articulate what is *fundamentally denied* to metaphysical thinking. And he reaches the single most important locus of this fundamental denial with the word *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*.

Accordingly, we realised that translating *Wesen* and *Wesung* must take its bearings from this fundamental denial instead of taking the easy way and accepting the dictionary as the ultimate authority. Having considered every statement that Heidegger has made on *essentia* (from the early pages of *Sein und Zeit* to the texts of his Nietzsche lectures and beyond), we found that *Wesen* and *Wesung* cannot be brought into English with the cognates of *essentia* because the latter is a word that blocks the hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally denied to metaphysical thinking. Having also taken into account Heidegger’s own repeated stricture that *Wesen* in his texts is used in the verbal sense of ‘swaying’, ‘enduring’, ‘abiding’, ‘whiling’, and so forth we found that this word should be brought into English with a word that in approximating the original German reflects its verbal

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27 Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006.

28 As indicated in Part One of “Translating Heidegger Translating *Wesen*”, “*Besinnung* (GA66)” or, in my translation of the title, “*Appraisal* (GA66)” is an abbreviation for Volume 66 of the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*, Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1997. For my critical appraisal of “the word *mindfulness* itself, which”, as Emad and Kalary point out in their “Translators’ Foreword” [p. xxiii], “appears in the title as well as throughout this translation as the English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*”, see the Afterword to (Part Two of) this [essay](#), not to mention the alternate articulation in what follows herewith and throughout the [essay](#) of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” and cognates (besinnen, Besinnen, besinnend, sinnen, Sinnen, sinnend, ersinnen, Ersinnen, nach-sinnen, Sinn, Sinne, sinnvoll, sinnlos, Sinnlosigkeit, Unsinn, unsinnig, besinnlich, Besinnlichkeit, unbesinnlich, Unbesinnlichkeit, unbesonnen, besinnungslos, Besinnungslosigkeit, ... ).

character. In short, in translating *Wesen* and *Wesung* we found ourselves committed to three criteria: (a) the word in question must not be a cognate of *essentia*; (b) it should have a verbal meaning; and (c) it should be an approximation and not aspire unrealistically to replace the original German word. These criteria guided us not only in our efforts to translate *Wesen* and *Wesung* but also in facing the task of rendering into English crucial phrases such as *Wesen des Seins* and *Wesung des Seyns*.

In the English words “sway” and “swaying” we found a good approximation to *Wesen* and *Wesung*. Translating *Wesen* and *Wesung* with “sway” and “swaying” has several advantages: (a) these words are not cognates of *essentia* and thus do not block the hermeneutic-phenomenological [xxxii] viewing of what is fundamentally denied to metaphysical thinking; (b) ... ; (c) ... ; (d) ... ; (e) ... ; and (f) ... .

To my way of thinking, the appraisal, i.e. *Besinnung* (mindfulness? *Besinnlichkeit*?), “that *Wesen* and *Wesung* cannot be brought into English with the cognates of *essentia*” for the alluring reason given, is inherently flawed in not apprising [nicht Ersinnen] of the incipient yet forgotten contraindication to what we are being appraised of. What if the “not apprising” of this contraindication, the supposed flaw in the appraisal, can be adequately addressed only with a heightened sense of appreciation for [Sinn für] how to discerningly embrace the *essentially* said yet *essentially* unsaid and unthought-through word *essentia* as uneschewable to the purpose of translating into English Heidegger’s own take on the metaphysical problematics *and* the being-historic interplay of German *Wesen*? How so? Perchance only *essentially* [*wesentlich*, im *Wesentlichen*]—*not* (pace Emad and Kalary’s trusted translation of Heidegger’s “*wesentlich*”, “im *Wesentlichen*”, with) “fundamentally” [“fundamental”, “grundsätzlich”, “im Grunde” ?]—through our suitably translating into our own English language, in the vein of appreciative [sinnenden] after-saying and after-thinking after Heidegger’s inceptive translating of the language of *das Wesen* into his, the appropriately ‘being-historic’ wording of this pioneering thinker’s appraisive [besinnenden] fore-saying and fore-thinking of that German keyword(ing)’s tendentially all-prevailing, almost exclusively substantive signification of ‘(das) *Wesen* = *essentia*, οὐσία’ in disregard of its unprevailing verbal (co-)signification of ‘(das) *wesen* = *esse*, εἶναι’.

And what if it is only with a somewise parenthesing view to and casting-open of the prevailing(-cum-unprevailing) metaphysical construction of this whole being-historic configuration, in clear sight of and yet in oblivion to the full s(w)ay of the translating German word “*Wesen*” in *essenz(ing)*, that the translated and in turn translating Latin word “*essentia*” in the former ‘equation’ can be said, contraindicatively to the bearing of the latter on what is also true to the word, to veil and, *all at once* [*zugleich*], to unveil our access to an inceptive viewing of what still remains unsaid and unthought in whatever the translated, and in turn translating, word “*Wesen*” otherwise says and thinks?

On this interpretation, it is our contraindicative apprising of the *wesen* in *Wesen*(heit), the *esse* in (*esse*)ntia, and the εἶναι, so to speak, in οὐσία (εἶναι) as the unprevailing, incipient yet forgotten verbal co-signification almost invariably left out of (while still in) contention in the tendentially all-prevailing, predominantly substantive — and nominally-partial — signification of “Wesen” as ‘Wesen(heit) = essentia, οὐσία’, that is essentially [*wesentlich*]—not (pace Emad and Kalary’s rendering of *wesentlich* with, for instance:) “fundamentally”—denied to metaphysical thinking. And since when it comes to the nominally-partial sentence [Satz]: ‘Wesen [i.e. *Wesen*(heit)] = essentia, οὐσία’, Latin *essentia* can essentially [*wesentlich*] be accused of (categorized as) always already ‘(inter)acting’, or rather: ‘essenz(ing)’, in concert with its German agnate *Wesen* and its Greek cognate οὐσία, the word *essentia* itself (let alone its cognates one and all) cannot properly be construed as or blamed for being the only culprit here in potentially blocking any casting-open of our view of the incipiently verbal co-signification that is *wesentlich*, i.e. *essentially* (≠ “fundamentally”), *denied* to the metaphysical thinking that unquestioningly relies upon the *nominal partiality* of this prevailing trend of occidental thought.

That the reciprocal arrangement (or adjustment or jointure) of its essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) [*Wesensfügung*] in concert with Latin *essentia* and Greek οὐσία in the nominally-partial sentence ‘Wesen = essentia, οὐσία’, renders the German word, appreciatively thought, likewise and otherwise culpable for blocking *and* commendable for unblocking an inceptive recasting from whence of itself (ἀρχή) of the wording of the word as an integral whole, and hence what Emad & Kalary are effectively calling “the hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing” of what is *wesentlich* denied to metaphysical thinking for this blameworthy state of affairs, is evidenced by the manifold ways of contraindicatively translating the *Wesen* of Heidegger’s own German language and thinking into its ownmost word, notably in our sense of its unveiling as ‘Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’.

On this interpretation, it would seem that the translator’s task of thinking through the perceived blockage to an *essential* viewing of any one-sided leaning towards the prevailing metaphysical construction of this nominally-accentuated (≠ nominally-partial) occidental train of thought, is to own rather than to disown the word *essentia* together with its inrooted time word *esse* through none other than a being-historic leap [Satz] of thought from the former through the latter to their incipient yet forgotten ‘going-together’ in our appraisively-appreciative apprising [*besinnend-sinnenden Ersinnen*] of the otherwise unquestioning metaphysical train of thought:

‘essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) = *Wesen*(heit) = (esse)ntia = οὐσία (εἶναι)’.

So without due regard to the manifold ways in which such that is true to the full s(w)ay of the German nouning, i.e. naming, of the time word *wesen* in its settled arrangement as ‘Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia = οὐσία (εἶναι)’ *can* be brought into English with the reappraised and reappraising cognates of Latin “(esse)ntia” — including Greek “οὐσία (εἶναι)” (!), and perchance therewith alone, our incipiently being-historic appraisal of what is *essentially* denied to *and* conceded to be this nominally-accentuated (almost invariably unquestioning) metaphysical train of (advancing-)nominal-cum-(retreating-)verbal thought, will inevitably be left in limbo, with the unenviable task of having, as a viable option, to acquaint ourselves to how to uphold what *cannot* be upheld and to think what *cannot* be thought without them.

Where does this leave Emad and Kalary’s finding [p. xxxi] that “*Wesen* and *Wesung* cannot be brought into English with the cognates of *essentia* because the latter is a word that blocks the hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally denied to metaphysical thinking.”? Somewhat up in the air? If there is any merit, and there surely is, in Emad and Kalary’s proposition that Heidegger’s (supposed “non-metaphysical”<sup>29</sup>) thinking reaches the single most important locus of this (supposed “fundamental”) denial with the word *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, is this not precisely because, when it is a matter of “these being-historical words” in Heidegger’s own German language and thinking, the

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29 Whether a thinking that is “not metaphysical” [“nicht metaphysisch”] or “not metaphysically meant” [“nicht metaphysisch gemeint”] equates in English to one that is “non-metaphysical” or “non-metaphysically meant” is surely a moot point. As “moot”, the point is likely to be regarded by conventional thinking as unworthy of further consideration. Not so for an appreciative thinking oriented to what in Heidegger’s “not metaphysical” and yet “being-historic” thinking is *essentially* [wesentlich, im Wesentlichen] worth(while)-thinking. This is because the prefix “non-” in “non-metaphysical” suggests only a lack or an absence of metaphysical thinking, its Abwesenheit (absentia, ἀπουσία), in Heidegger’s being-historic thinking. And that leaves little or no trace therein of its reappraised presenz(ing) [Anwesen(heit)] (prae(se)ntia, παρούσια (παρεῖναι)) *and* absenz(ing) [Abwesen(heit)] (ab(se)ntia, ἀπουσία (απεῖναι)) in an other-than-metaphysical sense. His appraisal of how in oblivion to the essencing [Wesung] and truth [Wahrheit], as in deconcealment [Entbergung], of being as beyng [seyn] (esse, εἶναι) our metaphysical (re)presentation of being as beingness [Seiendheit; Wesenheit] (essentia, οὐσία) and presence [Anwesenheit] (praesentia, παρούσια) is always already enpropriated by how being essences / essenzen [west] and conceals its essencing / essencing [sein als wesen] can be interpreted as the springboard whence (ἀρχή), in essenz(ing) [im Wesen], Heidegger’s other-than-(re)presentative thinking of being as such takes its historic leap of thought into an alternate thinking of beyng. Which is to say, in the illume of occidental beyng’s “properly (i.e. en-proprietarily) historic” [“eigentlich (d.h. er-eignet) geschichtlich”]: GA66, G351ff: essencing [Wesung]—and that means presenzing [Anwesung] *and* absenzing [Abwesung]—as an other-than-metaphysical (≠ non-metaphysical) thinking of the essenz(ing) [Wesen(heit)] of being as being(ness) [Seiend(heit)] that is, in essenz(ing) whence of itself as essencing [im Wesen von sich her als Wesung], likewise and otherwise enpropriated *through beyng* itself.



former German agnate of Latin *essentia* and Greek οὐσία, can be articulated as the very being-historic agnate thereof whose partial (metaphysical) translation as ‘Wesen(heit) [i.e. Wesenheit] = *essentia*, οὐσία’ can truly be said to block the (supposed “hermeneutic-phenomenological”) viewing of what is *wesentlich*, respectively *essentially* (≠ “fundamentally [fundamental, grundsätzlich ?]” per Emad and Kalary), denied to metaphysical thinking? The same can neither be said nor thought of the German language and thinking of *das Wesen* when the latter is merely transposed but not transported into English with “the sway” or indeed with any other English translating words that, in stark contrast to our Latinate-English noun phrase “the *essenz(ing)*”, do not closely approximate the interrelating paradigmatic inflections<sup>30</sup> of the full s(w)ay of the being-historic wording of the integral German word “(das) *Wesen*” in the settled arrangement and power to name of its prevailing(-cum-unprevailing) nomination of ‘(d.) *Wesen(heit)* = (*esse*)*ntia*, οὐσία (εἶναι)’.

In this light, it is remarkable that Emad and Kalary appear to have no qualms about their openly declared endeavour to remove the *Wesen* and *Wesung* of Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66)—and, much less overtly, some but by no means all of the cognates and compounds of the time word *wesen* in the German original—from the domain of (the paradigmatic *esse* in) *essentia* and its cognates. On the contrary, they seem to be emboldened to pursue to the end (or at least to its logical conclusion), as far as possible, their claim to have found in the English words “sway” and “swaying” an interpretation that, “by being removed from the domain of *essentia*” (and for other reasons purportedly associated therewith [p. xxxii]), are “a good approximation to *Wesen* and *Wesung*” when they insist: “Translating *Wesen* and *Wesung* with “sway” and “swaying” has several advantages:”, starting with, “(a) these words are not cognates of *essentia* and thus do not block the hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally denied to metaphysical thinking; ... ”.

And yet: Let us take a closer look, in short, and with recourse to the very domain of *essentia* and its cognates that Emad and Kalary’s rendition of *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, is seeking to avoid, at their attempt to remove “the sway” of the *Wesens*, respectively “the swaying” of the *Wesung*, from the domain of the Latinate-English cognates of the *esse* in (*esse*)*ntia* and so too, the εἶναι in οὐσία (εἶναι).

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30 For a sense of what is meant here and in what follows by the ‘(inter)relational’ character of “paradigmatic” inflections of the cognates and agnates of our English words “to be” and “to essence” and of our German words “sein” and “wesen” in the midst of a polyarchic interplay that is ownmost to our shared occidental language and thinking of being, see “Translating Heidegger translating *Wesen* (Part One)” (Version 1 • 28 November 2018, §3, pp. 14ff) at <http://www.archessenzing.com/essays/>

As a nouning of the time word “sway”, our English noun phrase “the sway” is neither an imperfectly good approximation to, nor is it (more or less) *wesentlich* [swayingly ? *fundamentally* ?] true to the full sway [Schweien ? Walten ?] and power to name of the German noun phrase *das Wesen* as a nouning of the time word *wesen* in the being-historic nomination of the occidental train of thought already outlined by this [essay](#) in the settled arrangement of ‘(d.) Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’; sway, v. ≠ *wesen*, v. as an interrelating paradigmatic inflection of the Indo-European time word for English “to be” (German “sein”, Latin “esse”, Greek “εἶναι”, ... ) in the intimation of “to essence / essenz” *per (es)se* but rather: = *schweien*, *schwaien*, v. in the nuance of *schwanken*, v. (“to vacillate / vary / alternate / be undecided”) with the added import, in English, of the German time word *walten*, “to prevail”, “to hold sway”, ... : “the full sway” in the prevailing-cum-unprevailing sense, perhaps, of “the full holding-sway of the hovering-wavering [Schweben-Wabern]” of the *essenz(ing)* [*Wesen*, *Wesen(heit)*], i.e. *essenzing* [*Wesung*], of be-ing, i.e. being, as being(ness) [*des Seiend*, d.h. *des Seins*, als *Seiend(heit)*].

With all of this not just mindfully but appreciatively in mind [nicht nur besinnlich, sondern sinnend im Sinn], each and every one of the other “several advantages” ascertained and elaborated upon by Emad and Kalary in their “Translators’ Foreword” [p. xxxii] to *Mindfulness* in the vacant positions of my citation of the interpretation they promote in “(b) ... ; (c) ... ; (d) ... ; (e) ... ; and (f) ... .” are, in my appraisal, *accordingly* question-worthy. But I shall leave consideration of that in abeyance for now to focus here on just some of the clear and obscure implications of the first two of the three criteria to which Emad and Kalary expressly (and silently) found themselves committed in their aspiring bid to find in “the sway and “the swaying”, hence without recourse to the cognates of (the *esse* in) Latin *essentia*, “a good approximation to” Heidegger’s preeminent verbal [*Wesen*] and deverbal [*Wesung*] nounings of the being-historic German time word *wesen*.

### First criterion

The finding that, in translating *Wesen* and *Wesung*, “(a) the word in question must not be a cognate of *essentia*,” is the first and most binding of the three self-imposed criteria from which Emad and Kalary take their bearings and to which they expressly commit themselves in rendering not just these two “being-historical words” with “(the) sway” and “(the) swaying” respectively but, as best they can under the circumstances, impliedly, *all cognates of wesen*, v. to boot. Their ‘unassuming’ translation of the German word *wesentlich* (and so too *wesenhaft*) with almost anything but, or at least much besides, “essential(ly)”,

even if this entails compromising with an English word that is a cognate neither of essence, v. nor of sway, v., is a case in point. As already indicated in connection with Emad and Kalary's rendition of *wesentlich* with "fundamental(ly)", throughout *Mindfulness* the indicantly most suitable Latinate-English word "essential(ly)" and cognates to translate German *wesentlich* and cognates would appear, on close examination, to be deliberately – albeit silently, so far as the unwitting English reader is concerned – shunned by Emad and Kalary for being cognate with Latin *essentia* in favour of a far less suitable clutter of English alternates that are purposely selected for not being cognate therewith, including "fundamental(ly)" or "foundational(ly)" or "strict(ly)" or "distinct(ly)" or "important(ly)" or "principal(ly)" and *their* respective cognates. The essentially being-historic semantic-etymological connection (through the paradigmatic cognates and closely associated agnates of essence, v. alone ?) to *wesen*, v. (and indeed sway, v.) is again compromised insofar as the first three English words listed also translate German *wesenhaft* rather than a distinctive rendering of the latter with some sense of essence, v. for the "wesen" in "wesenhaft" along the lines: '(in a manner) pertaining / beholden to the "wesen" = "essenc(ing)" or indeed "esse(ncing)" '.

We have seen that, in their "Translators' Foreword" to *Mindfulness*, Emad and Kalary are at pains to address the perceived advantages of their English rendition without recourse to the cognates of Latin *essentia* of the two German keywords *Wesen* and *Wesung* and to assure us that: "In translating these being-historical words we took our bearings from the differentiation in sections 98 and 99 of *Mindfulness* between the metaphysical and being-historical question of being and the concomitant differentiation between metaphysical and being-historical thinking." How so? By dint of the power of these "being-historical words" in the English of *Mindfulness* to name and to think through this differentiation in the original German of *Besinnung* (GA66) in and of themselves? Can the English words "sway" and "swaying" be considered to be "a good approximation to" "Wesen" and "Wesung" *in this respect*? Can any of the abovenamed English words "fundamental(ly)" or "foundational(ly)" or "strict(ly)" or ... be considered to be an equally good approximation to "wesentlich" and / or "wesenhaft" *in this respect*?

Or do the perceived advantages of these translating English words in *Mindfulness* rest solely upon taking to its logical conclusion, *yet without thinking through it*, a well-intentioned vailing of the bonnet to just one aspect of Heidegger's other-than-metaphysical being-historic interpretation of the enigma of 'Wesen = essentia, οὐσία' and 'Wesen ≠ essentia, οὐσία' within his own German language and thinking? How so? By taking part of the

‘Wesen  $\neq$  essentia, ...’ side of the full sway of this configuration all-too-literally and resorting to an English rendition of the German language of “das Wesen” (and alas, some but not all of the cognates and compounds of *wesen*, v.) that, while hastening to advance Heidegger’s retrieval of the retreating verbal character of this language in the German original (the incipient *wesen* in ‘*Wesen(heit)*’ ?), is deliberately selected by Emad and Kalary *for being not cognate with essentia; and therewith*, perhaps inadvertently (?), the incipient *esse* in (*esse*)ntia.

It is noteworthy that Emad and Kalary make no mention at all in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness* of just how inconsistent their English rendition of *Wesen* and *Wesung* with “sway” and “swaying” will turn out to be with their English rendition of so many other cognates of the time word *wesen* throughout Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66), including the distinguished German keywords *wesentlich* and *wesenhaft* and their equally-distinguished kindred words: *das Wesentliche*, *das Wesenhafte*, and so forth; to say nothing of the tendency of the translating English words of *Mindfulness* to blur over their distinguishment in the German original.

Nor do the translators make a concerted effort to ameliorate any inevitable misunderstanding associated with such *an undeclared incongruity of interpretation* all through *Mindfulness* by at least including the relevant German cognates of *wesen*, v. in translators’ square brackets in the main body of their English text. When it comes to our interpretation of what, for Heidegger, is being-historically [seinsgeschichtlich] as distinct from metaphysically [metaphysisch] worth(while)-thinking, is it not incumbent upon us as translators of the forgathering [versammelnden] λόγος of his thought, to forego—in the usual sense of the word—so-called “readability” or “legibility” [“Lesbarkeit”] of our translating texts in favour of not begrudging but allowing our readers, including those who may not be thoroughly versed in the German language but can very well take a hint, to glean, i.e. to read, [lesen] and to gather, i.e. to collect, [sammeln] for themselves *all at once* — in Heidegger’s sense of the time words “lesen” and “sammeln” and “versammeln(d)” — not just the metaphysical problematics but, *in conjunction therewith*, the being-historic interplay that, in *essenz(ing)* [im *Wesen*], respectively in *essenzing* [in der *Wesung*], is true to, and would otherwise be lost in, the very words of our English interpretation of the German original?

Since Emad and Kalary give no such intimation thereof in the main body of the text, and make no mention thereof in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness*, their English readers can have no way of knowing that by quietly rendering German *wesentlich* and *wesenhaft* and their cognates without recourse

to the cognates of either essence, v. or sway, v., let alone in such a disparate array of ostensible English ‘equivalents’, the being-historic connection of these and many other cognates of *wesen*, v. to the *Wesen* [“sway” ?] and *Wesung* [“swaying” ?] of Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66), will remain, on each occasion and all the way through *Mindfulness*—be it *wesentlich* or *wesenhaft* [“fundamentally” ?, “foundationally” ?, “strictly” ?, ... ]—*buried* in translation.

So the question remains: If whenever Emad and Kalary refer in their “Translators’ Foreword” to what, in the English of *Mindfulness*, is “*fundamentally denied*” to metaphysical thinking such that, on their interpretation, Heidegger “reaches the single most important locus of this fundamental denial with the word *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*”, are they obliquely intending to say, without saying as much in the very wording of their English words (or by way of special mention), what in the original German of Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) is *wesentlich*, respectively *wesenhaft*, denied thereto? And if not, why not?

Our Latinate-English loan translation “fundamentally” renders the Latinate-German Lehnübersetzung *fundamental* verbatim, principally in the closely associated sense of German ‘grundsätzlich, im Grunde’; but also, more widely and nebulously, in the less closely associated sense of German ‘wesentlich, im Wesentlichen’. And just as a German speaker or writer is wont to blur the distinction in their own language between ‘grundsätzlich, im Grunde’ and ‘wesentlich, im Wesentlichen’, we too are wont to blur the distinction in ours between “fundamentally” and “essentially”. By this wont, we vaguely know of and appreciate the distinction in our language but we ignore it. Moreover, without proper care and attention, we may be inclined to do so not just in our *conventional* [gewöhnlichen] but also our *essential* [wesentlichen] saying and thinking and translating. And by thus ignoring or not knowing and appreciating the distinction, or rather, not letting it be known and appreciated, we let it become an ignored or a not known or a not-let-be-known known, a so-called *unknown known*: a distinction we vaguely know of but ignore knowing of by blurring or conflating it. And in my appraisal, it is upon our blurring or conflating of this distinction in *both* languages that Emad and Kalary evidently rely in their translating-cum-transposing [Übersetzen] but not translating-cum-transporting [Übersetzen] of the German word *wesentlich*, respectively *wesenhaft*, into English.

Why else, but for its being not cognate with Latin *essentia*, the word “fundamental(ly)” (among others) would be favoured over the word “essential(ly)” as a good English approximation to Heidegger’s word *wesentlich* from Emad and Kalary’s perspective, is an unknown factor. If thanks to the



blurring of this distinction, there is a choice between one English word that is cognate with *essentia* and another that is not, Emad and Kalary can hardly acknowledge or spell out their appreciation for the greater advantages of “essential(ly)” over “fundamental(ly)”, as being, in spite of everything they hold dear, the better if not the best English approximation to the German word *wesentlich*.

In this regard, a preferential determination for their English translation of the latter in *Mindfulness* has effectively been ascertained (though not elaborated upon nor thought through) by Emad and Kalary from the outset. For, in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness*, and without further ado, the *essential* advantages possessed by our closest English approximation to German *wesentlich* over the word “fundamental(ly)” — or indeed “foundational(ly)” or “strict(ly)” or “distinct(ly)” or “important(ly)” or “principal(ly)” or, dare I say it, even ‘swaying(ly)’ — have, in principle, but not *im Wesentlichen*, already been confidently refused, by implication, to “essential(ly)”. So if, in principle [im Prinzip, prinzipiell, grundsätzlich], Emad and Kalary are neither willing nor able to contradict themselves by expressly allowing the latter cognate of *essentia* to serve well in *Mindfulness* as the closest approximation by far to Heidegger’s word *wesentlich* in *Besinnung* (GA66), what remains for them but to stay the course with a less-than-suitable choice of words while quietly ignoring, in practice, their own balking of the greater advantages of “essential(ly)” over “fundamental(ly)” — and much less worthy contenders — as a matter of unknown or unattested or yet-to-be-appraised-of significance? And *an appreciable one* at that, albeit only to an appraisively-appreciative appraising in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)* [wesenhaft] of “das *wesentliche* Wesen (des Seins)” [“the essential *essenz(ing)* (of being)”] as ‘Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’

Only through our appraisal of the practice in this light, can the need to resort to such an ill-serving array of translating English words in *Mindfulness* to render Heidegger’s being-historic word *wesentlich*, respectively *wesenhaft*, in the original German of *Besinnung* (GA66), be truly appreciated. And in this light, the practice can be regarded as consequent upon the very, somewhat shaky, principle to which Emad and Kalary have found themselves committed as the pervasive point of departure from which they take their bearings in arriving at “sway” and “swaying” as “a good approximation to” just the two cognates of *wesen*, v. that they address in their “Translators’ Foreword” *irrespective of all the others*: “that *Wesen* and *Wesung* cannot be brought into English with the cognates of *essentia* because the latter is a word that blocks the hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally denied to metaphysical thinking.”

And so it would seem that, in the service of their deliberate avoidance of the cognates of *essentia* in favour of those of “sway”, respectively “swaying”, to translate *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, as “the single most important locus” of Heidegger’s concern with articulating “what is *fundamentally denied* to metaphysical thinking”, Emad and Kalary are here, with their chosen word “*fundamentally*”, quietly avoiding having to have resort to the relevant cognates of *either* essence, v. *or* sway, v. to find a good approximation in English to the appreciable meaning and true sense of what in the original German of *Besinnung* (GA66) is *denied* to metaphysical thinking not just ‘grundsätzlich, im Grunde’, i.e. *fundamentally* [*fundamental*], but ‘wesentlich, im Wesentlichen’, i.e. *essentially*. I say “quietly”, because, while there is no mention of this when articulating the said principle in their “Translators’ Foreword”, in the main body of the text of *Mindfulness*, and without recourse to a cognate of either impliedly denied essence, v. *or* explicitly affirmed sway, v. to the purpose, Emad and Kalary rely a good deal upon our Latinate-English word “fundamental(ly)” to translate the German word *wesentlich* (respectively *wesenhaft*) in Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66). Even so, “fundamental(ly)”, as we have seen, is just one of a number of abstrusely incongruent translation equivalents in *Mindfulness* for *wesentlich* in *Besinnung* (GA66) along with “foundational(ly)”, “strict(ly)”, “distinct(ly)”, “important(ly)”, and “principal(ly)”. And to the extent that the *essentially* being-historic semantic-etymological connection of each of these translation equivalents for *wesentlich* to the ‘sway/ing’ translation equivalents for *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, is also quietly buried in translation, the translators are, in so many doubly incongruent words, *not expressly but implicitly* having (but failing) to ask of their English reader the impossible but necessary: somehow to read (or not to read, as the case may be) into their clutter of translation equivalents for *wesentlich* this not-so-apparently translated-translating German cognate of *wesen*, v. while simultaneously ignoring the *essentially*, that is to say, *wesentlich*, being-historic semantic-etymological connection of the latter to *none other than* our translating English word “essential(ly)”; which, unlike “fundamental(ly)” or any of the other contenders advanced by Emad and Kalary as, presumably, “a good approximation to” Heidegger’s word *wesentlich*, respectively *wesenhaft*, can be said to be not just word for word but true to the word that paradigmatically *is* [*ist*], i.e. *essences / essenzen* [d.h. *west*] (*and obsolesces-parentheses its essencing / essenzing* [*Wesung*]) as: ‘das *wesen*(tliche) im *Wesen*(tlichen)’. And, in a *quite distinctive* manner pertaining to the *wesen*, as: ‘das *wesen*(hafte) im *Wesen*(haften)’, the same can be said of our distinguishing English rendition of Heidegger’s word *wesenhaft* with, say, “(in a manner) beholden to the *essenz*(ing), respectively *essenzing*”.

By contrast, in their bid to avoid the cogates of Latin *essentia* to translate *Wesen* and *Wesung*, and thus, impliedly, our Latinate-English word “essentially” to translate ‘wesentlich, im Wesentlichen’, Emad and Kalary’s quite poorly substituting rendition of the latter—and, *without distinction*, of ‘wesenhaft, im Wesenhaften’—with “fundamentally” [lit. Latinate-German loan translation: *fundamental*] for, basically, ‘grundsätzlich, im Grunde’, is compelled to function implicitly, indeed incognito, and hence obscurely in *Mindfulness* as one of a clutter of alternately incognito English translation equivalents of the original German of *Besinnung* (GA66); obscurely because, without this being able to be heard in the English language of *Mindfulness*, either directly, and without subterfuge, in what is said, or else indirectly by way of special mention as the unsaid in what is said—most importantly, from Emad and Kalary’s perspective, in “being-historical” connection with their specially mentioned translation of *Wesen* with “sway” and *Wesung* with “swaying”, the translating Latinate-English word “fundamentally” for the translated-translating German word *wesentlich* (and, indiscriminately, *wesenhaft*) silently continues to reflect the already prevalent conflation in our own and everyday German language and thinking—but *not* in the original German of Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) *nor* elsewhere in his (essential) thought—of the appraisively-appreciative distinction in *essenzenz*(ing) [im *Wesen*], respectively in *essenzenz*ing [in der *Wesung*], between ‘essentially’ [‘wesentlich, im Wesentlichen’] and ‘fundamentally’ [‘grundsätzlich, im Grunde’].

## Second criterion

The first and most-binding of the three self-imposed criteria to which Emad and Kalary commit themselves in translating *Wesen* and *Wesung* has a direct bearing on the second criterion for the English word in question which is that, *without being a cognate of essentia*, “(b) it should have a verbal meaning” to comply with what is purportedly “Heidegger’s own repeated stricture that *Wesen* in his texts is used in the verbal sense of ...”.

However it should not be overlooked that to say, “*Wesen* in his texts is used in the verbal sense of ‘swaying’, ‘enduring’, ‘abiding’, ‘whiling’, and so forth,” is another way of saying, *albeit with the cognates of esse(ntia)*, that, within his own German language and thinking through of the *essenzenz*ing [Wesung] of being [des Seins] as *beyng* [des Seyns], Heidegger’s accentuated *transposing* of “(das) *Wesen*” into other German verbal nouns, here unspecified, of which the four specified verbal nouns are, in turn, an *English* translation, is *essentially* [*wesentlich*] *transporting* his emphasis on our hearing and letting-be-heard the finer nuances of this almost invariably *retreating* verbal (co-)signification of



“(das) *Wesen*” in the German sense corresponding to *wesen*, v. and our sense of “(the) *essencing*”, over to the almost invariably *advancing* verbal signification of these other words *as* ordinary verbal nouns; and in this way, back to what is thus held in reserve in the out-of-the-ordinary prominent *co*-signification of “(das) *Wesen*” in the German sense of ‘(d.) *Wesen(heit)* = *Wesenheit* = *essentia*’ and our sense of “(the) *essence*” as a merely substantive rather than a verbal noun and thus to an extra-ordinary German word(ing) of being (and time) that tendentially defies (the nuances of) its own ‘*essencing* / *essenizing*’ [‘*Wesung*’] as such. In other words, it could be said, the finer nuances of our Latinate-English verbal noun “(the) *essencing*”, corresponding to ‘*essence*, v. = *esse*, v.’, translates into English Heidegger’s re-interpretation and re-translation of the finer nuances of the German word ‘(das) *Wesen*’ as a *verbal* substantive, corresponding to the *co*-signifying ‘*wesen*, v. = *esse*, v.’ and our sense of “(the) *essencing*”, *through* his interpretive emphasis on the German counterparts, here unnamed, of our “[the] ‘*swaying*’, ‘*enduring*’, ‘*abiding*’, ‘*whiling*’, and so forth”.

As already suggested in Part One of this [essay](#), “(the) *essencing*” seems to stand out (like a sore thumb) in English as the most suitable contender to render “(das) *Wesen*” in Heidegger’s sense of hearing ‘*im Wesen*’ the little-heard-of ‘*wesen*, v. = *esse*, v.’ [essence / *essen*z, v.] through the usual din of ‘*Wesen(heit)*, n. = *essentia*, n.’ [essence / *essen*z, n.]. However this Latinate-English coinage “(the) *essencing*” to accentuate only that more or less ‘out-of-contention’ verbal *co*-signification of the Latinizing-German word “(das) *Wesen*” in the fuller re-appraised sense of ‘(d.) *Wesen(heit)* = (*esse*)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ is nonetheless plainly precluded by Emad and Kalary’s first criterion from ever being “a good approximation to”, let alone the most suitable translation into English of *this co*-signification of, “(das) *Wesen*” to render Heidegger’s nuanced re-translation thereof into his own language by way of the other, here unspecified, German verbal nouns. Why? Because, for some unknown and inestimable reason, this particular verbal noun “(the) *essencing*” is accused by implication, on *the* most question-worthy ground of its being cognate with *essentia*, of being a word that will, ‘*im Wesen*’, automatically (?) “block the hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally [wesentlich ? wesenhaft ? MAH] denied to metaphysical thinking”.

But why exactly is “(the) *essencing*” impliedly ruled out of the language from a being-historic perspective as a suitable time-word contender to translate into English “(das) *Wesen*” in the least obtrusive sense of Heidegger’s ostensibly self-imposed mission to use this German keyword strictly [wesentlich ? wesenhaft ? MAH] in its unprevailing sense as a *verbal* substantive and nothing but? Which in itself would be quite a feat on Heidegger’s part because,

confoundingly, this not-usually-so-apparent verbal sense of the word conceived in the main as a verbal *substantive* and nothing but, is usually stacked against him, and necessarily so; the verbal sense of the word is after all the less conspicuous time-word(ing) signification almost invariably left ‘out of contention’ yet still held in reserve so that it *can* be attended to *as* the more or less unsaid and unthought in all that the word “(das) *Wesen*” otherwise says and thinks. Anyway, the presumption of “Heidegger’s own repeated stricture that *Wesen* in his texts is used in the verbal sense of ...”, as if he could simply do away with his use of the word in its prevailing sense as a verbal *substantive*, does not stack up. It does not stack up because ‘im *Wesen*’ this *other* co-essential signification of *Wesen*(heit) [i.e. *Wesenheit*] = *essentia*, οὐσία in our sense of “(the) essence” is, bafflingly, still also (protrusively) true to the usage proper of the very word itself; and cannot just be erased and sent on its way by the ‘user’, no matter how hard they try, at will.

This is especially so in the context of an other-than-metaphysical appraisal of the *Wesen* als *Wesen*(heit) of metaphysics and its ‘problematic’ thinking of *Seiend*, d.h. *Sein*, as *Seiend*(heit) [be-ing, i.e. being, as being(ness)] and of the unenabling [des Unvermögens] of a transformative overcoming [Überwindung], or better: turnaround [Verwindung], thereof from within the horizon of metaphysical thinking itself. For, the kind of appraisal to which Heidegger devotes so much of his own inceptual thinking is one that, for its part, is enabled by an appreciative turn or twist [Verwindung] of thought unto *the being-historic interplay of the Wesen of metaphysics and its Seinsdenken*. It is a cast(ing-open) [Entwurf] of appreciative thought from the horizon of a “properly, i.e. en-propriatingly, historic” appraisal unto [Besinnung auf] the *essential* *essen*z(ing) of being [das *wesentliche Wesen des Seins*] through the primordial *essen*zing of beyng itself [durch die ursprüngliche *Wesung* des Seyns selbst].

**§7. ... *Wesen* = *essentia*, οὐσία  
[∴ ‘*Wesen(heit)* ≠ (*esse*)*ntia*, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ ?]**

As if to prove the point, in *Mindfulness* Emad and Kalary cannot entirely avoid having to resort to our partially-signifying Latinate-English noun phrase “the essence” to render the German noun phrase *das Wesen* in *Besinnung* (GA66), notably in circumstances where the indications for *Wesen* as ‘*Wesen(heit)* = (*esse*)*ntia*, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ leaning toward ‘*Wesen(heit)* [i.e. *Wesenheit*] = *essentia*, οὐσία’ seem so overwhelming, at least to the interpreters, that the ordinarily advancing verbal sense of “the sway” to translate, as per usual, the ordinarily retreating verbal sense of “*das Wesen*”, accentuated by what Emad and Kalary refer to as Heidegger’s “non-metaphysical thinking”, would hardly be fitting.

By dint of its ordinarily advancing verbal sense, the noun “sway” is essentially inept as a rendering of (Heidegger’s use of) the ordinarily advancing nominal sense of the noun “*Wesen*” as *Wesen(heit)*, even as ‘*Wesen(heit)* = (*esse*)*ntia*, οὐσία (εἶναι)’, a discrepancy that becomes evident to Emad and Kalary too, with a little attention to their plight, throughout *Mindfulness*. And this rather ironic ineptitude of the noun “sway” to translate the full s(w)ay (and holding s(w)ay) of the dually-signifying noun “*Wesen*” *wesentlich*, i.e. in its prevailing(-cum-unprevailing), hence (still) nominally-accentuated, arrangement of ‘*Wesen(heit)* = (*esse*)*ntia*, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ and our sense of (the) *essenz(ing)*, comes all the more to the fore when the *retreat* of the unprevailing verbal signification (*wesen*, v.) of the German noun seems to be all the more pronounced. In circumstances where, on their interpretation, Heidegger’s word “*Wesen*” leans toward ‘*Wesenheit* = *essentia*, οὐσία’ with no ifs and buts, it seems that to Emad and Kalary there would appear to be no other way around what now becomes the glaring ineptitude of their preferred translation of (the retreating verbal sense of) “*das Wesen*” with (the advancing verbal sense of) “the sway” than to abandon it altogether in favour of the standard translating noun phrase “the essence”. This discrepancy and the resulting translation difficulty for Emad and Kalary will likely arise whenever Heidegger is implicitly or expressly contrasting his other-than-metaphysical cast of thought of ‘*das Wesen*, d.h. *die Wesung*’ [‘the *essenz(ing)*, i.e. the *essenzing*,’ MAH] with the predominantly substantively-understood metaphysical cast of thought of “(das) *Wesen*” as ‘(d.) *Wesen(heit)* = *essentia*, οὐσία’ and little or no regard for the incipiently verbal sense of this arrangement as, *coessentially*, ‘(d.) *Wesen(heit)* = (*esse*)*ntia*, οὐσία (εἶναι)’. It almost goes without saying that during any such appraisal from a *beyng-historic* perspective of the ‘metaphysical problematics’ and the

‘being-historic interplay’ of the whole arrangement of ‘Wesen = essentia, οὐσία’ and ‘Wesen ≠ essentia, οὐσία but rather: = esse, εἶναι’, Heidegger’s own ‘hypostatic’ use of the word “Wesen” in the merely nominal sense of ‘Wesen(heit) [i.e. Wesenheit] = essentia, οὐσία’ will also, inevitably, be in play. Why? Because the naming of the said arrangement or adjustment or jointure of the essenz(ing) [Wesensfügung] of being as being(ness) in accordance with the full sway of its essenizing [Wesung] in the nominally-accentuated occidental train of thought ‘Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’, is not meant and does not understand itself, from a beyng-historic horizon, *only* metaphysically but *also* [zugleich] other-than-metaphysically (≠ “non-metaphysically” pace Emad and Kalary).

Take, for instance, when Heidegger indicates in *Besinnung* (GA66) [G143ff], with a pointer to *Being and Time*,<sup>31</sup> that the incipiently “hermeneutic-phenomenological” naming [Nennung] and casting-open [Entwerfen] of a coming “zur Wesung”, in our sense of a coming “to the essenizing”, “des Menschen *als Da-sein*”, “of (the) human being *as t/here-being*”, i.e. on the strength of their connection to the clearing (the ‘Da-’ or ‘t/here-’) of *being* (as *beyng*), does not understand itself as “»platonische« Wesens-schau”.

In this context, Emad and Kalary translate, according to expectations, the “Wesung” of “zur Wesung kommt” with the “swaying” of “evolves into swaying”; and yet, contra what we might be entitled to expect given their central thesis, “»platonische« Wesens-schau” with “the »Platonic« beholding of the essences”. In this English translation of *Wesen* and *Wesung* respectively, the inmostly cognate interconnection *and* the being-historic interplay between these distinctive (verbal and deverbial) nounings of *wesen*, v. in Heidegger’s German text is disrupted and compromised by an inconsistent rendering into English of the former *with* and of the latter *without* a Latinate-English cognate of the *esse* in *essentia*. Moreover the commensurate German counterpart of our Latinate-English *plural* noun phrase “the essences”, namely, “die Wesenheiten”, is here being ‘read into’ the “Wesens-” of the German phrase word “Wesens-schau” by Emad and Kalary such that, according to their English interpretation, the German word “Wesen” here signifies, for Heidegger too, nothing but ‘Wesen(heit)’ in the exclusively nominal sense of “(das) Wesen” as ‘(die) Wesenheit, essentia, οὐσία’, i.e. Latinate-English “(the) essence” and Latinate-German “(die) Essenz”. So if they are going to have recourse to this English rendering of Latin *essentia* verbatim then, strictly speaking, their

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31 “Vgl. “Sein und Zeit””; cf. Emad & Kalary, op.cit., pp. 122ff.

interpretation of the German phrase should read, “the »Platonic« beholding [or look or view or show MAH] of the essence”.

To my way of thinking, this *essentially* conclusive interpretation is still worthy of questioning because in Heidegger’s 1938 / 39 appraisal and re-appraisal under the title *Besinnung* (GA66) of his own pathways of thought hitherto, including self-appraisal [Selbstbesinnung] of his “*hermeneutic-phenomenological*” cast of thought in *Sein und Zeit* (1927) and later, the “Wesen[s-]” in his German phrase “»platonische« Wesens-schau” need not signify, for Heidegger especially, only ‘(die) Wesenheit = essentia = οὐσία’, i.e. “(the) essence” [“(die) Essenz”]. Here too, as elsewhere, the German word *Wesen* could just as well signify, from the perspective of Heidegger’s then beyng-historic cast(ing-open) of thought, the fuller ‘metaphysical’ s(w)ay of ‘Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia = οὐσία (εἶναι)’, i.e. “(the) essenz(ing)” (≠ “(the) essence(s)”), that, as such, remains the *essentially* said yet, for all that, *essentially* unsaid and unthought in all that “the »Platonic« show of the Wesen” likewise and otherwise (*essentially*) says and thinks.

It remains thus by virtue of the unsaid and unthought de-cision of this openly dark and obscure meta-physical language and thinking in favour of the essenz(ing) [Wesen(heit) ... Wesenheit] of being(ness) [der Seiend(heit) ... Seiendheit] as the essenz(ing) [Wesen ... Wesung] of be-ing, i.e. of being [des Seiend, d.h. des Seins]. And that would call for a much more nuanced translation *with the cognates of (esse)ntia* than Emad and Kalary’s conventional rendering with “the »Platonic« beholding of the essence[s]”. But in any case, when thought not (just) conventionally (*essentially* ?) but *essentially*, respectively *wesentlich*, “(the) essence” translates “(das) Wesen” only in the signification of ‘(die) Wesenheit, essentia, οὐσία’ *not coessentially* in that of ‘(d.) Wesen(heit), (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’. From this point of view, “the essence / essenz” is but one partial fold of the simple twofold that *is* (i.e. *essences / essences and reveals-conceals its essencing / essencing as*) *das Wesen* in the abovenamed sense of “the essence(-cum-essencing)”, respectively “the essenz(-cum-essenzen)”, or better: “the essenz(ing)”. As such, that is to say, as this *coessential* determination of ‘(d.) Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia ...’, “the essence / essenz” standing alone translates-cum-transposes only the prevailing nominal signification thereof without due regard for translating-cum-transporting us into the unprevailing verbal one that is also (occlusively, parenthetically) true to the full sway of the nominally-accentuated German noun phrase *das Wesen*. Still, as Emad and Kalary must surely surmise and seem forced to concede, it would be highly inappropriate (for being ‘being-historically’ unintelligible, indecipherable) in this context – where “Wesen” in its more or less advancing nominal and retreating verbal sense as



‘Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ might well lean all the more, though by no means straightforwardly, toward ‘Wesenheit = essentia, οὐσία’ with no ifs and buts – to render Heidegger’s “»platonische« Wesens-schau” with “the »Platonic« beholding [or look or view or show MAH] of the sway[s]”.

To reiterate: By translating *das Wesen* with “the essence[s]” and *die Wesung* not with “the essencing” (or, say, “the essencing”) but with “the swaying”, the semantic-etymological interconnection *and* the being-historic interplay in the German original between these distinctively verbal and deverbal ‘nounings’ of the incipient verb ‘to be’ [sein, v.] in the intimation of ‘to essence / essenz’ [wesen, v.] is essentially [wesentlich], or should that be unessentially [unwesentlich], disrupted and compromised; and the (un)essentially disrupted and compromised interconnection and interplay between these respectively verbal and deverbal ‘nounings’ of wesen, v. in *Besinnung* (GA66) will likely arise in *Mindfulness* whenever Heidegger is implicitly or expressly contrasting his own beyng-historic casting-open of thought ‘das Wesen, d.h. die Wesung, ≠ die Wesenheit / Essenz’ in our sense of ‘the essenz(ing), i.e. the essencing, ≠ the essenz’ with the tendentially omniprevalent metaphysical representation of the *verbal* substantive *Wesen* as a verbal *substantive*. On the latter interpretation, “(das) Wesen” has, protrusively, if not exclusively like its standard English counterpart “(the) essence / essenz”, the prevailing, predominantly *nominal* signification of essentia = οὐσία that “arises at the earliest in Greek thinking with the thought of Plato” [Heidegger, *Heraklit* (GA55), G122] and, unobtrusively, the unprevailing, incipiently *verbal* signification (corresponding to wesen, v.) of the esse = εἶναι and our sense of “the essencing / essencing” that remains more or less (in and) out of contention.

To translate in the English language of *Mindfulness* Heidegger’s contraindicative casting-open of thought ‘das Wesen, d.h. die Wesung’ with ‘the sway[s], i.e. the swaying’ or indeed, in the present context, ‘the essence[s], i.e. the swaying’ would make little sense to an English reader as a ‘twisting back’ of, by way of retort to, the generally-accepted torsion [Verwindung]—and that means, distortion and even contortion—of the metaphysical cast of thought of “(das) Wesen” as ‘(d.) Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ leaning one way toward ‘(d.) Wesen(heit) [i.e. Wesenheit] = essentia, οὐσία’. And in the present context, it would come nowhere near to being a close approximation to nor a suitable English translation of Heidegger’s casting off therefrom and thereof through an inspirational leap of thought in the German original whenceforward the thicket-maze of “»platonische« Wesens-schau”, in our sense of “»Platonic« show of the essenz(ing)”, opens out of itself (ἀρχή) into the clearing of an incipiently “*hermeneutic-phenomenological*” naming and casting-open of a coming “zur

Wesung”, in our sense of a coming “to the essencing”, “des Menschen *als Da-sein*”, “of (the) human being *as t/here-being*”.

Heidegger’s express appeal to the unidirectional wont of the German word “Wesen” in his phrase-wording “»platonische« Wesens-schau” *can* be gleaned exclusively (and is apparently so gleaned by Emad and Kalary) in keeping with his interpretation of the prevailing bent of »Platonic«, i.e. metaphysical, thinking such that ‘Wesen(heit) [i.e. Wesenheit] = essentia, οὐσία’. However, in light of what is coessentially true to the word “Wesen” as a *verbal* substantive, Heidegger’s appreciative turn or twist of thought ‘das Wesen, d.h. die Wesung’ *can also* be selectively gleaned out of ‘das Wesen, d.h. die Wesen(heit), essentia, οὐσία’ *as* the patent yet latent, incipient yet forgotten, co-signification of “das Wesen” as a ‘nouncing’ of *wesen*, v. translating *esse*, v. and εἶναι, v..

Earlier it was suggested that (the verbal nouncing of) *wesen*, v. can never be altogether expunged from the translated and translating German word *Wesen(heit)*, n. because it belongs together ‘in essencing’ [‘im Wesen’] therewith and hence with the entire history and the epochal destiny(ng) of the *wesentlich* clear(ing) arrangement in which the keyword ‘Wesen(heit)’ is, was, and will be invested with the merely nominal power to bring itself, at the same time, both in and out of consort with itself. Which is not to minimise the tendentially obsolescing-parenthesing wont of the *Wesen* as ‘Wesen(heit)’ to leave the play of its inextinguishable verbal co-signification more or less if not entirely out of the being-historic interplay. Nor is it to imply that this less protrusive but equally-*essential* use and wont of the German word in question cannot be suitably brought into English to arrive at the full s(w)ay of the »Platonic«, i.e. metaphysical, show of the “Wesen” in the openly dark and obscure prevailing(-cum-unprevailing) occidental train of thought ‘essenz(ing) = Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia = οὐσία (εἶναι)’.

That the translating German word *Wesen* as ‘Wesen(heit) ...’ tendentially holds sway in the first place and for the most part only in its nominally-partial signification of ‘Wesen(heit) [i.e. Wesenheit] = essentia, οὐσία’ in clear sight of and yet in oblivion to the full sway this train of occidental thinking in a manner beholden to its *essenz(ing)* [wesenhaft] as ‘Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’, can be interpreted as going to the core of Heidegger’s implicit appeal to and explicit retrieval of the always-already-obsolescing-parenthesing wont of the (inhibitive-exhibitive) showing-itself of the “Wesens-” in his phrase-wording “»platonische« Wesens-schau”. Hence, in keeping therewith, my select translation of the “Wesen[s-]” of Heidegger’s “»platonische« Wesens-schau” with “the *essenz(ing)*” of “the »Platonic« show of the *essenz(ing)*” and of the “Wesung” of his “zur Wesung kommt” with “the

essenzing” of “a coming to the essenzing”; as distinct from Emad and Kalary’s incongruous translation of the former with “the essence[s]” (as a notable exception on this occasion to ‘the sway[s]’ ?) of “the »Platonic« beholding of the essences” and of the latter with ‘the “swaying” ’ of “evolves into swaying”.

In this light, there is, in our appreciative after-saying and after-thinking after Heidegger’s inceptive turn [Kehre] of thought *from* the whole twist(ing about) of what is *essentially* [wesentlich] true to the word ‘Wesen as Wesen(heit) [i.e. Wesenheit]’ in the metaphysics of “the »Platonic« show of the essenz(ing)” *unto* the beyng-historic “essenzing” [“Wesung”] thereof, *all at once* a gleanable transition [Übergang] – a discernible coming and going and crossing over and passage or way through – *from* the essence / essenz *unto* the essencing / essenzing and *from* the essencing / essenzing *unto* the essence / essenz that is, in essenz(ing) [im Wesen, d.h. in der Wesen(heit)], equally-essentially [gleich-wesentlich] worth(while)-thinking-through in the clearing arrangement [lichtenden Fügung] (ἀρμονία) of what Heidegger in *Besinnung* (GA66) and elsewhere calls a “transformation of the essenz(ing)” [“Wesens[ver]wandlung”]<sup>32</sup>.

And, in the present context [GA66, G143], the “transformation of the essenz(ing)” refers to [GA66, G143] “a transformation of the essenz(ing) of the human being” [“eine Wesensverwandlung des Menschen”]; or, more precisely: [G146] “of (the) human being *as t/here-being* [des Menschen *als Da-sein*]”. In contradistinction to “the »Platonic« show of the essenz(ing)” and appertinent metaphysical showcasing of our »Platonic« t/here-being(ness) [i.e. t/here-beingness]<sup>33</sup> to this very day, there is, in an incipiently “*hermeneutic-phenomenological*” naming of a coming “to the essenzing” of (the) human being *as t/here-being*, the inceptual casting-open of a “transformation of the essenz(ing)” of our human being as such. That is to say, on the strength of our being and responding pertinently to being the (human) being who, *as t/here-being*, and by virtue of our very own (human) being-in-the-world [in-der-Welt-sein] in as-sociation with other human beings *as t/here-being-with*

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32 *not* (pace Emad and Kalary’s rendition of “Wesens[ver]wandlung” and “Wesenswandel”) a “fundamental transformation” or (for variations thereof, also “in relation to man”) an “ownmost transformation” or (pace their rendition of “Verwandlung des Wesens”) a “transformation of the sway” or (again for “*Wesen* in relation to man”) a “transformation of [man’s] ownmost” or (pace their rendition of “Verwandlung seines eigenen Wesens”) a “transformation of [man’s] ownmost” or (for “Wesensverwandlung (des Menschen)”) a “fundamental transformation (of man)”, and so forth. On Emad and Kalary’s English translation of “*Wesen* in relation to man” with resort to the cognates of “ownmost” instead of “sway” for *Wesen*, see §10 of this essay.

33 < Da-seiend, i.e. Da-sein, > Da-seiend(heit) [i.e. Da-seiendheit] > Da-(seiend)heit > Da-heit.



[*als Mitdasein*], has always already been thrown-, or projected-, or cast-open [ent-worfen “als geworfener Entwurf”; Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (GA2), G285] unto the clearing [Lichtung] of the ‘t/here-’ [‘Da-’] of “-being” [“-sein”] in the midst of the being (one and all) as such in respect of the whole.

A correspondingly transformative ‘casting-open’ of the ownmost essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) of our human (t/here-)being unto the revealing self-concealing essen<sup>z</sup>ing [Wesung] and truth [Wahrheit] (ἀλήθεια) of being as beyng will likely be rooted, be it ever so tentatively, in an essentially ‘homological’ concert of understanding thereof in Heidegger’s sense of the word: a deconcealing way to glean and to gather-in [lesen, sammeln] (λέγειν), while gleaning the like along with the λόγος [gleaning [Lesung] (ὁμολογεῖν), the forgathering [Versammlung] (Λόγος) of our most appertinent (human) being-t/here-unto.<sup>34</sup>

It is as if in attempting to navigate and to articulate the transition *from* all of the metaphysical baggage associated with the ambiguous German keyword(ing) of being *Wesen* as a verbal *substantive* through the renewed appraisal of what is coessentially true to the word as a *verbal* substantive *unto* the quintessentially being-historic casting-open of “das Wesen” [“the essen<sup>z</sup>(ing)”] from whence of itself [von sich her] (ἀρχή) as, im Wesen, “die Wesung” [“the essen<sup>z</sup>ing”], Heidegger wants to leave no stone unturned as to the *beyng*-historic import (How does beyng essen<sup>z</sup>? Which is the truth of beyng?) of the very time word in which ‘im Wesen, d.h. in der Wesung, der Wesen(heit)’ of human being [des Menschseins], these respectively verbal and deverbal nounings of *wesen*, v. essentially resonate and reside in the naming of a coming “to the essen<sup>z</sup>ing” [“zur Wesung”] of the essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) [des Wesens] of our most appertinent human being *as t/here-being* in the abovenamed sense; and to do so by no means irrespective of how, in clear sight of and yet in oblivion to the essen<sup>z</sup>ing and the truth, as in deconcealment, of beyng, the full sway of the *Wesen* as ‘Wesen(heit), (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ of (the) as-sociated human being is almost invariably showcased to all intents and purposes »Platonically«, i.e. metaphysically, in its nigh on exclusively substantive setting as the ‘Wesen(heit) [ ... Wesenheit, Essenz], essentia, οὐσία’ of our human being(ness) [Seiend(heit) ... Seiendheit].

Perhaps it is only by having recourse to a *commensurate English translation and interpretation* of Heidegger’s German ‘construct’, or better: coinage, *die Wesung* as an accentuated ‘deverbal nouning’ of the incipient verb *wesen* [“to essence / essen<sup>z</sup>”], that ‘the *verbal* nouning’ of the compounded incipient verb “to be” [*sein*] in the intimation of “to be-t/here” [*da-sein*] can be properly

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34 On the question concerning the primordial concert of understanding [dem ursprünglichen Einverständnis] (ὁμολογία), see Heidegger, *Heraklit* (GA55), G242ff.

(enpropriatingly) illumed in an other-than-»Platonic« deconcealment of the *essenz(ing)* [*Wesen*, *Wesen(heit)*] from whence of itself as the *essenzing* [*Wesung*] of our human being-t/hereunto *as t/here-being* [*als Da-sein*]. How so? By dint of an other-than-metaphysical thinking pursuant to and purveyant of, not in oblivion to, a saying of the incipient *essenzing* of this openly dark and obscure ‘*essenz(ing)* ≠ *essence* / *essenz* [*Wesen(heit)* ≠ *Wesenheit*, *Essenz*]’ of (our) human being as such. For, in Heidegger’s appreciative thinking of ‘a coming “zur *Wesung*” des Menschen *als Da-sein*’ in our (amplified) sense of ‘a coming “to the *essenzing*” ’ (the being-t/here corresponding to the ‘to be-t/here’) of (the) human being (on the strength of their connection to the clearing of being) *as t/here-being*, there is, after all, a hint of an altogether different saying of *who* in the (worlding of their as-sociated) world the human being *is* from the horizon of *how* in the (worlding of their as-sociated) world they *essenz*. And how do we translate-cum-transport into our own language and thinking the appertinently transformative *essenz(ing)* of this human (t/here-)being translated-cum-transported by Heidegger into his, if not by diligently attending to his inceptive interpretation of the paradigmatic being-historic interplay of the German time words *wesen* and (*da*)*sein* and of their incipient belonging-together ‘im *Wesen*’, d.h. ‘in der *Wesung*’, des *Da-seins* as, in *essenz(ing)*, i.e. in *essenzing*, a timely coming-and-going-together of being [*Sein*] and human being [*Menschsein*].

I say “Heidegger’s German ‘construct’ ... *die Wesung*” because when presently looking up online Deutsches Wörterbuch (DWB) for the word coined by Heidegger himself to highlight the archessentially verbal character of (the) *Wesen* from whence of itself, to wit, (the) *Wesung*, what comes up is “Keine passenden Stichwörter gefunden!” [“No suitable or fitting headword(s) found!”]. This is analagous to searching online Oxford English Dictionary (OED) to no avail at the present time for our Latinate-English coinage (the) “*essencing*” or, to spell the same word in another way (some might say untowardly, though I beg to differ) (the) “*essenzing*”. For the latter, there are “No dictionary entries found”. And for the former, there is, at the time of writing, no dedicated entry; we are instead taken directly to the yet-to-be-fully-updated OED entry for (a much-depleted) *essence*, v. where there is, however, no mention of the relevant coinage itself, the proviso being that “This entry has not yet been fully updated (first published 1891).”

By contrast, not so very long ago when consulting “Google Translate” for an online English translation of the (Heidegger’s) German word *Wesung*, what turned up, perhaps not surprisingly, were the following suggestions: “*essencing*, *swaying*, the *swaying*, *essential swaying*, the *essential swaying*”. The prevalence

of the word “swaying” in all but one of these suggestions does rather go to show the likelihood that, with the exception of the stand-alone word “essencing” and the adjectival use of “essential” in “[the] essential swaying”, learned students of Heidegger in translation or other interested parties who were then availing themselves of the facility in Google Translate for anyone to “Suggest an edit” were implicitly drawing, be it wittingly or unwittingly, from the publication of *Mindfulness* to promote Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary’s 2006 teaching on what counts in current parlance as the authoritative English rendition of *Wesung* in Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) and elsewhere, notably *without our having to have resort to the cognates of essentia* to this end. Whereas, in their suggestions “essential swaying” and “the essential swaying” these Google Translate editors were apparently relying upon the authority not of *Mindfulness* but an earlier, yet-to-be-superseded rendering by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly of *Wesung* with “essential swaying”, respectively *Wesen* with “essential sway”, and of *wesentlich* with “essential(ly)”. This earlier, less aspirational rendering of the German words *with resort to the cognates of essentia* is for this very reason somewhat reluctantly proposed by Emad and Maly in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*<sup>35</sup>, their English translation of *Beiträge* (GA65) by Martin Heidegger<sup>36</sup>. I say “somewhat reluctantly” because, in bringing these German words into a suitable English translation in *Contributions* (1999), Emad and Maly would clearly prefer to go down the path subsequently taken by Emad and Kalary in *Mindfulness* (2006) of aspiring to rule out entirely their having to have resort to the cognates of *essentia* to the purpose. Instructive in this regard is Emad and Maly’s “Translators’ Foreword” [p. xxv] to *Contributions* where their rendering of (and apparent loath to so render) *Wesen* in Heidegger’s *Beiträge* (GA65) with “essential sway” is described (and seemingly exonerated) as —

less than ideal (since there is an etymological hint at a connection with the word *essence*, a connection that is completely inappropriate [sic] in *Contributions*, though perhaps acceptable, given the connotations of the word *essential*: carry-ing the whole sway within itself, inherent sway, inmost sway, belonging-inherently to sway, or: in-depth-sway. This fact allowed us to translate the adjective *wesentlich* as “essential.”

“Essential sway” has nothing to do with “essence” [sic] and everything to do with what inheres within the sway of being in its originary, profound, comprehensive vibrancy and resonance. Using the word *essential* while calling on the reader to

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35 Indiana University Press, 1999.

36 “*Beiträge* (GA65)” is an abbreviation for the being-historic ‘treatise’ published 1989 in German as *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* [(in my translation:) “Contributions to Philosophy (From enpropriation)”] edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, being volume 65 of the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*.

ignore [sic] the word's etymological root-word, *essence*, is a risk that we had to decide to take.

No doubt the DWB will eventually catch up with the 'other-than-metaphysical' import of Heidegger's evolving appreciation – in *Beiträge* (GA65), *Besinnung* (GA66), *and elsewhere* – for what is *wesentlich* true to these being-historic words in his own German language and thinking; and the OED will in due course likely reflect, at any given time, a parallel universe including any risks that we so-called "Heidegger translators" are bound to take in arriving at a suitable English approximation to such keywords of being and time, drawn in part, on good authority, from the English-speaking world of evolving 'Heidegger interpretation' on how best to translate them into our own language and thinking. The extent to which, to be *essentially* true to the very words, we are behoven to have recourse to *the appropriate* Latinate-English cognates of the 'esse' in '(esse)ntia', respectively 'esse(ntia)', to translate the *(en)propriating* 'wesen', as it were, in 'Wesen(heit)', 'Wesung', 'wesentlich', 'wesenhaft', and so forth, is yet to be embraced.

Could it not be demonstrated, as has been provisionally attempted here, that precisely because it is so inmosty cognate with the *esse* in *esse(ntia)* and commensurately agnate with the *wesen* in *Wesen(heit)* = *(esse)ntia*, "the essencing / essenizing", as the verbal substantive translating *das Wesen* not in the merely nominal sense of 'Wesen(heit) = essentia, οὐσία' but above all in the merely (yes, merely) verbal sense corresponding to 'wesen = esse, εἶναι', is for this very reason not just "a good approximation to" but the most suitable of all of the other specified contenders including 'the sway/ing' – being the verbal noun phrase corresponding literally to German *das Schweien* / *Schwaien* – for this side of the 'equation', or better: this partial fold of the simple twofold that *essentially is*, i.e. *essences / essenzen (and obsolesces-parentheses its essencing / essenizing) as*, "das Wesen"?

How else but *with* the cognates of Latin 'esse(ntia)' through which the (paradigmatically agnate) translating German word *Wesen* incipiently brings itself into and lays itself out in the German language of 'to be' ['zu sein'] in the intimation of 'to essence / essenzen' ['zu wesen'] could Heidegger articulate his reinterpreting and retranslating of the '*wesentlich*' verbal co-signification of "das *Wesen*" into the elucidatory German counterparts – which is to say, the manifestly nuanced *verbal-noun* counterparts – of our "[the] 'swaying', 'enduring', 'abiding', 'whiling', and so forth", as one fold of the *whole* of its *essentially* twofold saying (and yes, s(w)aying) in order to think through, inceptively and in one sweep of this German keyword(ing) of being, the enigmatic going-together of 'Wesen = essentia, οὐσία' *and* 'Wesen ≠ essentia,

οὐσία but rather: = esse, εἶναι'? So *without* the cognates of '(esse)ntia', and our interpreting thereof *essentially*, respectively *wesentlich*, what would come of our translating into our own language Heidegger's being-historic, respectively beyng-historic, interpretation of the way in which, through deconcealment [Entbergung], the ownmost essenizing of beyng itself [die eigenste Wesung des Seyns selbst] takes the "properly (i.e. enpropriatingly) historic" truth, i.e. clearing [Wahrheit, d.h. Lichtung], of be-ing, i.e. of being, itself [des Seiend, d.h. des Seins, selbst] back to its ownmost essen(zing) [in sein eigenstes Wesen] whence of itself (ἀρχή) *as such*?



## §8. ... das eigenste Wesen des Seiend, d.h. des Seins, des Seienden ‘im Ganzen’

To differentiate and avoid confusion here: “ownmost essenzenz”—*not* “ownmost swaying”—is my translation of *eigenste Wesung*; and “beyng”, as distinct from Emad and Kalary’s “be-ing”, is my translation of Heidegger’s *das Seyn*; whereas their translation of the latter with “be-ing” is my translation of his *das Seiend*.<sup>37</sup> In one place in *Mindfulness*,<sup>38</sup> “das »Seiend« (ἐόν)” in *Besinnung* (GA66) is translated as: ““that which is” [*das Seiend*] (ἐόν)”. To my mind, it makes infinitely more sense to translate Heidegger’s “das Seyn” with “(the) beyng”, “das Seiend” with “(the) be-ing”, and “das Seiende” with “the being”; and *not*, in the case of “das Seiende”, with Emad and Kalary’s (= the standard ‘zero-article’ noun) “beings”. The latter (Ø beings) is generally accepted (authorised) in licensed English interpretation of the texts of Martin Heidegger as being the most suitable translation equivalent of and best approximation to his *essentially nominal* participle *das Seiende*. However the ubiquity of the taken-for-granted term “beings” therefor does not prove its worth. Admittedly, Emad and Kalary do take a stab at giving reasons for their own adoption of this standard translation-equivalent for *das Seiende*, one of which is quite confounding [p. xxxiii]:

If philosophical precision were to be the only criterion, then “*das Seiende*” has to be uniformly translated as “a being”, and consequently the phrase “*eines einzigen im Seienden*” as “that which is sole and unique in *a being*”.

This is confounding because, to be precise, the article “*das*” in the neuter singular nominal participle “*das Seiende*” is a definite, not an indefinite article. So why render on this occasion the indefinite article “*a*” in “*a being*” rather than the definite article “*the*” in “*the being*”? In my view, by relying upon an imprecise interpretation of the definite article “*das*” in “*das Seiende*” to reject only *a* being not *the* being as a suitable English translation, in the singular, of *das Seiende* in favour of their selection of the ‘zero-article’ (Ø) word, in the plural, “beings”, Emad and Kalary’s further reasoning in their “Translators’ Foreword” around the whys and wherefores of this rejection and the justification for their selection does not ‘cut the mustard’. This is especially so given that “the being” can be interpreted (per Heidegger himself analogously in respect of “*das Seiende*”<sup>39</sup>) as

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<sup>37</sup> cf. Emad & Kalary, op.cit., p. xxix.

<sup>38</sup> *ibid.*, p. 311; *Besinnung* (GA66), G349.

<sup>39</sup> cf. *Anaximander* (GA78) G79ff and *Aristotle* (GA33) G20ff; “*Aristotle* (GA33)” is an abbreviation for the lecture course delivered by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg during the summer semester of 1931 that was first published posthumously under the title *Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 1–3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft* [*Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ 1–3: Of the*



embracing *both* “a being” *and* “beings”; and neither the one nor the other of the latter two alone can stand in for the former as this going-together (and hence differentiation) in “the being” itself of ‘a being and beings’; to say nothing of the going-together (and hence differentiation) in “the being” itself as *one* such as it *is* in respect of the whole, of the being and (the) be-ing, that is to say, of the being [des Seienden] in its be-ing [seiend] and the be-ing, i.e. the being, of the being [des Seiend, d.h. des Seins, des Seienden].

In any case, with my translation it is possible to say and to think Heidegger’s phrase “eines [E]inzigen im Seienden” in the form: “one singular / one sole and unique, in respect of the being” as distinct from Emad and Kalary’s “that which is sole and unique in beings”. To put this German phrase to which Emad and Kalary refer in their Translators’ Forward as placing special demands on translation in the context from which it is drawn [p.xxxiif]: “In the very first sentence of the prose section of the “Introduction” to *Mindfulness*”, the beginning of the relevant sentence in Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66), [G12] reads,

Aus der Lichtung des Seyns steigt die Anfänglichkeit eines Einzigen [not “einzigen” per Emad and Kalery p. xxxiii] im Seienden, ...

And is translated thus [*Mindfulness*, p. 8]:

The inceptuality of that which is sole and unique in beings rises out of the clearing of be-ing, ...

On my interpretation, the phrase in its context lends itself to an alternate rendering thus:

Out of the clearing of beyng rises the inceptuality of one singular, one sole and unique, in respect of the being, ...”.

With my translation it is also possible to say and to think the intimately associated phrase-wording ‘das »Seiend« des Seienden im Ganzen’ in the form: ‘the »be-ing« of the being in respect of the whole’ instead of words consistent with Emad and Kalary’s interpretation in the form: ‘[the ?] »that which is« of ‘beings in a whole’ ’ which, to me, is way off the mark. However the second of the two formulations would be consistent with the full array of Emad and Kalary’s very different interpretation of the German keywords pertaining to my wording of the word “the »be-ing« of the being in respect of the whole”, to wit, “das Seiend”, “das Seiende”, and so too, “das Seiende im Ganzen”. We are told

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*essenz(ing) and actuality of force*], being Volume 33 of the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*, Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, edited by Heinrich Hüni, 1981, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1990.



that the latter phrase, translated by Emad and Kalary with the said “ ‘beings in a whole’ ”, is “[t]he other phrase that plays a significant role throughout *Mindfulness* and must be brought into English with a great deal of care”. The (s)care quotes around the phrase “ ‘beings in a whole’ ” in *Mindfulness* are theirs [p. xxxiiif]:

Considering Heidegger’s hermeneutic-phenomenological finding that beings are always already situated within a whole (see his “being-in the world” as a case in point), the phrase “*das Seiende im Ganzen*” should be brought into English with “beings in a whole” and *not* with “beings as a whole”. Accordingly, we translated this phrase with “beings in a whole” and in order to point to the technical nature of this phrase we placed it between inverted commas.

Without inverted commas, my translation of Heidegger’s wording of the word, *das Seiende im Ganzen* is, as above, “the being in respect of the whole”. The word “whole” in this phrase is not (just ?) a (*nebulous*) whole “in” which, in the sense of “within” which, “beings” *are*, but *the (very) whole in respect of* which “the being” (one and all) *is*, always already “situate[d]” *as such*, i.e. as the being that it *is*, which is to say, as *be-ing* [*seiend*]. To say “the being in respect of the whole” is to say, in other words, “the being as (the) be-ing, i.e. being” [*das Seiende als (das) Seiend, d.h. Sein*], which is another way of articulating, all at once, the twofold (advancing-)nominal-cum-(retreating-)verbal signification of the *essentially nominal* participial word of “the being” *and* “(the) being” in respect of the whole; or, in other words, the going-together, the altogether, of the discernible difference in meaning between “the being in its being” *and* “the being of the being” as *one (and all)* such as it *is* in respect of the whole, the ‘all-in-one’ (and the ‘one (is) all’), of its saying –

Out of the clearing of beyng rises the inceptuality of one singular, one sole and unique, in respect of the being, ...”.

My English translation of the German phrase *das Seiende im Ganzen* with “the being in respect of the whole” clearly draws from a vastly differing interpretation of the translating that is always already apparent (and not so apparent) in the (and Heidegger’s) original German language<sup>40</sup> to that from which Emad and Kalary explicitly and silently draw for their English wording-in-translation “ ‘beings in a whole’ ” and all of the other so canvassed and wrested (from their true sense ?) word(ing)s. It is hard to fathom ‘im Wesen’, especially ‘im eigensten Wesen des Seins’ [‘in the ownmost essen(z)ing of being’], d.h. in der eigensten Wesung des Seyns [i.e. in the ownmost essen(z)ing of beyng], the interpretive source from

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40 being the ambiguous participial language of “*das Seiende*”, i.e. ‘*das (Seiend)e*’, i.e. ‘*das Seiend(e)*’; and so too: ‘*das Seiend*’, i.e. ‘*das Seiend-sein*’ [‘the (to) be be-ing’], i.e. ‘*das Sein*’, *des Seienden*, “*im Ganzen*”.

which may spring such divergent and incongruous renderings of what *wesentlich* holds sway [waltet<sup>41</sup>] and yet still remains unsaid and unthought in so precious few of the very same words. The question does not abate as to which interpretation comes closer in not-so-poor (initiating or else consummating) translation to saying and to thinking in manifold ways such that in the wording of these *very* words is *verily*, in the sense of *essentially*, respectively, *wesentlich*, true to the word.

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41 “waltet”, that is to say, *west* in the intimation of *waltet*.

**§9. ... das ‘im Wesen’, d.h. ‘in der Wesung’, der Wesen(heit)  
wesentlich Zu-sagende und Zu-denkende**

In light of all of the above and what follows, would it not be more appropriate, in connection with criteria (a) ... and (b) ... <sup>42</sup>, for us to take our bearings from and commit ourselves to the very antithesis of what Emad and Kalary are proposing when it comes to suitably translating *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, in the first and last instance: “The word in question can, should, and must be a cognate of (the *esse* in) *essentia*.”? Or in the words of one of Shakespeare’s protagonists in *Merry Wives of Windsor* (1623) v. v. 229: “What cannot be eschew’d, must be embrac’d.” Because, to give less due to the expounding of the interpreter’s “can, should, and must” and more to what lays itself out for the interpretation ‘im Wesen’ and ‘in der Wesung’ der Wesen(heit), should we pay heed thereto, the cognates of (esse)ntia—including Greek οὐσία (εἶναι)—are tantamount to the inmost possibilities and imperatives of suitable translation inherent to the wording of the keywords in question themselves and their peculiar way of being able or unable to transpose and transport their own as well as their ownmost essen(z)ing [Wesen], respectively essen(z)ing [Wesung], into our English language.

From the outset and all the way through *Mindfulness*, Shakespeare’s word will come to haunt Emad and Kalary’s endeavour to shy away from instead of welcoming and availing themselves of the appropriate cognates of (esse)ntia, respectively esse(ntia), to address what I have referred to as the “seemingly insurmountable translation difficulty” that Heidegger has bestowed upon his interpreters. That to this purpose the cognates of the time word ‘sway’ [lit. Ger. *schweien*, *schwaien*] and its ‘noured verbing’ have nowhere near the singular expanse of signification and power to name let alone the full s(w)ay of the cognates of the (undepleted) time word ‘essence / essen(z)’ and its ‘noured verbing’ is clear from the start. Both time words can be interpreted in Heidegger’s sense as word(ing)s of being, of “the word of all words per se”, and of “the going-together of ‘being and time’” that calls for commemorative thinking if it is not to be forgotten as that which for the thinking of the thinkers remains worth(while)-thinking. However the uniquely expansive power to name and the unparalleled interplay of the properly (enpropriatingly) historic time word of being [*sein*, v.] essence, v. and its cognates and compounds in their distinctive modes of arrangement are *essentially* [ $\neq$  *fundamentally*] *denied as one and the same* to sway, v. and its cognates and compounds, resulting in the

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<sup>42</sup> “(a) the word in question must not be a cognate of *essentia*; (b) it should have a verbal meaning” [ibid., p. xxxi].

relatively truncated and strictly limited scope of the latter to say and to think, in translation, what for the appreciative thinkers of *wesen*, v. and its cognates and compounds in their paradigmatic being-historic interplay is *wesentlich* [ $\neq$  *fundamental*] worth(while)-saying and thinking; or so it would seem.

As already intimated, the archessentially *being-historic* ‘semantic-etymological’ connection of *essence*, v. to *wesen*, v. (as paradigmatically-related agnates) is *wesentlich* denied to the abovenamed words-in-translation of *wesen*, v. and cognates that are not cognate with *essence*, v. and cognates. This *essent-ial* connection is potentially disrupted and compromised by Emad and Kalary whenever they choose to avoid the cognates of *essence*, v. to translate those of *wesen*, v., the translation of *das Wesen* with “the sway” and of *die Wesung* with “the swaying” being no exception.

At least the decision of the translators to steer clear of the cognates of *essentia* in favour of those of ‘sway/ing’ to translate *Wesen* and *Wesung* in *Besinnung* (GA66) has been preempted in *Mindfulness* due to the express notification thereof to the English reader in their “Translators’ Forward”. But this archessential connection of *essence*, v. to *wesen*, v. is in a way doubly compromised in the sense of being doubly buried in Emad and Kalary’s English translation of Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) wherever the cognates of *wesen*, v. are rendered with *neither* those of *essence*, v. *nor* those of *sway*, v., especially when no such express notification thereof has been given. This is the situation, for instance, whenever Emad and Kalary *implicitly* shun the word “essential(ly)” and cognates, as they almost invariably do in *Mindfulness*, to translate *wesentlich* (or alternatively *wesenhaft*) and cognates (e.g. *das Wesentliche*, *die Wesentlichkeit*, or *das Wesenhafte*) in *Besinnung* (GA66) with words such as “fundamental(ly)” or “foundational(ly)” or “strict(ly)” or (in the case of *wesentlich* also) “distinct(ly)” or “important(ly)” or “principal(ly)” and *their* respective cognates (e.g. if not “swayingness”, then “fundamentality” or “foundationality” for *Wesentlichkeit* [essentiality]). Which is to say: without the translators having recourse to a cognate of “sway” to this purpose and without their forewarning the English reader that, having been *essentially*, respectively *wesentlich*, cut off from its life-blood, yet unrooted out, by these disparate English words-in-translation, the poor, buried-alive word *wesen*, coherently inrooted in *wesentlich*, *wesenhaft*, and so forth, is nonetheless still (un)intended (and left unattended) in the ‘wizen’ body of the discourse. If the conventional and essential language and thinking of the German words can be said to shroud themselves in the mystery of their own ‘*Wesen*’ to the extent of ‘*Ver-wesung*’, of ‘wizen-essenzing’ as it were, then all the more so by the diffuse scattering of the true intent of these very words in English translation.

### §10. ... das eigenste Wesen (des Seins *und*) des Menschseins

This doubling of the compromise is further occasioned by Emad and Kalary's translation of the phrase *das Wesen des Menschen*, in fact whenever it is a matter of their having 'on principle' to avoid cognates of '(esse)ntia' while at the same time relinquishing those of 'sway' to translate *Wesen* in relation to (the) human being, as evidenced by their proviso to the relevant discussion of the German word in their "Translators' Foreword" [p. xxxii]:

However, in translating *Wesen* in relation to man, we took our bearings from Heidegger's own remarks about this word to the effect that *Wesen* also means what is ownmost to something.<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, we translated the phrase "*das Wesen des Menschen*" with "what is ownmost to man", or sometimes with "man's ownmost".

This is not the place to delve the pointer in endnote "15" to Heidegger's early (1929) conception in "Vom Wesen des Grundes" of the "*Wesen [essenz(ing)]*" of (the) human being as t/here-being, of their being-in-the-world, as "their ownmost inner possibility as t/here-being [... sein Wesen (seine eigenste innere Möglichkeit als Dasein)]".<sup>43</sup>

I simply draw attention below to something that goes against the grain of what Emad and Kalary have been saying in their "Translators' Foreword" thus far concerning their translation of Heidegger's interpretation of *Wesen* and, for all that, by contrast, are now saying concerning their translation of his (1938 / 39) interpretation of "*Wesen* in relation to man" and of "the phrase "*das Wesen des Menschen*" with "what is ownmost to man", or sometimes with "man's ownmost"."

Supposing it be true to say that Heidegger's own remarks about the German word are to the effect that "*Wesen* also means what is ownmost to something", and this is a question-worthy invocation unless each word here including the word "also" is *essentially* [wesentlich] given its proper due, is it therefore perfectly in order to translate his phrase "*das Wesen des Menschen*" with "what is ownmost to man", or sometimes with "man's ownmost"? Apart from any other considerations, this assumes that, *for Heidegger*, 'das Wesen [of (the) human being]' is equivalent to 'what is ownmost [to (the) human being]' or to 'the ownmost [of (the) human being]'. In which case, Heidegger can hardly be said to be adhering to his "repeated stricture" of using *Wesen*, including the *Wesen* of (the) human being [?], in the verbal sense [corresponding to *wesen*, v. ?] of

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43 *ibid.*, p. xlii. "15 See M. Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann Verlag, 1976), p. 141." The reference is to a passage of Heidegger's 1929 essay "Vom Wesen des Grundes" ["Of the *essenz(ing)* of ground" at G141 (37) of the 1976 collection *Wegmarken* [*Pathmarks*], being Volume 9 of the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter abbreviated as "*Wegmarken* (GA9)"), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.

“[the] ‘sway/ing’, ‘enduring’, ‘abiding’, ‘whiling’, and so forth” [but not ‘the essencing’ ? nor even ‘[the] ?\*ownmosting’ ?] that is otherwise accentuated in his texts and especially in his later thinking; on the contrary.<sup>44</sup>

It is true that this incipient verbal (co-)signification of *the word itself* still has to be *attended to* by Heidegger in the contextual – essentially [wesentlich] inconspicuous – arrangement [Fügung] (ἀρμονία) of his translating word *Wesen* on each occasion *if* this word is *not* to be taken for granted, even unwittingly by the thinker himself, not to mention his interpreters, as laying itself out for the interpretation in its predominantly and almost exclusively substantive signification of ‘Wesen(heit) = Wesenheit, essentia, οὐσία’. In the latter case, *das Wesen* will haply be rendered into English by translators other than Emad and Kalary with “the essence” rather than, say, “the essencing” of (the) human being such that Emad and Kalary’s rendering of the German phrase *das Wesen des Menschen* with “man’s ownmost” or “the ownmost of man” might equate, so far as they are concerned, to their rendering with “man’s essence” or “the essence of man”.

Why? Because insofar as they too were to interpret Heidegger to mean *das Wesen* in only the advancing nominally-partial sense of “the essence” or, per Emad and Kalary, “the ownmost” of something (or someone) or “what is ownmost” to it (them), without his also giving due regard to the retreating verbal (co-)signification of the German word itself [the ‘wesen’ in ‘Wesen(heit)’] to render, so to speak, the unprevailing ‘essencing’ or, per Emad and Kalary perhaps, ‘?\*ownmosting’ [?] of [to ?] that *something’s* or, in this case, *someone’s* ‘ownmost(ness?)’, which would be highly counterintuitive unless he was out to make some point, this could also be interpreted, per the English translation of the German original, as Heidegger overwhelming the mindful disposition and better appreciation of his verily own thought — being ever-attentive to the ‘wesen’ in ‘Wesen(heit)’, the ‘esse’ in ‘(esse)ntia’, the ‘εἶναι’, as it were, in ‘οὐσία (εἶναι)’, to closely align his perhaps ‘not-yet-fully-refined’ conception of “das (eigenste) Wesen” of (the) human being to the exclusively nominal signification of this “(eigenste) Wesen” as ‘(eigenste) Wesen(heit) [i.e. Wesenheit / Essenz] = essentia, οὐσία’ of (the) human being with no ifs and buts.

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44 “?\*” is my loose shorthand here and hereafter for “tending to unacceptability, but not fully unacceptable”, a combination of the symbols “\*” for “unacceptable” and “?” for “native speakers unsure about acceptability”; drawn (the authors would likely say without due reverence on my part) from “Abbreviations and symbols” [p. x] in the seminal 1779-page study of the English language by Randolph Quirk, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartvik under the title, *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*, Longman Group Limited, 1985.



So not one of Heidegger's most inceptive conceptions when it comes to his appraisal unto 'the (ownmost) essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) of (the) human being' ['das (eigenste) Wesen des Menschen']? Or perchance a misreading, a mistaken construction, thereof on the part of his interpreters? Which has intriguing implications for how, in *Mindfulness*, the constructive reading of Heidegger's (1938 / 39) interpretation of the phrase *das Wesen des Menschen* in the nominally-partial sense of "what is ownmost to man" or "man's ownmost" or "the ownmost of man" can be carried off as *wesentlich* true to the full s(w)ay of the noun phrase "*das Wesen*" and concomitantly the noun phrase "*des Menschen*" according to how the former lays (and does not lay) itself out for the interpretation in this German phrase, let alone in Heidegger's (re)appraisal thereof as 'das Wesen, d.h. die Wesung, des Menschen *als Da-sein*' ['the essen<sup>z</sup>(ing), i.e. the essen<sup>z</sup>ing, of (the) human being *as t/here-being*'], *unless* a little more of the *wesen*, v. in Wesen(heit), n. has managed to creep out through the back door of (or a little less of the same is being construed of or read into) Heidegger's *Besinnung* (GA66), contrary to what is purported to be the thinker's (or is it only Emad and Kalary's ?) self-imposed "repeated stricture that *Wesen* in his texts is used in the verbal sense of ...".

One phrase-wording in *Besinnung* (GA66) and elsewhere that lands a monkey wrench in the workings of Emad and Kalary's interpretation in *Mindfulness* of what is worth(while)-translating in the German language and thinking of "das Wesen" is Heidegger's versatile use of the words, "das eigenste Wesen ..." especially where "..." is tantamount to "des Seins", "des Seyns", or "des Menschen". When it is a matter of their translating Heidegger's "das eigenste Wesen ..." with not so much the words "des Menschen" ["of (the) human being"] but, say, the words "des Seins" ["of being"] or "des Seyns" ["of beyng"] in the vacant position, be it expressly or impliedly so, Emad and Kalary tend to translate with "the ownmost sway [of] ...".<sup>45</sup> However "in translating *Wesen* in relation to man", they would, strictly speaking, according (yet also tangential) to their own criteria, be prompted to convolute the turn of phrase *das eigenste Wesen des Menschen* with the substantively-conceived "what is ownmost as ownmost to man" or "man's ownmost ownmost(ness?)" or, more in line with the syntax of the German original, "the ownmost ownmost(ness?) of man", the difficulty being that the English phrase word "ownmost" is not just the most suitable word-for-word translation of the German phrase's adjective "*eigenste*", as Emad and Kalary acknowledge, but also inherent in their superinducing transposition of the substantivized adjective "the ownmost" [lit. Ger. "das

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45 Cf. Emad and Kalary's [ibid., p. 71] "*Be-ing now demands the struggle for what is its most ownmost sway.*" for Heidegger's [GA66, G85] "*Das Seyn fordert jetzt die Erkämpfung seines eigensten Wesens. [Beyng now requires the engagement with its ownmost essen<sup>z</sup>(ing)].*"

Eigenste”] and of “what is ownmost” upon the German phrase’s verbal noun(ing) “*das ... Wesen*”. To say nothing of their superinducing transposition of the ubiquitous “man” – more precisely, “to man” or “man’s” or “of man” – upon “*des Menschen*”.

Whilst Emad and Kalary’s substantively-conceived renditions of Heidegger’s variations on the theme of ‘*das eigenste Wesen des Menschen*’ do not have recourse to quite such convoluted and from their point of view most unsatisfactorily deverbifying formulations, including by way of their intermittently re-introducing the ordinarily advancing verbal sense of “the sway” for “*Wesen* in relation to man”—and this may well be indicative of a refusal on their part to be limited in all respects by the artificial boundaries they have marked out for themselves in their translating of *das Wesen* (and *die Wesung*), also “in relation to man”, there is no guarantee that any adherence to or overstepping of the bounds pertaining to the criteria to which Emad and Kalary expressly commit themselves in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness* will better lead to what, in this elevated domain of (essential) thinking [*des (wesentlichen) Denkens*], Heidegger holds in regard as a “not-so-poor” rendition that is true to the word as distinct from a “very poor” one that is not, the former being clearly acceptable, the latter quite unacceptable.

As an English translation of Heidegger’s phrase *das Wesen des Menschen* that seemingly counteracts Emad and Kalary’s central thesis that in translating *Wesen* the word in question that is not to be a cognate of *essentia* (first criterion) “should have a verbal meaning” (second criterion), it is hard not to interpret the word “ownmost” in their phrase “man’s ownmost” as anything but a substantivized (nominalized) adjective, namely the de-adjectival noun homomorphic with the adjective “ownmost”. On this interpretation “man’s ownmost” to translate, in this context, not ‘his Eigenstes’ but ‘his Wesen’ lends itself to being rephrased, and is rephrased by Emad and Kalary in the main body of the text of *Mindfulness*, to more closely align with the syntax of the German original as “the ownmost of man”. And where is the (Heidegger’s) verbal sense of *das Wesen des Menschen* in that?

Indeed, on another interpretation, the de-adjectival noun phrase “the ownmost” literally and properly (enpropriatingly) translates into English not the non-cognate verbal noun phrase “*das ... Wesen*” [“the ... *essenz(ing)*”] in the German phrase-wording “*das eigenste Wesen ...*” [“the ownmost *essenz(ing)* ... ”] but the cognate de-adjectival noun phrase homomorphic with the phrase-wording’s adjective “*eigenste*” [“ownmost”]. And just as the German nominalized adjective *das Eigenste* gets its true bearing from the nouning of its corresponding adjective *eigenst* so the perchance best English approximation



thereto in our cognate nominalized adjective “the ownmost” gets its true bearing *likewise* from the nouning of its corresponding adjective “ownmost”. Whereas the verbal noun(ing) *das Wesen* gets its true bearing *otherwise* from the nouning of its corresponding verb infinitive, to wit, time word, *wesen*, a true bearing of the incipient “going-together of ‘being and time’ ” that is by no means properly allowed for but rather *essentially denied* when this verbal noun (phrase) is translated into English with the de-adjectival noun (phrase) “the ownmost” or equivalent.

Emad and Kalary’s bold conflation in *Mindfulness* of the nominalized adjective (*das*) *Eigenste* and the verbal noun (*das*) *Wesen* in Heidegger’s *Besinnung* [*Appraisal*] (GA66), essentially [wesentlich] disallowing in translation what is true to the very words, each in their ownmost [eigensten] way, is reflected in the interpreters’ composite (mis?)reading of the diversely signifying language and variant nominal and verbal characteristics of the two wordings of the word such that, for example, “the ownmost of (the) human being” [or in Emad and Kalary’s phraseology: “... of man”] translates not, properly speaking, (the) human being’s [“man’s” ?] “Eigenste [ownmost]”, but, adventitiously, (the) human being’s [“man’s” ?] “Wesen [essenz(ing)]”. On this interpretation, “the ownmost” in the phrase “the ownmost of (the) human being” [ $\neq$  E & K: “ ... of man”] is, properly speaking, an apposite word-for-word English translation equivalent of and likely best approximation to the cognate German noun phrase *das Eigenste* in the relevant German phrase *das Eigenste des Menschen* that is, likewise, also true to the nominal characteristics and signification of this German phrase’s distinctively de-adjectival noun phrase. In stark contrast, the *likewise* distinctively de-adjectival noun phrase “the ownmost” or equivalent [e.g. “what is ownmost”] to render “*Wesen* in relation to man” or, in other words, the dually-signifying verbal noun(ing) *das Wesen* in the *other* supposedly relevant German phrase *das Wesen des Menschen*, is neither an apposite word-for-word English translation equivalent of this second phrase’s *otherwise* distinctively verbal noun(ing) *das Wesen* and nor is it true, it is rather untrue [unwahr, un(ge)treu], as the likely best approximation, to the (co-)essentially advancing nominal and retreating verbal co-significations of this German keyword(ing) of being as understood, respectively, in both everyday and philosophic, including Heidegger’s, language and thinking.

Moreover it almost seems beyond the bounds of possibility, diligently on each occasion, to suspend the bias of and our predilection for the exclusively nominal signification of an already substantivized (nominal) adjective “the ownmost” leaning even more solidly, if understatedly in *Mindfulness*, toward ‘the ownmost(ness) = ownmostness (= ownmost essence ?)’ of (the) human being, in

order *to read back into* the adventitiously substantifying English text of “the ownmost of man” or “man’s ownmost” or “what is ownmost to man” the incipient verbal co-signification of *das Wesen des Menschen* that, by this English translation bordering on the nominally-partial sense of “(das) Wesen” as ‘(die) Wesen(heit) = Wesenheit / Essenz (essentia !)’ is, in so many words, ‘truly’ expunged from the German translating word as a genuine possibility of suitable translation.

*Unless* we are willing to suspend disbelief (wherever possible) in the true bearing of this deverbifying English translation of Heidegger’s *das Wesen des Menschen* and allow ourselves on each occasion to re-interpret in the sense of over-interpret the translating word “ownmost” in the phrase “man’s ownmost” as still fully adjectival to an implied verbal noun. On this reading it is hard not to answer the obvious question of “man’s ownmost ...” *what?* (or, more discerningly, *who?*) with the German noun “Wesen” in the vacant position, i.e. not to read “ownmost” here as still fully adjectival to the implied verbal noun specified in Heidegger’s German phrase along the lines of “man’s ownmost Wesen”; in which case “what is ownmost to man” and “the ownmost of man” could also be rephrased with a view to rendering in translation the advancing nominal and retreating verbal co-significations of ‘what is ownmost to the Wesen of man’ and of ‘the ownmost Wesen of man’. Of course this rendering would more closely approximate to a translation of the elucidatory turn of phrase *das eigenste Wesen des Menschen* [the ownmost essenz(ing) of (the) human being] rather than the pared-down expression *das Wesen des Menschen* [the essenz(ing) of (the) human being]. Whereas by interpreting the latter such that “man’s ownmost”—but not ‘his ownmost(ness?) = his essence’ nor indeed ‘his ?\*ownmost(ing) = his essencing’ (?)—counts as the English translation equivalent of ‘man’s Wesen’, it is apparently nothing more than the determinate nominalized adjective “the ownmost” in the phrase “the ownmost of man”, respectively its German counterpart “das Eigenste” in the phrase “das Eigenste des Menschen”, that in its function as the English, respectively German, translation equivalent of “das Wesen” in the phrase “das Wesen des Menschen” is here being superimposed upon the German verbal noun *Wesen* to the detriment of, among other things, its inmost (and ownmost) verbal co-signification.

Now language has a name for what characterizes ‘the inmost’ as one such as it is, for what singles it out and distinguishes it as something inmost and it is called (as a so-called “nonce-wd” per OED) “inmostness”. Accordingly, though the ordinary ear may balk at this, we can say, “ownmostness” is what earmarks “the ownmost” in much the same way that “beingness” earmarks “the being” as one

such as it is.<sup>46</sup> However Emad and Kalary cannot afford to further substantify (deverbify) their express translation of *das Wesen* in Heidegger's phrase *das Wesen des Menschen* by going so far as to earmark their already substantivized rendering of "the ownmost" for *das Wesen* of (the) human being, with the additional de-adjectival noun suffix '-ness', as "man's ownmostness" (in the usual sense of 'his ownmost essence'?). Why not? Because when answered straightforwardly in terms of 'his ownmostness' or less straightforwardly in terms of 'his ownmost(ness)', the question of "man's ownmost ... " *what?* (and *who?*) is presumably being posed and answered on the solid, if for the most part un(der)stated, metaphysical assumption of the 'Wesen(heit) = Wesenheit / Essenz' of 'his' (human) 'being(ness) = beingness' as, substantively, 'what(-be-ing)ness (i.e. what(-being)ness) = whatness' ['Was(-seiend)heit = Washeit'].

Apart from "the ownmostness" in the ordinary sense of "the ownmost essence or nature" of (the) human being sailing too close to the wind of the metaphysical problematics of the word *essentia* that is said to block the hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally denied to metaphysical thinking, this English rendition of *das Wesen* by Emad and Kalary would in any event be to blatantly disregard their express undertaking, having also taken account of "Heidegger's own repeated stricture that *Wesen* in his texts is used in the verbal sense of ...", to bring this German word into English, notably without the cognates of *esse(ntia)*, "with a word that in approximating the original German reflects its verbal character". That Emad and Kalary have evidently committed themselves to refrain from tendentially heading any further in the *other* direction — by giving explicit nominal intensity to their already substantivized rendering of "*das Wesen*" with "what is ownmost" and "the ownmost" — is reflected in their reservation of the term "(the) ownmostness" to translate the solidly 'nominal' character of the German substantive nouns (*die*) *Wesenheit* and (*die*) *Wesentlichkeit*.<sup>47</sup> However by not naming *as such* the expressly (and silently) substantifying (deverbifying) language of "the ownmost" for "*das Wesen*" of (the) human being as, more emphatically, 'man's ownmost(ness)', i.e. 'his *Wesen(heit)*', the *essential* questioning of "man's ownmost ..." *what?* (or *who?*) with a view to rendering in English translation not only the advancing nominal but also the retreating verbal co-signification of

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46 cf. Heidegger, *Heraklit* (GA55), G56.

47 To further confuse matters in Emad and Kalary's bid at all costs to avoid the cognates of Latin '(esse)ntia' to translate the cognates of German 'Wesen(heit)' with or without the cognates of either "sway" or "ownmost": Aside from "ownmostness", *Wesenheit* [essence] is also rendered with "swayness" or "swayingness" while *Wesentlichkeit* [essentiality] is also rendered with "swayingness", "fundamentality", or "foundationality".

‘his ownmost *Wesen(heit)* [*essenz(ing)*],’ in terms of ‘his ownmost ownmost(ness),’ is no less decidedly circumvented. To circumvent the full “sway” and “holding sway” [“*Schweien*”? “*Walten*”?] of the *essential* questioning thus, but without naming the metaphysical problematics and the being-historic interplay that are always already at stake in the circumvention itself, is quite consistent with our accustomed way of responding to as well as quietly distorting the question concerning “*das Wesen*” [“the *essenz(ing)*”] of (the) human being to the detriment of the inmost (and ownmost) verbal co-signification of this translating [and in turn translated] German word *Wesen*.

Or by a slightly more circuitous route that is also attentive to what is not so apparent in the latent *whatness* of what is ownmost to *something* or *somewhat* or, more discerningly, the latent *whoness* of who is ownmost to *someone* or *somewho*: Unfurling the unexpressed language and thinking in translation of the *what(-being)ness* (or *who(-being)ness* ?) of ‘*what* (or *who* ?) is ownmost to man’ or of ‘man’s ownmost’ can, for the English reader, be a barely perceptible advance leading from the express nominal accentuation of “man’s ownmost” or “the ownmost of [to ?] man” to yet more silently-focussed nominal-accentuation of “the ownmost” as ‘the ownmost(ness) = ownmostness’ of [to ?] man. And in this roundabout way we still arrive at a predominantly and more or less exclusively deverbifying interpretation of “*das Wesen* [*des Menschen*]” as ‘*die Wesen(heit)* = *Wesenheit* / *Essenz* (= *essentia* ? !) [of (the) human being]’.

Yet the *co-essentially* verbal signification of the “*Wesen*” in accordance with the word being a *verbal* noun corresponding to *wesen*, v. translating *esse*, v. and *εἶναι*, v., is the one to which Heidegger attends first and foremost as *also* incipiently true to the word; and no less so in his translating of ‘*das Wesen*’ and ‘*das eigenste Wesen*’ of (the) human being into the *beyng-historic* language proper of occidental thinking. The extraneous expunging of the co-signifying whiling of an appropriate English time word for the unprevailing ‘*wesen*’ [‘to ?\*ownmost’ ?] in ‘*Wesen(heit?)* = *ownmost(ness?)*’ as an essential possibility of suitable translation is likely to be compounded in any ‘workaround’ solutions that may be devised by Emad and Kalary to render what is tantamount to Heidegger’s (express or implied) interpretation of *das eigenste Wesen des Menschen* [the ownmost *essenz(ing)* of (the) human being] so that his wording of these keywords in his own German language and thinking does not transpose either without a cognate of *essentia* as “the ownmost(ness?) that is ownmost to man” or “man’s ownmost ownmost(ness?) or “the ownmost ownmost(ness?) of

man”, or words to that effect; or, with a cognate of ‘(esse)ntia = essentia’, as “the ownmost essence of [to ?] man” or ‘man’s ownmost essence’.<sup>48</sup>

The crux of the central thesis put forward by Emad and Kalary in relation to their aspirational translation of the words *Wesen* and *Wesung*, apart from that the translating English words should have a verbal meaning, is that these “being-historical” words “cannot be brought into English with the cognates of *essentia* because the latter is a word that blocks the hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally denied to metaphysical thinking”. The thesis comes home to roost for Emad and Kalary in *Mindfulness* in many ways beside those mentioned thus far. We have already seen how, without the appropriate cognates of (esse)ntia, respectively esse(ntia), the archessentially being-historic semantic-etymological connection to *wesen*, v. translating *esse*, v. and εἶναι, v. is disrupted and compromised by the translation of *Wesen* with “sway” and *Wesung* with “swaying”; how this connection is in a way doubly compromised by the tacit avoidance of the word ‘essential(ly)’ and moreover unspoken relinquishment of any cognate of ‘sway’ to render *wesentlich* and cognates with a disparate cluster of disruptive English words including (also indistinguishably for *wesenhaft* in the first three cases) “fundamental(ly)” or “foundational(ly)” or “strict(ly)” or “distinct(ly)” or “important(ly)” or “principal(ly)” and *their* respective cognates; and how this same connection is yet again disrupted and compromised by Emad and Kalary’s overt avoidance of the cognates of (esse)ntia and plain relinquishment of their word ‘sway[ing]’ to render “*Wesen* in relation to man” as “what is ownmost to man” or “man’s ownmost” or “the ownmost of man”.

Here is yet a further observation that presents an enormous challenge to any undertaking to rule out as inadmissible without due consideration the appropriate cognates of the *esse* in *essentia* to translate the German language of the *wesen* in *Wesen(heit)* into its ownmost [eigenste] word(ing) in our English language in a way that is not just word for word but true to the German word that *is*, i.e. *essences / essenzen and reveals-conceals its essencing / essenzenz as*, ‘das

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48 cf. Emad & Kalary, *Mindfulness*, p. 291: “... : man is not at all the image of an other [Andere], but he has his most, indeed his distinctly ownmost by virtue of his relation to be-ing.” for *Besinnung* (GA66), G328: “... : der Mensch ist überhaupt nicht Ebenbild von Anderem, sondern eigensten und zwar ausgezeichneten Wesens (kraft des Seynsbezugs);”. Here Emad and Kalary’s ‘workaround solution’ of, more or less, “man [der Mensch] is not at all ... , but he has his most [eigensten], indeed his distinctly ownmost [und zwar ausgezeichneten Wesens] by virtue of his relation to be-ing;” translates-cum-transposes without truly translating-cum-transporting us into Heidegger’s “... : (the) human being is not at all the image of another but is the(ir) ownmost and indeed distinguished essenzenz(ing) [eigensten und zwar ausgezeichneten Wesens] (by dint of the(ir) connection to beyng);”.

*wesentliche* Wesen (des Seins)' in a manner beholden to the *essenz*(ing) of the incipiently beyng-historic train of occidental thought:

*essenz*(ing) = Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia = οὐσία (εἶναι)



**§11. ... das wesentliche An- und Abwesen (d.h. die An- und Abwesenung)  
des An- und Abwesenden**

Consistent with the thesis Emad and Kalary are proposing when it comes to translating into our own language and thinking Heidegger's translating of German *Wesen* and *Wesung* into his, the kindred being-historic words *Anwesen* and *Anwesenung*, apart from their having to have a verbal sense in English translation, cannot, should not, and must not be brought into English with the cognates of *praesentia* because the latter is a word that, being a compound cognate of Latin *essentia*, blocks access to the said "hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally denied to metaphysical thinking." For the same reason, consistent with the thesis, the countervailing being-historic words *Abwesen* and *Abwesenung*, apart from their having to have a verbal sense in English translation, cannot, should not, and must not be brought into English with the cognates of *absentia*. Yet throughout *Mindfulness*, and without Emad and Kalary alerting their readers to this essential discrepancy in their translation of Heidegger's *Besinnung* (GA66), the express or implied language and thinking of *Anwesen*, respectively *Anwesenung*, and *Abwesen*, respectively *Abwesenung*, is almost invariably brought into English with recourse to the Latinate-English cognates of *praesentia* and *absentia* respectively, demonstrating the abovenamed antithesis once again and raising the obvious question as to why the inconsistent English rendition of these key German compounds of *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, insofar as it relies upon the key English cognates of Latin *praesentia* and *absentia*, does not recoil upon the proponents of the central thesis to block their own (and our) "hermeneutic-phenomenological viewing of what is fundamentally [wesentlich ? wesenhaft ? MAH] denied to metaphysical thinking."

Here too any semantic-etymological time-word connection to "sway" as the proffered *wesen* in *An- und Ab-wesen* and to "swaying" as the proffered *wesung* in *An- und Ab-wesung* appears to be quietly disrupted and compromised by Emad and Kalary's (un)apparent disowning of the compound cognates of sway, v. to render and to discern these German keyword(ing)s of be, v. [sein, v.] in the intimation of (compounded) *wesen*, v.. How so? Because, on the occasion of these compound (verbal and deverbial) nounings of the therein primordial time word *wesen* the interpreters in the main do not shun but avail themselves of the compound cognates of the *esse* in *essentia* to this end, thereby leaving the archessentially being-historic semantic-etymological connection of *essence*, v. to *wesen*, v. (as paradigmatically-related agnates) *potentially* intact while simultaneously contradicting their implied obligation, also on this occasion (?),

to at least the first and most binding of the three criteria to which they have committed themselves in translating *Wesen* with “sway” and *Wesung* with “swaying”.

There is a partial exception to this trend on one occasion when, instead of *inconspicuously* maintaining a compound cognate of essence, v. for the *-wesen* in both *an-* und *abwesen*, respectively the *-wesung* in both *An-* und *Abwesung*, Emad and Kalary *conspicuously* introduce (in inverted commas) a compound cognate of sway, v. (but only) for *ab-wesen* [to ab-sent / be ab-senting, to ab-senz / be ab-senzing] vis-à-vis *Anwesung* [presenzing] by contrarily translating-cum-transposing Heidegger’s [*Besinnung* (GA66), G366:] “... die Anwesung dessen, was scheinbar gegen sich ab-west.” with [*Mindfulness*, p. 325:] “... the presencing of that which vis-à-vis itself apparently ‘ab-sways’ [*ab-west*].” Are we not better able to translate-cum-transport ourselves into the incipient saying and thinking of the German original with an alternate English interpretation that consistently embraces the more appropriate compound cognates of essence, v. to render those of *wesen*, v. along the lines: “... the presencing / presenzing of that which is apparently ab-sencing / ab-senzing contrary to itself.”?

In this respect, the second of the three criteria specifying that in translating *Wesen* and *Wesung* the word in question (that is not to be a cognate of *essentia*) “should have a verbal meaning” is, to my way of thinking, also transgressed by Emad and Kalary in *Mindfulness* for many of their English renditions of the compound cognates of *das Wesen* and so too *das Wesende* in Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66). These renditions may well be on the right track insofar as they have recourse to the Latinate-English compound cognates of the *esse* in *essentia* to translate the word in question, but are they on track to *the appropriate* ones?

Take, for instance, Emad and Kalary’s rendering of “the presence” for the occasional verbal noun phrase *das An-wesen* in the prevailing substantive sense of “An-wesen” = ‘An-wesen(heit) [i.e. An-wesenheit] = prae-sentia, παρ-ουσία’ without attending to its unprevailing verbal sense of “An-wesen” = ‘an-wesen = prae-esse, παρ-εἶναι’.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, in *Mindfulness*, “the presence”, from the Latin *praesentia* verbatim, appears to render indiscriminately both the verbal noun phrase *das An-wesen / Anwesen* and, most literally and aptly, the substantive noun phrase *die Anwesenheit*; while the former verbal

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<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*, p. 287; GA66, G323.

substantive is also translated in the merely verbal sense of “(the) presencing”<sup>50</sup> or alternately, the merely nominal sense of “what presences” or alternatively “what is present”<sup>51</sup>. The latter, however, is for the most part Emad and Kalary’s translation of the nominal participle *das Anwesende* just as “what is absent” (or, on occasion, “what absences”) is their translation of the countervailing nominal participle *das Abwesende*.<sup>52</sup> And through their trusted English rendition of *das An- und Abwesende* with only the partially-signifying, nominally-overloaded “what is present and absent” (or “what presences and absences”), the unprevailing yet *for Heidegger* quintessentially verbal co-signification of these two predominantly substantively-understood nominal participles in the German language of conventional and even (supposed) *essential* thinking, is more or less disregarded. Nevertheless, the unprevailing *verbal* substantives “(das) An- und Abwesen” ignored in what usually transpires to prevail in these predominantly *nominal* participles “(das) An- und Abwesende” *can* be retrieved from the very words and *is*, I submit, (*co-*)*essentially* restored thereto, as far as possible, in my English translations thereof, as exemplified in my tentative rendition of the turn of phrase, ‘das An- und Abwesen des An- und Abwesenden’ with ‘the present-ing and absent-ing of the / what is / that which is present(ing) and absent(ing)’;<sup>53</sup> or, alternatively, with ‘the present-ing / presencing / presencing and absent-ing / absencing / absencing of that which is (the) present-ing / presencing / presencing and (the) absent-ing / absencing / absencing’.

I say “as far as possible” because, to highlight the point, in this context I have clearly emphasised in “the present-ing / presencing / presencing and absent-ing / absencing / absencing”, the ‘merely’ verbal senses of “(das) An- und

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50 To add to the confusion, the verbal noun “presencing”, usually reserved in *Mindfulness* for Heidegger’s deverbal noun *Anwesung*, translates both the latter and the verbal noun *An-wesen* at *ibid.*, p. 282; GA66, G317.

51 *ibid.*, pp. 344 and 155 respectively; GA66, G389 and G177 respectively.

52 *An- und Abwesendes* is translated by Emad and Kalary with both “what is present and absent” [*ibid.*, p. 277; GA66, G312] and “what presences and absences” [*ibid.*, p. 178; GA66, G203].

53 Heidegger’s superlative nominal participle *das Anwesendste* in *Besinnung* (GA66) is, to my way of thinking, inadequately translated by Emad and Kalary in *Mindfulness* with “the most present” [*ibid.*, pp. 108, 340, 347; GA66, G128, G383, G393]. An affined rendering of the latter commensurate with the prevailing(-cum-unprevailing) participial language of the German original—where the emphasis remains on the German noun phrase being an *essentially nominal* participial such that the latter’s inrooted verbal noun phrase [*das Anwesen*] is being kept more or less under wraps—might be: “the most present(ing)” or “that which is / what is most present(ing)”; here the incipient verbal noun phrase ‘the present-ing’ that, for its part, remains under wraps in the English phrase ‘the (most) present(ing)’ can be said to translate-cum-transport us into the incipient verbal noun phrase ‘das Anwesen’ that remains likewise and otherwise under wraps in ‘das Anwesend(st)e’.

Abwesen” = ‘(das) an- und abwesen’ as the *verbal* nouns inrooted equally-essentially [gleich-wesentlich] in their respective *nominal* participles “(das) An- und Abwesende”. This is admittedly an *essential* ‘twisting back’ of, by way of re-tort to, not just the ‘merely’ nominal interpretation of “(das) An- und Abwesen” as predominantly verbal *nouns* exemplified in their mainstream rendition with “(the) presence and absence” translating “(das) An- und Abwesen” = ‘(die) An- und Abwesenheit’ but also to their otherwise advancing nominal and retreating verbal signification in the fuller sense of “(the) presenz(ing) and absenz(ing)” translating “(das) An- und Abwesen” = ‘(d.) An- und Abwesen(heit)’; analogous to my appraisal hitherto of the fuller signification of “(das) Wesen” as ‘(d.) Wesen(heit)’ in our sense of “(the) essenz(ing)”.

A good deal of care and manifold ingenuity as well as diligence of thought is required for an appropriate translation that is not just word for word but true to the word of *all* nominal participles in the texts of Martin Heidegger. And without hankering after unattainable perfection or heedless uniformity, the apposite translation of the ordinarily advancing nominal and retreating verbal senses of *das Wesende* and *das An- und Abwesende* is no exception if we are to think all the way through to what is *essentially* true to these being-historic participial words in translation.<sup>54</sup>

We have earlier touched upon what Heidegger has to say in *Heraklit* (GA55) [G71f] concerning how we can think the participle either nominally or verbally, both ‘nominally’ and ‘verbally’ at once, and then again the emphasis can be placed either on the verbal or the nominal aspect; and that [G85] “when the thinkers are essent-ially [wesentlich] thinking participial words per se they are in any case thinking the verbal signification first of all.” In the event of our *essent-ially* thinking the German participle of all participles *das Seiende*, “the being”, for example, we will, on this interpretation, attend first of all to thinking *das Seiend*, *d.h. das Sein*, *des Seienden*, the be-ing, i.e. the being, of the being.

*Likewise and otherwise* in the event of our *essent-ially* thinking the German language of *das Seiende* in the intimation of *das Wesende* in the sense of *das An- und Abwesende* and, in my provisional translation into the English language

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54 To draw from his (1939) essay “Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristotles Physik B, 1” [“Of the essenz(ing) and concept of Φύσις. Aristotle, *Physics* B, I.”], here is an incidental remark by Heidegger on the authentically philosophic language of the Greek participial forms that we are yet to learn how to translate: “... : (the unusually rich and manifold forms of the participle in the Greek language — the authentically philosophic language — are not fortuitous, yet their significance is still to be recognised).” The essay, written 1939 and presented as a seminar 1940, was first published in 1958; cf. *Wegmarken* [Pathmarks] (GA9), G261 (331).

of this distinctive arrangement of these nominal participles (of all participles): “the being” in the intimation of “the / what is / that which is essent(ing)” in the sense of “the / what is / that which is present(ing) and absent(ing)”; or, if needs must, in the intimation of “that which is (the) essent-ing / essencing / essenizing” in the sense of “that which is (the) present-ing / presencing / presenizing and (the) absent-ing / absencing / absenizing”.

However in light of all that has been written thus far, the turn of phrase ‘das Wesen (d.h. die Wesung) des Wesenden’ could be rendered ‘the essenz(ing) (i.e. the essenizing) of that which is (the) essenizing’. And the turn of phrase ‘das An- und Abwesen (d.h. die An- und Abwesung) des An- und Abwesenden’ could concomitantly be rendered ‘the presenz(ing) and absenz(ing) (i.e. the presenizing and absenizing) of that which is (the) presenizing and absenizing’.

As far as our English translation of these key compound cognates of *wesen*, v. is concerned, therefore, we will need to bear in mind and truly appreciate that, in the German original, the language of ‘das Wesen des Wesenden’ is primordially inherent in the language of ‘das An- und Abwesen des An- und Abwesenden’ so that in thinking through the latter we are always already in one way or another thinking (likewise and otherwise) through the former.<sup>55</sup> How, then, to translate this primordial language and thinking into English in a way that is, as far as possible, *essentially* [*wesentlich*] true to the associated translating that is always already taking place within the German original?

Take, for instance, my tentative rendition of the primordial turn of phrase ‘das Wesen des Wesenden’ with ‘the essent-ing of the / what is / that which is essent(ing)’, or alternatively, with ‘the essent-ing / essencing / essenizing of that which is (the) essent-ing / essencing / essenizing’, to indicate how, on this occasion too, the unprevailing *verbal* substantive “(das) Wesen” ignored in what usually transpires to prevail in its predominantly *nominal* participle “(das) Wesende” *can* likewise and otherwise be retrieved from the very words and is, I submit, (*co-*)*essentially* restored thereto, as far as possible, in my English renditions thereof. Here too I say “as far as possible” because to further highlight the point made in connection with the compound cognates of ‘*wesen*, v. = essence, v.’ in the turn of phrase ‘das An- und Abwesen des An- und Abwesenden’ where the therein primordially inherent language of ‘das Wesen des Wesenden’ is *always already* at stake, in the present context I have again

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55 cf. *Besinnung* (GA66) [G383] where the primordial signification of Heidegger’s “das Wesen des vorher und zuerst Anwesenden” as, incipiently, “the essenz(ing) [i.e. the essenizing] of that which is (the) earlier and at first presenizing” is altogether lost in the English of *Mindfulness* with Emad and Kalary’s rendition [p. 340] “the sway of what beforehand and primarily presences”.



clearly emphasised in “the essent-ing / essencing / essenizing” the ‘merely’ verbal senses of “(das) *Wesen*” = ‘(das) *wesen*’ as the *verbal* noun (phrase) inrooted equally-essentially [gleich-wesentlich] in its respective *nominal* participle “(das) *Wesende*”. This too is admittedly an *essential* ‘twisting back’ of, by way of re-tort to, not just the ‘merely’ nominal interpretation of “(das) *Wesen*” as predominantly a verbal *noun* (phrase) exemplified in its mainstream rendition with “(the) essence” translating “(das) *Wesen*” = ‘(die) *Wesenheit*’ but also to its otherwise advancing nominal and retreating verbal signification in the fuller sense of “(das) *Wesen*” as ‘(d.) *Wesen(heit)*’ and our sense of “(the) essen(ing)”.

If we are *to think through* these participial words *in translation*, each in their ownmost way in connection with the others, pursuant to and purveyant of the way they are thought not just conventionally but *essentially*, that is to say, by appreciative thinkers for whom the verbal signification of the participial word is what is worth(while)-thinking first and foremost, then, as with *das Seiende*, the being, we are behoven to think *das Wesende*, that which is (the) essenizing, respectively *das An- und Abwesende*, that which is (the) presenizing and absenizing, in a corresponding way, namely in a way corresponding to our thinking first and foremost the be-ing (i.e. the being) of the being [das Seiend (d.h. das Sein) des Seienden]. We will therefore surely attend first of all to thinking, coessentially, the essen(ing) (i.e. the essenizing) of that which is (the) essenizing [das *Wesen* (d.h. die *Wesung*) des Wesenden], respectively the presen(ing) and absen(ing) (i.e. the presenizing and absenizing) of that which is (the) presenizing and absenizing [das *An- und Abwesen* (d.h. die *An- und Abwesung*) des An- und Abwesenden].

On the strength of their well-nigh coessentially restorative power, two of the *tentative* variations on my imperfectly good approximation to the turn of phrase ‘das An- und Abwesen des An- und Abwesenden’, to wit, ‘the present-ing and absent-ing of the / what is present(ing) and absent(ing)’ and, alternatively, ‘the presen(ing) (i.e. presenizing) and the absen(ing) (i.e. absenizing) of that which is (the) presenizing and absenizing’, may serve to highlight how *even with the appropriate compound cognates of the esse in (esse)ntia, respectively esse(ntia), potentially at their disposal*, Emad and Kalary would struggle, on their interpretation, to translate into its ownmost word(ing) in our English language and thinking the unprevailing verbal *co-signification* that is *also* true to the German phrase’s dually-signifying, *essentially nominal* participles by dint of the latter’s inrooted *verbal* nouns “(das) *An- und Abwesen*” = ‘(das) *an- und abwesen*’. It would instead be consistent with their express and silent interpretation of the German original in the main, for Emad and Kalary to



‘unassumingly’ substantify and tacitly deverbify the phrase in English translation along the lines of ‘the presence<sup>56</sup> and absence of what is present and absent / what presences and absences’ or ‘[the ?] what is present and absent / [the ?] what presences and absences of [in ? to ?] what is present and absent / what presences and absences’; with little trace in translation of the absence of the absent-ing / absencing / absenzing in absentia and of the present-ing / presencing / presenzing in praesentia and thus the unprevailing fold of the full sway of what for the appreciative thinker after Heidegger is essentially worth(while)-saying and thinking and translating: the prevailing(-cum-unprevailing) wording in the German original of *das An- und Abwesen* and *das An- und Abwesende* as distinctively key compounds of the likewise and otherwise advancing nominal and retreating verbal co-significations of *das Wesen* and *das Wesende* respectively.

Only Heidegger’s intentionally deverbal coinings of *die Anwesenung* from ‘(das) anwesen’ and *die Abwesenung* from ‘(das) abwesen’ are essentially and properly (en-proprietarily) allowed for and not begrudged in Emad and Kalary’s Latinate-English translating noun phrases “the presencing” and “the absencing” respectively. By translating *An- und Abwesenung* thus, Emad and Kalary could be said not to eschew but to embrace *the appropriate* Latinate-English compound cognates of essence, v. to arrive at an imperfectly good approximation to the advancing (*de*)verbal signification that unmistakably prevails in the German original.

But there’s the rub. By our having recourse to the appropriate compound cognates of the *esse* in *esse(ntia)* to translate Heidegger’s *die An- und Abwesenung* with “the presencing / presenzing and absencing / absenzing”, this ‘not-so-poor’ English translation can surely only be said to be true to its ownmost word(ing) so long as it is commensurate to our ‘not-so-poor’ English translation “the essencing / essenizing” for Heidegger’s intentionally deverbal coining of *die Wesung* from ‘(das) wesen’. Can the same be said of Emad and Kalary’s English rendition of *die Wesung* with “the swaying” on the one hand and of *die An- und Abwesenung* with “the presencing and absencing” on the other? Or are not these English renditions truly out of joint with one another in *Mindfulness* such that, in essenizing [in der Wesung], they are untrue (*unwahr*, *un(ge)treu*) to the arrangement or adjustment or jointure of the essen(ing) [Wesensfügung] of their German counterparts in *Besinnung* (GA66) and elsewhere in the texts of Martin Heidegger?

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56 With the rare exception, previously cited, of “the presencing” (usually reserved by Emad and Kalary for *die Anwesenung*) instead of “the presence” or “[the ?] what is present” or “[the ?] what presences” for Heidegger’s *das An-wesen / Anwesen*.

To translate into our own English language and thinking each and every one of his key wordings of the time word *wesen* in a way that is true to the translating that is always already at stake within Heidegger's German language and thinking, we cannot afford to ignore but need to bear in mind and to appraisively-appreciate that, as essentially [*wesentlich*] and properly (en-propriatingly) intended in the distinguished coining of *Wesung* vis-à-vis *Wesen* and, concomitantly, of *An- und Ab-Wesung* vis-à-vis *An- und Ab-Wesen*, it is not just the former deverbal but also the latter verbal nounings of *an- und ab-wesen* that are equally-essentially [*gleich-wesentlich*], each in their ownmost way, incipiently taking their distinguished bearing in the German original from these key compound cognates of none other than primordial *wesen*, v. translating *esse*, v. translating εἶναι, v. in the archessentially being-historic occidental train of thought of *das Wesen* as '(d.) Wesen(heit) = (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)' and our sense of "the essen~~z~~(ing)".

**§12. ... das wesentliche (An- und Ab-)Wesen (d.h. die (An- und Ab-)Wesung)  
des (An- und Ab-)Wesenden**

To reiterate: Heidegger's appraisal of *das An- und Abwesen*, respectively *die An- und Abwesung*, is intimately and inextricably linked to his appraisal of *das Wesen*, respectively *die Wesung*, and, in conjunction therewith, to his appraisal of the inmosty cognate nominal participle *das Wesende* and compounds thereof *das An- und Abwesende*. And so long as these verbal and deverbal noun(ing)s and nominal participles, each in their ownmost way in connection with the others, are, as far as possible, accordantly and consistently translated into 'not-so-poor' English with the relevant cognates of 'the esse in (esse)ntia = the wesen in Wesen(heit)' and the abovenamed compounds thereof, namely, 'the praesse in (praese)ntia = the anwesen in Anwesen(heit)' and 'the abesse in (abse)ntia = the abwesen in Abwesen(heit)', that original nexus and thus the being-historic interplay of the said verbal and deverbal noun(ing)s and nominal participles corresponding to 'essence, v. = wesen, v.', and compounds thereof, *can* remain *essentially*, respectively *wesentlich*, intact as that which, for an appreciative thinker after Heidegger, is properly (enpropriatingly) worth(while)-saying and thinking and translating. The proviso being that the irrelevant cognates of supposed and superimposed 'sway, v. = wesen, v.', and compounds thereof, are not disruptively thrown into the primordial mix, so to speak, as they are in Emad and Kalary's discordant and inconsistent rendition of Heidegger's *das Wesen* with "the sway" and *die Wesung* with "the swaying"—to name just two, among many other cognates of sway, v. in *Mindfulness* to translate those of wesen, v. in *Besinnung* (GA66)<sup>57</sup>.

The same is true for the nexus between *das An- und Abwesende* in the full sway of "that which is (the) presenzing / present-ing and absenzing / absent-ing" and, in accordance therewith, *das Wesende* in the full sway of "that which is (the) essenzenz / essent-ing". A little attention will show that this nexus is (un)essentially *disrupted* by Emad and Kalary's discordant and inconsistent

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57 For instance: the aforementioned "(to) ab-sway" for *ab-wesen* on one occasion; also, "(to) en-sway" for *erwesen*, respectively "(the) enswaying" for *(die) Erwesung*; also "(to) sway over" or "(to) sway surpassingly" for *überwesen* and "(the) un-sway / un-swaying"—let alone "(the) un-ownmost"—for *(das) Unwesen*. An alternate English rendition of the latter, having recourse to the more appropriate cognates of 'essence, v. = wesen, v.', might be "(the) un(doing-of-the)-essenz(ing)" and for *erwesen* (not easy!) perhaps an approximation along the lines of "(to) inessence / inessenz" or, to take Emad and Kalary's lead solely in respect of translating the German prefix *er-* with English "en-" rather than "in-", "(to) enessence / enessenz"; and hence for *(die) Erwesung*, "(the) inessenzing / enessenzing". The German verb *überwesen* might lend itself to an alternate English rendition in the vein of "(to) essence / essenz over" or "(to) essence / essenz surpassingly".

English renditions of the nominal participle *das Wesende* with *either* the nominally-partial “what / that which sways” / “holds sway” *or*, alternately, the verbally-partial “the swaying”, the latter of course also for *die Wesung*, that is to say, *with* the cognates of sway, v., and, by contrast, of the compound nominal participles *das An- und Abwesende* with, in the main, the nominally-partial “what / that which is present and absent” (or sometimes “what / that which presences and absences”), that is to say, *without* the compound cognates of sway, v. but *with* the compound cognates of essence, v..

I say, “in the main” because, by way of exception to their most trusted translation of *das Anwesende* (or *Anwesendes*) with “what / that which is present” to the exclusion of the co-signifying verbal sense of the *essentially nominal* participle’s inrooted verbal noun — exemplified in the phrase ‘das Anwesen des Anwesenden’ such that “das Anwesen” = ‘(das) anwesen’ des Anwesen(den)<sup>58</sup>, Emad and Kalary also translate the German participial word, in one or two instances, with the likewise partially-signifying, nominally-conceived, “what ... presences”<sup>59</sup>. In another instance<sup>60</sup>, there appears to be an attempt by the translators to be more inclusive while at the same time partially reversing the ordinarily advancing nominal and retreating verbal significations of *das Anwesende* in their rendition with (the equivalent of) “the presencing of [what / that which is] present”, the noun phrase “the presencing” of course also for the deverbal noun phrase *die Anwesung*.

I say “(the equivalent of)” because in this instance I take Emad and Kalary’s “the presencing of everything present” to be their rendering of Heidegger’s “jedes Anwesende” in the context of his beyng-historic interpretation in *Besinnung* (GA66) of the presencing [die Anwesung] that presences / is presencing [west an] and at first prevails over any of that which is (the) presencing [jedes Anwesende] and thus its ownself [G342f].

Alternative renditions of “jedes Anwesende” — which can be said in manifold ways — to “any of that which is (the) presencing” might be, in a different context, “any of that which is (the) present-ing” or “any of what / that which is present(ing)” or “any of the present(ing)”. It is important to note, however, that in this particular instance what is also at stake in our translating of the interconnection of “jedes Anwesende” [“any of that which is (the) presencing”] and “die Anwesung” [“the presencing”] in a way that is true to the distinguishing interplay of these essential words in Heidegger’s text, is his translating within his

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58 “des Anwesen(den)”: “of ( that which is) (the) presencing / present-ing”.

59 *ibid.*, pp. 178 and 331; GA66, G203 and G373.

60 *ibid.*, p. 305; GA66, G343.

own German language and thinking of the “difference” pertaining to the metaphysical and the beyng-historic question of being in consideration of the inceptual saying that “being is” [“das Sein ist”] in the intimation of “the presencing presences” or “the presenizing presenizes” [“die Anwesenung west an”].

To paraphrase and to translate in brief Heidegger’s interpretation of the presenizing that presenizes / is presenizing and at first prevails over any of that which is (the) presenizing [jedes Anwesende] and thus its ownself [G342f]:

The insight that eventually emerges for the metaphysical thinking that at any one moment ascribes being as “predicate” to the being [dem Seienden], is that being itself [das Sein selbst] can no longer be belayed with the predicates “is” [“ist”] and “be” [“sein”] because being will thereby suddenly amount to the being. Rather than that, Heidegger indicates, being will indeed be elevated (by metaphysical thinking) to the ὄντως ὄν, *das Seiendste*, the beingest or most beingwise being / be-ing, wherein lies that it is being that “is”. “This is how, even pre-Platonically, Parmenides is thinking: ἔστιν γὰρ εἶναι.” Of course it will surely have to borne in mind how the εἶναι is intended here, so far as Heidegger is concerned; and because the μηδέν will at once be counterpoised to the εἶναι in Parmenides’ Saying, it comes to light, on Heidegger’s interpretation thereof, that εἶναι here, as yet undifferentiated, especially intends “the *being* that is *and* the *being* of this being” [“das Seiende, das ist, *und* das Sein dieses Seienden”].<sup>61</sup>

But, for Heidegger, the appraisal unto the inceptual saying: “being is” [“das Sein ist”] falls into the void so long as we do not allow the “being” [dem “Sein”] (“εἶναι”) and the “is” [dem “ist”] (“ἔστιν”) their incipient meaning of “the presenizing presenizes / is presenizing / is present-ing” [“die Anwesenung west an”] that will be meant or inkled as: “the present(ing) / presenizing [anwesende] bestantiation of the bestance of the presenizing [Anwesenung]”<sup>62</sup>. This “*presenizing*

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61 Re “... [the] εἶναι here, as yet undifferentiated, ...”, cf. “Translating Heidegger translating *Wesen* (Part One)”, V.1 • 28 November 2018, at <http://www.archessenzing.com/essays/>, §3, p. 17. The following is an excerpt from my translation on page seventeen of a passage from Heidegger’s *Heraklit* (GA55) [G57f]: “Occidental thinking is metaphysics since the time of Plato and Aristotle right up to the present moment. Whereas the thinking of the inceptual thinkers is not yet metaphysics. They too think being no doubt. But they think it in another way. They too are acquainted with the being no doubt. But they experience it in another way. Therefore if the inceptual thinkers ever do say the very words τὸ ὄν, τὰ ὄντα, the being [das Seiende], then as pioneering thinkers they especially think the ‘participial’ word not substantively but verbally; τὸ ὄν, the being, is thought in the sense of be-ing [des Seiend], that is, of being [d.h. des Seins]. τὸ ὄν or according to an earlier form of the word τὸ εἶναι is for Parmenides synonymous with τὸ εἶναι. —”.

62 being a provisional translation of Heidegger’s “die anwesende Beständigung der Beständigkeit der Anwesenung” at *Besinnung* (GA66), G343. Re the adjectival use of “present(ing) / presenizing” for “anwesende” in connection with “bestantiation” for

[*Anwesenung*]”, to translate Heidegger a little further on in *Besinnung* (GA66) [G343], is the one that—

at first prevails over any of that which is (the) presencing [jedes Anwesende] and thus its ownself. When adequately thought through, the metaphysical saying: “being is” can become a telltale sign of whether there is within metaphysics any extent at all to which being itself [das Sein selbst] brings its own essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) under its dominion / sway [das eigene Wesen zur Herrschaft bringt].

The metaphysical Saying: “being is” [“das Sein ist”] wants to *rescue* being as the beingest and first of the being.

The beyng-historic saying: “beyng is” [“das Seyn ist”] thinks an other, not the beingest (or be-ingst) as the first, indeed by no means beyng — notwithstanding the say(ing) of the “is” — as the being; the beyng-historic say(ing) says the pure essen<sup>z</sup>ing of beyng [die reine Wesung des Seyns], the allowance of what pertains to decision and yet the taking back of beyng to the still of the ab(yssal)-ground [in die Stille des Abgrundes].

“Beyng is” says: the en-proprietation en-propropriates to itself the (lighting-)clearing of the in-between and grounds that pertaining to the essential decisions which is not publicly accessible and protects the incomparable and unapparent of its essen<sup>z</sup>(ing). “Essentiality” is no longer importance, which would require prominence and supremacy, but rather: shelters and conceals itself in the dominion of its sheltered and concealed lenience.

Heidegger’s appraisal of the horizon of metaphysics and its overcoming [Überwindung] in light of the inkled un-enabling of such an overcoming from within metaphysics itself is an evolving one.

In *Besinnung* (GA66), his take on the self-overcoming [Selbst-Überwindung] of metaphysical thinking as the representing [das Vorstellen] of being as beingness, is that nothing less is at stake than giving up [Aufgeben] *this* thinking, *this* representing of being as beingness, while leaping into “quite another” inception of occidental thinking [G212]. One insight into this “other inception” is that it cannot come from within the metaphysical thinking that, in saying that “being is”, wants to *rescue* [or *salvage*: *retten*] the meaning of being as the

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“Beständigkeit” and “bestance” for “Beständigkeit” in this particular context, cf. “Translating Heidegger translating *Wesen* (Part One)”, V.1 • 28 November 2018, at <http://www.archessenzing.com/essays/>, §3, p. 14. The following is an excerpt from my translation on page fourteen of a passage from Heidegger’s *Introduction to Metaphysics* (GA40) [G76 (G55)]: “The participle “wesend” [“essent(ing)” / “essen<sup>z</sup>ing”] is still preserved in an-wesend [pre-sent(ing) / pre-sen<sup>z</sup>ing], ab-wesend [ab-sent(ing) / ab-sen<sup>z</sup>ing]. The substantive “Wesen” primordially signifies not the Was-sein [what-being], the quidditas, but the Währen [lasting, tarrying, abiding] as Gegenwart [the (being) present (or around or there), being (the) present], An-wesen [pre-sent-ing / pre-sen<sup>z</sup>(ing)] and Ab-wesen [ab-sent-ing / ab-sen<sup>z</sup>(ing)]. The “sens” in Latin prae-sens und ab-sens has been lost. Does “Dii con-sentes” mean the gods pre-sent(ing) / pre-sen<sup>z</sup>ing together?”.



beingest / be-ingest and first of the being [das Seiendste und Erste des Seienden] [G343]. With a view to rendering (giving again, back, in return) the overcoming of this saying and thinking of metaphysics while at the same time wrestling with the intention to give it up, to sur-render it, Heidegger attempts to convey (t)his “*crucial surrendering*” [“*entschiedene Preisgabe*”, G212] of the metaphysical saying that “being is” to this “other inception” of occidental thinking, as cited above, thus [G343]: “The beyng-historic saying: “beyng is” thinks an other (inception) [ein Anderes], not the beingest (or be-ingest) as the first, indeed by no means beyng — notwithstanding the say(ing) of the “is” — as the being; the beyng-historic say(ing) says the pure essenizing of beyng [die reine Wesung des Seyns], ... .”

Much later, in his 1962 lecture “Zeit und Sein [Time and Being]”<sup>63</sup>, there is [gibt es] a rather more ‘abyssally ground-breaking’ reappraisal of the task [Aufgabe] of giving up [des Aufgebens], also in the sense of ‘letting go of’, of ‘leaving to its own devises’, the horizon of metaphysics *and* its overcoming to re-say and to re-think the epochal destiny(ng) of “the pure essenizing of beyng, ...” and all that in 1938 / 39 had followed in the vacant position. Here Heidegger homes in on and hones what it means to (re-)say in essen(ing) [im Wesen], respectively in essenizing [in der Wesung], that [GA14, G10] “Being *is* not.” [“Sein *ist* night.”] but that “There is, It gives being as the deconcealing of presenz(ing).” [“Sein gibt Es als das Entbergen von Anwesen.”]; and what it means to (re-)think the “Es gibt” [the “There is” in the sense of ‘It gives’] of *this* revealing-concealing truth of being, *this* de-concealing of presenz(ing), specially, on its own terms, [eigens<sup>64</sup>], without regard for a grounding of being in terms of the whence and

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63 Page numbers for citations from Heidegger’s 1962 lecture “Zeit und Sein” correspond to those in the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* edition of “Zur Sache des Denkens” [“To the matter of thinking”], being volume 14 of the *Gesamtausgabe* [hereafter cited as “GA14”], Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, Frankfurt am Main 2007, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. A separate edition of “Zur Sache des Denkens” was first published by Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen 1969.

64 “specially, on its own terms,” is not quite to the mustard. For a closer delineation of the intended use of *eigens* in *Zeit and Sein*, see Heidegger’s amplificatory footnote to an earlier use of the word in this introductory remark to his lecture at GA14, G6:

Der Versuch, Sein ohne das Seiende zu denken, wird notwendig, weil anders sonst, wie mir scheint, keine Möglichkeit mehr besteht, das Sein dessen, was heute rund um den Erdball *ist*, eigens<sup>(1)</sup> in den Blick zu bringen, geschweige denn das Verhältnis des Menschen zu dem, was bislang »Sein« hieß, hinreichend zu bestimmen.

<sup>(1)</sup> in seiner eigenen einzigen Eigentümlichkeit

In translation:

The attempt to think being without the being becomes necessary because otherwise, it seems to me, there is no longer any possibility of bringing into view specially, on its own terms, [eigens<sup>(1)</sup>] the being [das Sein] of that which *is*, nowadays, all around the globe, let

whither of the being and, coincidentally, no mention of “being” [“Sein”] as “beyng” [“Seyn”]; and to do so with renewed regard for *das Ereignis* [“the enpropriation” or, per Emad and Kalery in *Mindfulness* (2006) and Emad and Maly in *Contributions* (1999), “the enowning”] as his guiding word in the (re-)appraisal of *das Ereignen* [“the enpropriating / enowning”] that is so germane, so *essential* [wesentlich], to the hitherto unthought “It gives” in the inceptual saying “It gives being” [“Es gibt Sein”] and concomitantly “It gives time” [“Es gibt Zeit”]; and hence the hitherto unthought going-together of being *and* time in his elucidatory exposition [GA14, G9]: “It gives being and it gives time.” [G10]:

To think being specially, on its own terms, requires letting go of being as the ground of the being in favour of the giving that is at play, sheltered and concealed, in the deconcealing, i.e. in favour of the It gives [des Es gibt].

And at the close of his lecture [G29f], an inkling of how the indicative enpropriation of being and time in the saying “It gives being and it gives time” is yet to be so thought pursuant to his having ventured to say that what still remains to be said having said that enpropriation neither *is*, nor *gibt es* [*is* there, does it *give*] enpropriation, is only this: “The enpropriation enpropriates.” [“Das Ereignis ereignet.”]. With that, Heidegger suggests, “we are saying the same from whence of the same whither the same”. And while to all appearances this says nothing, it does indeed say nothing, he concedes [G29], so long as we hear what has been said [das Gesagte] as a mere sentence [or proposition or statement or tenet: einen bloßen Satz] and hand it over it to the interrogation of logic.

But what if we were, without let-up, to take care of what was said and accept the same as the clue to our thinking pursuant thereto while bearing in mind that this same is not even something new but the oldest of the old in occidental thinking: the primordial age-old that shelters and conceals itself in the name: Ἀ-λήθεια? What will be foresaid [or said first (for saying again): vorgesagt], by such that is incipient [durch dieses Anfängliche] to all leitmotifs of thinking is telling of an obligation that obliges all thinking, providing the latter adjusts itself to the behest of what is worthwhile thinking.

It has been a matter, while looking through time proper [die eigentliche Zeit], of thinking being in regard to its own [in sein Eigenes] — from the enpropriation [aus dem Ereignis] — without regard for the relation of being to the being.

To think being without the being means: to think being without regard to metaphysics. But then such a regard still reigns [G30] even in the intention to

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alone of adequately determining the relation of the human being to what has hitherto been called »being«.

<sup>(1)</sup> in its own unique singularity / its own singular peculiarity (or propriety).

overcome metaphysics. It is therefore a matter of leaving overcoming alone and leaving metaphysics to itself. <sup>(14)</sup>

<sup>(14)</sup> purely observe [or conserve: *bewahren*] metaphysics as such and not mix up with my thinking.

Note, incidentally, that, in his 1962 lecture “Zeit und Sein”, there appears to be no *thought-through* reappraisal on Heidegger’s part of the *determined* conflation in *Besinnung* (GA66) (and elsewhere) of the pure *essenzing* and the pure *presenizing* of *beyng*. From whence (ἀρχή), so Heidegger, the decidedly *Greek* *essenz(ing)* as ( = ) *presenz(ing)* of being that pervades occidental thinking to the present day, gets its true bearing. And yet here, where the hitherto taken-for-granted *essenzing* of the being of the being signifies — “only and for all time” (?), as Heidegger queries — the *presenizing* of that which is (the) *presenizing*, the *questioning* must first begin. With regard to the primacy afforded by occidental-European thinking to the incipient meaning of being as *presenizing*, Heidegger himself will later remind us, in so many words, that the hitherto unheeded *essenzing* of the *presenizing* alone gives us sufficient pause for thought.

So why, in 1938 / 39, does his appraisal unto the inceptual saying: “being is” [“das Sein ist”] — exemplified in Parmenides’ Saying *ἔστιν γὰρ εἶναι* — “not allow the “being” [dem “Sein”] (“εἶναι”) and the “is” [dem “ist”] (“ἔστιν”) their archessentially incipient meaning of “the *essenzing* *essenzen*” [“die *Wesung* *wes*”] that will be meant or inkled as: “the *essent(ing)* / *essenzing* [*wesende*] *bestantiation* of the *bestance* of the *essenzing* [*Wesung*]”? Is not this archessential *essenzing* [*Wesung*] (*εἶναι*), be it *presenizing* [*Anwesung*] (*παρεῖναι*) or *absenizing* [*Abwesung*] (*ἀπείναι*), the one that — ‘at first prevails over any of that which is (the) *essenzing* [jedes *Wesende*], be it any of that which is (the) *presenizing* or *absenizing* [jedes *An- oder Abwesende*], and thus its ownself’? A less composite reading of the *beyng-historic* saying: “*beyng* is” [“das *Seyn* ist”] in the vein of “the *essenzing* *essenzen*” *as* ( = *and* ≠ ) “the *presenizing* *presenzen*” would make better sense of the following sentences [*Besinnung* (GA66), G343]: “When adequately thought through, the metaphysical saying: “being is” can become a telltale sign of whether there is within metaphysics any extent at all to which being itself brings its own *essenz(ing)* [*Wesen*] under control.”; And: “... the *beyng-historic* say(ing) says the pure *essenzing* [*Wesung*] of *beyng*”.

In the same vein, we could ask: why, in 1962, does Heidegger’s appraisal unto the inceptual saying [GA14, G10: “Being *is* not. There is, It gives, being as the deconcealing of *presenz(ing)*. [*Sein ist nicht. Sein gibt Es als das Entbergen von Anwesen.*]” not allow the archessentially incipient meaning: “Being *is* not. There is, It gives, being as the deconcealing of *essenz(ing)* [... als das Entbergen von

Wesen].”? From this horizon, the *questioning* must first begin with any *resolved upon yet unthought-through* blurring of the *twofold*, indeed *manifold*, distinction between the deconcealing “of *essenz(ing)* [von *Wesen*]” whence of itself, the *essenizing* [*Wesung*], as (= and  $\neq$ ) “of *presenz(ing)* [von *Anwesen*]” whence of itself, the *presenizing* [*Anwesung*], on the one hand, and, in a countervailing sense, as (= and  $\neq$ ) “of *absenz(ing)* [von *Abwesen*]” whence of itself, the *absenizing* [*Abwesung*], on the other. Is there no hint in our gleaning of the *essential* content of the prevailing(-cum-unprevailing) forgoing: ‘the *presenz(ing)* = *essenz(ing)* ( *absenz(ing)* )’, of a glossing over of the incipient primacy of the meaning of being in the intimation of *essenizing* as (=) *presenizing*? Is it not remarkable that *essenizing* will be handsomely glossed with *presenizing* so readily in the settled arrangement of these *distinctive* modes of *how* being archessentially *is*, i.e. *essenzen* (= *presenzen* ?) and *is not*, i.e. *essenzen* (= (*pre-*)(*es*)*senzen* ?) ab-<sup>65</sup> as the deconcealing of *essenz(ing)* whence of itself and whither the same, to wit, the *essenizing*?

The ‘unassuming’ primacy afforded to the meaning of being as *presenz(ing)* [= *essenz(ing)* ( *absenz(ing)* ?)] in the 1962 lecture will however be tellingly remarked upon in “Protokoll zu einem Seminar über “Zeit und Sein” [Protocol to a seminar on “Time and Being”]” where, it is said, “the primacy of *presenz(ing)* [Vorrang des *Anwesens*]” that emerges as co-determinative in all coinages of being and thus also makes itself known as the meaning of being in “Time and Being”, will be reappraised (evidently with Heidegger’s imprimature) as “still unthought” and hence, in the lecture itself, “an assertion, but as such therefore a *question* and task of thinking [eine Behauptung, als solche aber eine *Frage* und Aufgabe des Denkens]” [*Zur Sache des Denkens* (GA14), G42]:

It was said straightforwardly from the outset: “Ever since the beginning of occidental-European thinking up to today, being means the same as “*presenz(ing)*”. How about this statement? Does being mean as much as *presenz(ing)* exclusively or in any case with such primacy that its other determinations can be ignored? Does the determination of being as *presenz(ing)*, the trait solely featuring in the lecture, ensue only from the intention of the lecture to try to think being and time together? Or, in respect of the whole array of determinations of being, does *presenz(ing)* have, so far as the ‘matter-at-stake’ is concerned, a ‘material’ primacy independent of the intention of the lecture? Above all, how do matters stand when it comes to the determination of being as ground?

*Presenz(ing)*, presence, talks its way into all metaphysical concepts of being, into all determinations of being. Even the ground, as that which is (the) already lying before [das schon Vorliegende], as that which is (the) underlying [das Zugrundeliegende], leads, considered in itself, to whiling, lasting, to time, (being) present. Not only in the Greek determinations of being but, as it were, also in the Kantian ‘position’ and

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65 wie Sein ... ist, d.h. west (= west an ?) und ist nicht, d.h. west (= (an-)west ?) ab-.

in the Hegelian dialectic as the movement of *thesis*, *antithesis*, and *synthesis* (so here again also positedness), (being) present [Gegenwart] speaks, a primacy of *presenz(ing)* [ein Vorrang des Anwesens] makes itself known (cf. *Nietzsche II*, pp. G399ff [GA6.2, G363ff], further: *Wegmarken* [1967], G273ff, [GA9, G445ff]: “Kants These über das Sein [Kant’s thesis concerning being]”).

From these indicant references a primacy of *presenz(ing)* emerges that is co-determinative in all coinages of being. How, in which manner, this determination is, which meaning the primacy of *presenz(ing)* that is making itself known has, is still unthought. In the lecture “Time and Being”, the primacy of *presenz(ing)* remains an assertion, but as such therefore a *question* and task of thinking, namely, one of giving considerate thought to whether and whence and to what extent the primacy of *presenz(ing)* stands good.

To return to our task [Aufgabe] of the rendering (giving again, back, in return) of what is worth(while)-saying and thinking and translating with regard to the *essential* [wesentliche] de-concealing of the *presenz(ing)* [des Anwesens], respectively the *presenzing* [der Anwesung], of that which is (the) *presenzing* [des Anwesenden] and hence with regard to the *beyng*-historic say(ing) that, in saying that “*beyng* is”, says the pure *essenzing* of *beyng* [die reine Wesung des Seyns] as the *presenzing* [Anwesung] that *presenzes* / is *presenzing* [west an] and at first prevails over any of that which is (the) *presenzing* [jedes Anwesende] and thus its ownself, the question arises: What *essentially* is Emad and Kalary’s rendition of (the equivalent of) “the *presencing* of [what / that which is] present” in the English of *Mindfulness* intending to translate? Is it meant as an alternate, more inclusive English translation of only the dually-signifying nominal participle “das Anwesende” in contrast to its less inclusive nominally-partial rendition with “what / that which is present” (or “what / that which *presences*”) to acknowledge that, in accordance with the German original, the translating word in question “should have a verbal meaning” too, one that is hardly taken care of in any such pared-down English rendition? Or is it meant, again more inclusively, as an alternate English translation not of “das Anwesende” *per (es)se* but of this *essentially nominal* participle in what would otherwise be the well-trusted, less inclusive rendition of the German phrase ‘das Anwesen des Anwesenden’ with the nominally-partial ‘the presence of what / that which is present’ (or ‘the presence of what / that which *presences*’)? Or is it meant, strictly speaking, on Emad and Kalary’s interpretation in other respects, to be a translation, albeit still only partially-signifying, of the German turn of phrase ‘die Anwesung des Anwesenden’ [‘the *presenzing* of that which is (the) *presenzing*’]?

In any event, there would seem to be the still of an abyssal-ground in *essenz(ing)* [im Wesen], respectively in *essenzing* [in der Wesung], between the language and thinking of, on the one hand, an *essentially* [wesentlich] advancing nominal and retreating verbal English rendition of *das Anwesende* with, say, “that which



is (the) presencing / presenzing / present-ing” or, alternatively, “the / what is / that which is present(ing)”, and of *das Abwesende* with, say, “that which is (the) absencing / absenzing / absent-ing” or, alternatively, “the / what is / that which is absent(ing)”, and, on the other hand, Emad and Kalary’s un-essentially [un-*wesentlich*] alternate English rendition thereof with “[the presencing of] what / that which is present” or, alternatively, “[... of] what / that which presences” and, impliedly, “[the absencing of] what / that which is absent” or, alternatively, “[... of] what / that which absences”.

In their struggle to translate, even with the compound cognates of the *esse* in (*esse*)ntia, respectively *esse*(ntia), at play, the *distinctive* ‘nounings’ of the respective verbal sense from which *das Anwesen*, *die Anwesenung*, and *das Anwesende* get their true bearing, each noun phrase in its ownmost way in connection with the others, there appears to be an *unthought-through* conflation of these three German noun phrases, a confused co-mingling of equally-essentially altering beyng-historic distinctions that will in all likelihood carry over in translation, be it expressly or impliedly so, to the three countervailing German noun phrases *das Abwesen*, *die Abwesenung*, and *das Abwesende*.

The same struggle on the part of Emad and Kalary to translate the *distinctive* ‘nounings’ of the respective verbal sense from which the kindred (primordially inherent) German noun phrases *das Wesen*, *die Wesung*, and *das Wesende* get their true bearing, each noun phrase in its ownmost way in connection with the others, yet this time without their paradigmatically related agnates, the cognates of the *esse* in (*esse*)ntia, respectively *esse*(ntia), being in play, has to some extent already become apparent in connection with the appraisal of Emad and Kalary’s interpretation of what is or is not required of a suitable English translation of *das Wesen* vis-à-vis *die Wesung*. It can also be discerned in their (unthought-through) conflation of *die Wesung* and *das Wesende* by dint of the former deverbal noun (phrase) and, selectively, the latter nominal participle both being translated with the same English verbal noun (phrase) “the swaying”. And by thus equating the true bearing with and apart from one another of the two German noun phrases, by thus conflating the language of their true identity and difference without thinking through it, this English translation silently by-passes, for the unwitting English reader, the beyng-historic conundrum of an essent-ial distinction between them despite their inclination to overlap; and hence the challenge to the translators of having to wrestle therewith all at once if their best shot at a ‘not-so-poor’ interpretation of the inconspicuous identity *and* difference between *das Wesen*, *die Wesung*, and *das Wesende* is to hold true to the distinguished wording of these keywords in the German original.



In this domain of translating especially, the uneschewable conflation of differing renderings of the very same in the enigmatic wording of the distinguished keywords of occidental thinking when they overlap, must surely be embraced, not consigned to oblivion, as at any moment worthy of interpretation, of thinking through. Why do we so often leave the suspected shortcomings of our own interpretation of this enigma out of consideration? Why do we so obstinately shut our eyes and ears to them more than ever when called upon to translate into English Heidegger's approach to the riddle of translating the uneschewable conflating of the differing renderings of the same time word *wesen* and cognates within his own German language and thinking?

Do we not yet dare, as best we can, to riddle out—rather than wriggle out of—the mystery of our uneschewable conflating of the correspondingly distinguished keywords of our own English language and thinking when they overlap? And to riddle [rätseln] out in the open, in a manner beholden to their *essenz(ing)*, respectively *essenzing*, to wit, *wesenhaft*, *not* by 'speaking in riddles' or 'riddling with errors' or by way of surreptitiously 'solving' or 'answering' or 'explaining' the riddle of some or other mystery keyword without openly beholding and thinking through it.

It seems likely that before Heidegger's 'not-so-poor' translating of the enigmatic co-mingling of these distinguished 'nounings' of *wesen*, v. in the German original can be truly appreciated in a manner beholden to their *essenz(ing)*, respectively *essenzing*, that is to say, translated into our own English language and thinking in a (deconcealing) way that holds true (ἀλήθεύειν) to the very words, any conflating English rendition of such distinguished and distinguishing German keywords that we might otherwise prefer to ignore, in a manner unholden to their *essenz(ing)*, respectively *essenzing*, to wit, *unwesenhaft*, will first have to be inked as a question-worthy interpretation for not just *veiling* but also *unveiling* our access to an inceptive viewing of their true bearing with and apart from one among another. Let us consider the following in this light.

In respect of the *essentially deverbally* noun phrase *die Wesung*, in our sense of "the *essenzing*", Emad and Kalary's verbal noun phrase "the *swaying*" is meant to translate, as is appropriate, the accentuation of the prevailing (de)verbal signification of the German phrase word *Wesung*, analogously to their translation of *die An- und Abwesung*, in our sense of "the *presenzing* and *absenzing*", with "the *presencing* and *absencing*", albeit the [*W*]*esung* that is primordially inherent to German *An- und Abwesung* is thus inconsistently translated without, and the compound cognates thereof with, a cognate, respectively compound cognate, of the *esse* in *esse(ntia)*.

Whereas in respect of the *essentially nominal* participle “das Wesende”, in our sense of “that which is (the) essenizing / essent-ing”, the same verbal noun phrase “the swaying” is meant to translate, as is appropriate, not just the reverse-thrust signification of the inrooted *verbal* noun phrase “das Wesen” = ‘(das) wesen’ des Wesen(den)<sup>66</sup> but the distinctive ‘going together’ of the prevailing nominal and unprevailing verbal co-significations of the German participial phrase-wording “das Wesende” in the vein of “that which is (the) swaying”. Therefore not an impossible assignment but clearly one for which the translating verbal noun phrase “the swaying” on its own is in any event unsuited. Just as the alternate rendition with the prevailing nominally-partial signification “that which is swaying” on its own would be unsuited for different reasons. And because their verbally-partial English rendition of “das Wesende” with “the swaying” is wanting in its own way when it comes to the assignment of suitably translating the fuller nominally-accentuated sway of the prevailing(-cum-unprevailing) power to name and the settled arrangement of this *essentially nominal* participle as one such as it is in respect of the whole wording of the word, Emad and Kalary seem forced to equivocate and content themselves with the mutual exclusivity of either their nominally-partial or, *alternately*, their verbally-partial rendition of the German word(s): *either* their most trusted nominally-partial rendition “what / that which sways / holds sway” *or*, by way of exception when this deverbifying signification will simply not do, their verbally-partial rendition “the swaying” that is, confusingly, also their well-trusted rendition of Heidegger’s deverbal noun phrase “die Wesung”.

In other words: If the English translation of “das Wesende” with the preferred cognates of sway, v. [lit. Ger. *schweien* / *schwaien*, v.] is to approximate not just the ‘either / or’ partiality but the full s(w)ay of this German participial word(ing), that assignment would require Emad and Kalary to somehow render *all at once* their accentuation of an obtrusive nominal sense of “das Wesende” as “what / that which sways / holds sway” over a less obtrusive verbal sense of the German nominal participle’s inrooted verbal noun(ing) “das Wesen” = ‘(das) wesen’ des Wesen(den) that they otherwise translate with the ordinarily advancing verbal sense of substantivized sway, v. “the sway” (or, to throw a much bigger spanner in the works, with the ordinarily advancing nominal sense of substantivized ownmost, adj. “the ownmost”). So even though it be within the confines of their preferred terminology (including their equating of *das Wesende* and *das Schweiende*), the limitations of which have already been explored to some extent in this appraisal, a somewise commensurate modification to Emad and Kalary’s ‘either / or’ translation of “das Wesende” (= “das Schweiende”) in

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66 “des Wesen(den)”: “of ( that which is ) (the) essenizing/ essent-ing”.

the (nuanced) vein of a more appositely co-signifying, (still) nominally-accentuated, “that which is (the) swaying” or, if need be, “that which is (the) holding sway” [“das Schweiende” as “das Waltende” ?] seems unavoidable if their English translation is to come anywhere near to approximating the full “sway” [“Schweien” ?] and “holding sway” [“Walten” ?] of the German noun phrase “das Wesende” as the *essentially nominal* participle that it is.

This alternative translation of “das Wesende” more or less on Emad and Kalary’s preferred, albeit question-worthy terms, notably with the cognates of sway, v. and without the cognates of essence, v., would at least make some sense of an English rendition of the turn of phrase “das Wesen des Wesenden” [= “das Schweien des Schweienden” ?] with “the swaying of that which is (the) swaying”. And the latter formulation is by no means equivalent to “the sway [= d. Schwei(en) ?] of what / that which sways [des Schweienden ?]” nor indeed to “the swaying [= die Schweiung ?] of what / that which sways [des Schweienden ?]”.

The somewise commensurate modification to Emad and Kalary’s English translation of “das Wesende” [= “das Schweiende” ?] therefore demands, by implication, a correspondingly commensurate modification to their English rendition of nominally-partial *and* verbally-partial co-significations of this *essentially nominal* participle with, respectively, “that which is swaying” *and* “the swaying”; and, in the case of the latter specifically, *not* with “the sway” [“der Schwei” ?] (pace Emad and Kalary’s preferred translation of the unprevailing fold of the participial German twofold’s inrooted verbal noun “das Wesen” = ‘(das) wesen’ des Wesen(den) ).

Though all of this would only serve to extend the unthought-through conflation of *die Wesung* and *das Wesende* to *das Wesen* in Emad and Kalary’s partly unveiling partly veiling English translation of these distinctive ‘nounings’ of the primordial time word *wesen* and thus to augment the question-worthy implications of their reliance upon the chiaroscuro notion that, selectively, sway, v. can be upheld as a good approximation, let alone a better approximation than essence / essenz, v., to wesen, v. in *Besinnung* (GA66). And, to draw once again on Emad and Kalary’s “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness* [p. xxxi], not just in *Besinnung* (GA66) but everywhere else in Heidegger’s thought:

Having considered every statement that Heidegger has made on *essentia* (from the early pages of *Sein und Zeit* to the texts of his Nietzsche lectures and beyond), we found that *Wesen* and *Wesung* cannot be brought into English with the cognates of *essentia* because ...

In the English words “sway” and “swaying” we found a good approximation to *Wesen* and *Wesung*. ...

Be that as it may, the prevailing nominal reading of the German participial noun phrase *das Wesende* without proper regard to the unprevailing fold of its inrooted verbal nouncing *das Wesen*, is mostly translated by Emad and Kalary in *Mindfulness* accordingly, that is, with their well-trusted, nominally-partial rendition “what / that which sways / holds sway”, analogously to their well-trusted, nominally-partial rendition of *das An- und Abwesende* with “what / that which is present and absent” or “what / that which presences and absences”. The interpretation is therefore question-worthy because not only is *das Wesende* inconsistently translated without, and its compound cognates *das An- und Abwesende* with, a cognate, respectively compound cognate, of essence, v., but because, in respect of none of these being-historic participial words (in translation), does the interpretation have recourse to the full s(w)ay and array of *the appropriate* cognates of the Latinate-English time word “to essence / essenz” that would allow for and not begrudge the closest approximation by far in our English language to the paradigmatically-related agnates of the German time word *wesen*.

All in all, there appears to be an untenable disruption to and compromise of the original nexus between *das Wesen*, *die Wesung*, and *das Wesende* and, concomitantly, *das An- und Abwesen*, *die An- und Abwesung*, and *das An- und Abwesende* whenever these kindred German noun phrases are translated into the English of *Mindfulness* without recourse to the appropriate cognates, and compound cognates, of ‘essence / essenz, v. = *wesen*, v., *esse*, v., εἶναι, v.’. And this disruption to and compromise of the interrelating paradigmatic inflections of the cognates and compound cognates of primordial *wesen*, v. translating *esse*, v. translating εἶναι, v., occurs *solely* in Emad and Kalary’s English translation thereof, *not* in the original German of *Besinnung* (GA66) *nor* anywhere else in Heidegger’s German texts where the being-historic interplay of the distinguished and distinguishing cognates (and agnates) of *wesen*, v. remains, more or less, intact.

It may be, that to hold in regard but an inkling of an other-than-metaphysical inception of the *Wesen* of occidental thinking after Heidegger, we have first to behold in the occidental train of thought of “(das) *Wesen*” as ‘(d.) *Wesen*(heit), (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ and our sense of “(the) *essen*(ing)”, an incipiently being-historic intimation of the disconcerting harmonia of the agnates and cognates of *wesen*, v. translating *esse*, v. and εἶναι, v. in a manner beholden to their *essen*(ing) [*wesen*haft, im *Wesen*haften]. In this manner, perchance, a venture in appreciative thinking in full pursuance *and* purveyance of Heidegger

translating *Wesen* and the enigma of ‘*Wesen* = *essentia*, οὐσία’ and ‘*Wesen* ≠ *essentia*, οὐσία but rather: = *esse*, εἶναι’ may ensue; and be welcomed.

Heidegger is well known for his open condemnation of the given-and-taken-for-granted Latinization of the occident consequent upon what he perceives to be the Romanizing of Greek thinking through the Latin language, above all through the word *essentia* and, concomitantly, the word *substantia*. And sometimes, let it be said, he permits himself a question-worthy disparagement of what is perceived to be only the depreciative and unacquitable Latinization via *essentia* of the German word *Wesen* and the Greek word οὐσία to overwhelm and to get in the way of his original thinking; more precisely, his genuine appreciation for and thinking through of the prevailing (culpable ?) language of ‘*Wesen* = *essentia*, οὐσία’ as but a partial laying (and not laying) itself out of the enigmatic *Wesen* of occidental thinking as an integral being-historic whole; leaving little or no trace of the unprevailing (commendable ?) language of ‘*wesen* = *esse*, εἶναι’ that is *also* incipiently true to this very *Wesen* of our occidental language and thinking as such.

It may therefore come to pass, shall we (es)say, that while risking the translation decision *not* to pander to Heidegger’s at times *unthought-through* prejudice (when it rears its ugly head) against the (merely culpable ?<sup>67</sup>) Latinization of the German word *Wesen* and the Greek word οὐσία through *essentia*,<sup>68</sup> it becomes an appraisively-appreciative apprising of the inceptive essenizing [Wesung] of being as beyng, to let our shared occidental language of the essen(z)ing [Wesen(heit)] of being as being(ness) [Seiend(heit)], and hence *the Wesen of metaphysics and its Seinsdenken*—to which we are, in the first place and for the most part, oblivious—become the incipiently given-and-taken-for-granted language of beyng that is most essentially [am *wesentlichsten*] worth(while)-saying and thinking and translating.

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67 or, in a manner beholden to the essen(z)ing [wesenhaft, im Wesenhaften], culpable(-cum-commendable)?

68 I shall leave my appraisal of this controversial point in abeyance for now, except to say that to consider “every statement that Heidegger has made on *essentia* ( ... )” in light of it and yet still hear an inkling, if not maintain a finding, diametrically opposed to Emad and Kalary’s “( ... ), we found that *Wesen* and *Wesung* cannot be brought into English with the cognates of *essentia* because ...”, would merit an [essay](#) of its own.





**§13. A closing observation on the task of  
'translating Heidegger translating *Wesen*'**

As far as I am aware, my translation of *das Wesen* with “the essenz(ing)”—and, concomitantly, of *das An- und Abwesen* with “the presenz(ing) and absenz(ing)”—is, with one notable exception, unparalleled as the hitherto closest approximation by far in our English language to the archessentially beyng-historic wording of the German word *Wesen* (-wesen) in the inceptual language and thinking of Martin Heidegger; and thus a parallel venture in appreciative thinking after Heidegger to say and to think and to translate in another language what is *essentially* [*wesentlich*] true to this keyword of occidental being and time *in a manner beholden to its essenz(ing)* [*wesenhaft*]. The exception is a coinage tried though not fully tested more than half a century ago by William J. Richardson in his seminal study, *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*<sup>69</sup> where, on rare occasions, the author innovatively ventures “the essenc[-ing]”, respectively “the essenc(-ing)”, to translate the (Heidegger’s) noun phrase *das Wesen*. I say “rare occasions” because, in an influential study comprising nearly eight-hundred pages and uncountable references to and alternate English translations of the phrase, I counted the author’s highly original take on the German word *Wesen* only seven, respectively two, times.

Of the seven occurrences, the coinage “essenc[-ing]” is conceded three times in quick succession by Richardson in the following brief passage of *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* where the author is citing, by way of paraphrasing and translating, from Heidegger’s essay “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)” in the 1954 collection *Vorträge and Aufsätze*<sup>70</sup> [p. 497f]:

So it comes about that Heidegger, re-trieving as he does the original sense of λέγειν, thinks “... the essenc[-ing] of language in terms of the essenc[-ing] of Being, indeed as this essenc[-ing] itself,”<sup>20</sup> ...

<sup>20</sup> “... das Wesen der Sprache aus dem Wesen des Seins, ja sogar als dieses selbst gedacht. ...” (VA, p. 228).

The word “essenc[-ing]” for *Wesen* is given short shrift just four more times in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* at pp. XXII (once), 500 (twice), and 568 (once). There are, in addition, two variations of this novel

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<sup>69</sup> Published by Marinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1963.

<sup>70</sup> Verlag Gunther Neske Pfullingen, 1954. Cf. *Vorträge and Aufsätze* [*Lectures and Essays*], being volume 7 of the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter cited as “GA7”), Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2000, G233 (G220).

Latinate-English coinage with the “-ing” in parentheses rather than square brackets at pp. 578 (once, with an initial lower-case “e” as “the essenc(-ing)”) and 565 (once, with an initial upper-case “E” as “Essenc(-ing)”).

With these few exceptions, Richardson almost invariably prefers to render “the essence” to emphasise *das Wesen* in the merely substantive sense or, alternately, “the essenc-ing” to emphasise the “fully verbal sense” when either the former or the latter emphasis is evidently intended by the thinker Heidegger or else, for the most part, surmised as so intended by Richardson.

It is Richardson’s wont, moreover, to regularly distinguish between the phrase word “essence” that does not normally bear an initial capital “e” in the noun phrase “the essence” and the phrase word “Essence” that does bear an initial capital “E” in the noun phrase “the Essence”, with his proviso being that the noun “Essence” with an upper-case initial understands *Wesen* verbally whereas the noun “essence” with a lower-case initial understands *Wesen* substantively. Hence the phrase word “Essence”, with an initial capital, in the noun phrase “the Essence” is intended to substitute for the phrase word “essenc-ing”, with a lower-case initial, in the verbal noun phrase “the essenc-ing”.<sup>71</sup> On this interpretation, the noun “Essence” with an initial capital “E” and the noun “essenc-ing” with an initial small “e” are *alternative* Latinate-English renditions of the verbally-partial signification of the German verbal noun *Wesen*; whereas the noun “essence” with an initial small “e” is an *alternate* Latinate-English rendition of its nominally-partial signification.

We therefore arrive, on the one hand, at alternate variations on Latin *essentia* verbatim, with one variant rendition of essence, n. being distinguished from the other by capitalisation of the word’s first letter to afford it, by this means alone, the “fully verbal sense” of the noun “essenc-ing” that does not normally bear an initial capital, and, on the other, the latter as the supposed alternate only to the noun “essence” with a lower-case initial not to the purportedly “fully verbal sense” of the noun “Essence” with an upper-case initial. But can any of these mutually-exclusive renditions truly be said to translate the being-historic interplay of the integral German noun phrase *das Wesen* in the settled arrangement of its advancing nominal and retreating verbal significations? That

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71 Moreover Richardson expressly intends his “Essence” with an initial capital “E” translating *Wesen* to be read (contraindicatively) in the “fully verbal sense” of not just “essenc-ing” but also “presenc-ing” / “coming-to-(a-)presence” translating *Anwesen* and “Being” translating *Sein* [Richardson, op.cit., pp. 228f; 239f; 698f, 741, 753]. The author’s conflation in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* of the essential distinction in Heidegger’s German texts between *Wesen*, n., respectively *wesen*, v., and *Anwesen*, n., respectively *anwesen*, v., is addressed below.

is to say, in a manner beholden to its essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing), to wit, *wesenhaft*?

Richardson's unusual rendering of *das Wesen* with "the essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)" is an exceptional translation in more ways than one. First, it is an exceptionally good approximation to the full sway of the advancing nominal and retreating verbal significations of the German noun phrase in a manner beholden to its essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing). Second, it stands apart from the (his) usual rend(er)ings thereof in a manner un beholden to its essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing), to wit, *unwesenhaft*, as the rare exception, an exceptional rend(er)ing – giving again, back, in return through rending – of a suitable translation that is then abandoned in favour of less suitable alternates. The latter include (among others):

- (1) "the essence" or, alternately, either
- (2) "the essenc-ing" or, alternatively (?),
- (3) "the Essence"

Re (1): nominally-partial; *Wesen* as 'Wesenheit = essentia, οὐσία';

Re (2): verbally-partial; corresponding to *Wesen* as 'wesen = esse, εἶναι';

Re (3): nominally-partial to be read as verbally-partial; 'Wesenheit = essentia, οὐσία' to be read as 'wesen = esse, εἶναι'.

Which raises the question of whether a not-so-poor interpretation of the full s(w)ay of *das Wesen* in a manner beholden to the essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing) thereof can properly rely upon the unexamined coining of an exceptionally good Latinate-English approximation to the conventional and essent-ial language of this German noun phrase that is all but abandoned for a bundle of much poorer alternates in the vein of, for example, either (1) or (2) or (3) above.

To accomplish its full potential as a tried and well-tested translation that is, as far as possible, not just word for word but true to the word that *is*, i.e. *essences / essenzen* (and brackets / parentheses its essencing / essenzening) *as*, "das Wesen", the wording of the word in question must surely be practised as befits all manner of ways pertaining to its 'usage' proper. When it comes to discerning whether or not a word in translation, newly coined or otherwise, truly befits the experiential enigma of the language of "das Wesen" on every occasion, there is no getting around having to try it out, test its worth, and convey it as such. With few 'not-so-poor' exceptions to his relatively ill-befitting renditions of "das Wesen", there is no way of telling the extent to which Richardson's most

inceptive interpretation in *Heidegger through Phenomenology to Thought* of Heidegger's translating of *Wesen* within his own German language and thinking can bear the test to leave its exceptional mark on the little that remains of the generally foresaken word "essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)", the latter being the only English translation of *Wesen* at Richardson's disposal that comes close to approximating what is most inceptively and near consummately true to (Heidegger's translating thereof in) the German original.

For, instead of fully putting to the test his originary experience of "das Wesen" in a manner beholden to its essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing), that is to say, 'wesenhaft, im Wesenhaften', the author of *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* prefers to equivocate with the generally accepted Latinate-English cognates of *essentia* by rendering, in the first place, either his most prevalent choice of "the essence" to stress "das Wesen" in its predominantly substantive sense or alternately his much less prevalent choice of "the essenc-ing" to stress its "fully verbal sense" whenever greater emphasis on one or the other of the former or the latter signification is indicated or expressly intended by the thinker Heidegger; or else, for the most part, surmised as so indicated or intended by him per Richardson. In any case, whenever the full s(w)ay of his most inceptive and near consummate term "the essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)", is dispensed with, a partial decision has to be made by the interpreter one way or the other: *either* "the essence" *or* "the essenc-ing", or alternating words to this effect.

I say "alternating words to this effect" because, as already indicated, it is the author's wont when translating "das Wesen" to alternate not just between "the essence" and "the essenc-ing" but also between one of two variations on the very same word essence, n.: by counterposing the aforementioned most prevalent use of the lower-case first letter "e" of "essence" to a less prevalent use of the upper-case first letter "E" of "Essence" such that the noun "essence" with a lower-case initial continues to understand *Wesen* substantively in the usual sense of 'Wesen = essentia' whereas the noun "Essence" with an initial capital tries to understand *Wesen* verbally in the not-quite-so-usual 'Heideggerean' sense corresponding to 'wesen = esse' and Richardson's sense of "the essenc-ing". Thus Richardson is effectively urging his readers to read essence, v. into his merely substantive noun "Essence" with an initial capital "E" on every occasion where, and this applies in the main, this verbal sense is not otherwise expressly indicated or reiterated as such by him. Were the prescient silence of essence, v. not read into Essence, n. with an initial capital, as somehow fully suspended therein, the latter, as a mere substantive, could not partake of the "fully verbal sense" of the verbal noun (phrase) corresponding to the former, to wit, "the

essenc-ing”, let alone to the full sway of “das Wesen” as “the essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)”.

Though it is doubtful that converting the lower-case initial “e” of essence, n. to the upper-case initial “E” of Essence, n. will suffice to turn the latter second take on *essentia* verbatim into an appropriately close approximation to the Latinate-English noun phrase “the essenc-ing” (with a lower-case initial “e”) and thus a *verbal* substantive proper corresponding to essence, v. as distinct from a merely substantive [e]ssence, n.-substitute therefor. Indeed the bare ‘title-case’ distinction between an advancing nominally-partial essence, n. (*essentia*) with a lower-case initial “e” and, purportedly, an advancing verbally-partial “Essence, n. ( $\neq$  *essentia* ?) with an initial capital “E” promises to be a distinction without a difference. In any case, with this array of less-than-suitable renditions at his disposal, Richardson is still faced with a seemingly insurmountable translation difficulty. He must decide upon and content himself with *either* an advancing nominally-partial *or*, alternately, an advancing verbally-partial rendition of “das Wesen” in disregard of the appreciable meaning and true sense of its saying as “the essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)”.

This is a challenge not just to Richardson but to any interpreter who relies upon such an array of mutually-exclusive alternating renditions of the characteristically advancing nominal and retreating verbal signification of the German word *Wesen* in a partial manner un beholden to its *essenz(ing): unwesenhaft*.

In Heidegger’s texts, this *one* German word *Wesen* is always already *coherently* said both ‘nominally’ and ‘verbally’ at once, and then again the usual emphasis on the advancing nominal and retreating verbal signification may be reappraised. Indeed, from a being-historic perspective [seinsgeschichtlich gesehen], the go-to predominantly substantive signification of the word *Wesen* in the accustomed circumscription of ‘Wesen(heit) [i.e. Wesenheit] = *essentia*, οὐσία’ that, in an ordinary historical manner [historisch  $\neq$  (seins)geschichtlich], plagues conventional [gewöhnliche] and even essential [wesentliche] thinking, is hardly ever the only one intended by the thinker Heidegger. Still, his meaning cannot always be decided straightforwardly. Unless, that is, an other-than-usual leaning of the prevailing ‘nominal’ and unprevailing ‘verbal’ significations of the dually-signifying word *Wesen* as Wesen(heit), (*esse*)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι) in our sense of “*essenz(ing)*” and Richardson’s sense of “*essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)*” is intended—be it lightly and clearly, be it darkly and obscurely—and in some way intimated if not expressly addressed by Heidegger as such. Whenever an out-of-the-ordinary reversal of the ordinarily advancing nominal and retreating verbal significations of *das Wesen* is *also* in play in the texts of Martin Heidegger

(which it almost invariably is!), those of us called upon to interpret *all at once* his distinguished translating of *Wesen* within his own German language and thinking are especially challenged to do so in a manner beholden to its *essenzenz(ing)* whence of itself as *essenzenz*ing, that is to say: *wesenhaft* in respect of what is true to the word *Wesen* as ‘Wesen(heit)’, i.e. in its *essenzenz(ing)*, and, at the same time, indeed before all else [*zugleich und zuerst*], in its *essenzenz*ing, that is to say: *wesenhaft* in respect of what is also true to the word ‘Wesen(heit)’ as *Wesung*.

In light of having already ventured to think this *one* English translating word “*essenc(-ing)*”, respectively *essenc[-ing]*”, that, in an exceptionally good approximation to the translated-translating German word *Wesen*, is *coherently* said both ‘nominally’ and ‘verbally’ at once with the emphasis equally-essentially [*gleich-wesentlich*] on its advancing nominal and retreating verbal significations, why equivocate between *either* an advancing nominally-partial *or*, alternately, an advancing verbally-partial rendition thereof? Why settle for an ‘either / or’ partiality to the detriment of being able to translate into English the full sway of the power to name and the settled arrangement of the integral noun phrase *das Wesen* in a manner beholden to its “*essenc(-ing)* / *essenc[-ing]*”? After all, the latter translation that is not just univocally word for word and partial but equivocally true to the wording of the word as an integral being-historic whole, has already been glimpsed and expounded as available and accessible for the interpretation. So instead of relying upon and being beholden to *either* nominally-partial “the essence” *or*, alternately, verbally-partial “the *essenc(-ing)*” *or*, alternatively in the case of the latter, its supposed translation-equivalent “the Essence” to render “*das Wesen*”, why not leave such equivocation to its own devices and put fully to the test the word “*essenc[-ing]* / *essenc(-ing)*” as an exceptionally, albeit imperfectly, good approximation to the likewise (and otherwise) nominally-advancing verbally-retreating wording of the German original?

The special challenge of a ‘not-so-poor’ as distinct from a ‘very poor’ interpretation when it comes to the task of translating Heidegger translating *Wesen* can be highlighted by way of the following (roughly translated) passage from the closing sections of his essay “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” [“Of the *essenzenz(ing)* of truth”].<sup>72</sup> In this passage [GA9, G200f (95ff)], Richardson’s word

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72 My translation is of the German passage from the essay “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” in the 1976 collection *Wegmarken* (GA9), being Volume 9 of the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. The first edition of the essay appeared in 1943, published by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main. It contains the text that was revised several times of a public lecture conceived by Heidegger in 1930 and delivered on several occasions during the 1930s under the same title. The first paragraph of the concluding “Note” [“Anmerkung”] was added in the second edition of 1949. A fifth edition, published in 1967,



“(the) essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)” *alone among his abovenamed or any of his other renditions* of “(das) *Wesen*” in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* could be read *without distortion* for my word “(the) *essenz(ing)*”:

The undertaking ventured here takes the question concerning the *essenz(ing)* of truth beyond the preserve of the accustomed circumscription of the usual concept of *essenz(ing)* and goes toward thinking pursuant to whether the question concerning the *essenz(ing)* of truth must not also and primarily be the question concerning the truth of *essenz(ing)*. In the concept of the “*essenz(ing)*” [des “*Wesens*”] however philosophy thinks being [das *Sein*]. By tracing back the inner possibility of the correctness of a statement to the ek-sistent freedom of letting-be as its “ground”, and by foreshadowing the inception of the *essenz(ing)* of this ground in the sheltering-concealment and the erranz [in der Verbergung und der Irre], we intend to suggest that the *essenz(ing)* of truth is not the empty “general” of an “abstract” generality or universality but the self-concealing one and only of the history proper that is unique to the deconcealment of the “meaning” [des “*Sinnes*”] of what we call being and have been wont for a long while to think on only as the being in respect of the whole.

[G201 (96f)]

9.

Note

The question concerning the *essenz(ing)* of truth originates from the question concerning the truth of *essenz(ing)*. The former understands *essenz(ing)* initially in the sense of whatness [Washeit] (quidditas) or matterhood [Sachheit] (realitas), the truth however as a character of cognizance or knowledge [Erkenntnis]. The question concerning the truth of *essenz(ing)* understands *essenz(ing)* verbally and thinks in respect of this word, still remaining within the (re)presenting of metaphysics, beyng as the prevailing difference of being and the being. Truth signifies a clearing-wise sheltering-recovering [lichtendes Bergen] as key character or fundamental trait of beyng. The question concerning the *essenz(ing)* of truth has its answer in the sentence [and leap (of thought): in dem Satz]: *the essenz(ing) of truth is the truth of essenz(ing)*. Following the elucidation, one can easily see that the sentence does not merely invert a collocation of words to give the impression of paradox. The subject of the sentence—if this fateful grammatical category may still be used at all—is the truth of *essenz(ing)*. The clearing-wise sheltering-recovering is, i.e. lets *essenz* [ist, d.h. läßt *wesen*], the agreement or accord between knowledge and the being. The sentence is not dialectical. [G201 (97)] It is no sentence [and leap of thought MAH] at all in the sense of a statement or proposition [einer Aussage]. The answer to the question concerning the *essenz(ing)* of truth is the say(ing) that is telling of a turn within the history proper of beyng. Because clearing-wise sheltering-recovering

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appeared four years after the 1963 publication of *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* containing a contribution by Martin Heidegger to the book’s Preface comprised of 1) Heidegger’s early April 1962 response, in German, to a letter from Richardson concerning the latter’s then forthcoming publication; and 2) Richardson’s English translation of the German text. I wonder what Heidegger made of the (his) German word *Wesen* being translated into Latinate-English “*essenc[-ing]*”, respectively “*essenc(-ing)*”, without follow-through, and how he would now respond more than half a century later to a somewhat more tried and tested “*essenz(ing)*” therefor.

belongs thereto, beyng incipiently appears in the light of the concealing withdrawal. The name of this clearing is ἀλήθεια.

Even in the original draft, the lecture “Of the essenz(ing) of truth” [“Vom Wesen der Wahrheit”] shall be complemented by a second casting-open of thought, “Of the truth of essenz(ing)” [“Von der Wahrheit des Wesens”]. The latter was rendered unfeasible for reasons that are now intimated in the letter “Concerning Humanism” [(1946) MAH].

Compare the following selection of statements by Richardson in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* where he elaborates upon his altogether different take on the word *Wesen* generally and also specifically in respect of the above passage from Heidegger’s essay “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit”, titled, in Richardson’s translation thereof, “On the Essence of Truth”—*not*, to highlight what is at stake, “On the Essenc[-ing] / Essenc(-ing) of Truth”. The selection below is indicative of the interpretation that apparently motivates Richardson’s bypassing of his original insight into “essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)” for *Wesen* in favour of equivocating between his alternately ‘go-to’ renditions therefor.

For a start [p. 228f <sup>73</sup>]:

Now that by reason of which beings “are” what they “are” we call their essence or (to avoid the impulse to conceive of “essence” as something general or abstract) their “essenc-ing,” where this term now has a fully verbal sense. “To be,” then, means “to essence,” sc. “to come-to-an-essence,” or, more idiomatically, “to come-to-a-presence.” Such, Heidegger claims, is the sense of the old German word *Wesen*, and such an understanding of it enables the author to say that his research has forced us to ask ourselves “... whether or not the question about the essence of truth must not be at the same time, indeed before all else, the question about the truth of Essence ...,”<sup>43</sup> where “Essence” [229] in the second position has the verbal sense of essenc-ing, coming-to-a-presence, Being.

<sup>43</sup> “... ob die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit nicht zugleich und zuerst die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens sein muß. ...” (WW, p. 25). We translate *Wesen*, when used to refer to Being as Presence, by “coming-to-presence,” or simply “presenc-ing.” For fuller treatment of *Wesen* in verbal sense, see ...

Richardson again passes over his original insight into “essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing)” as an exceptionally good approximation to *Wesen* in his English translation of the remark he cites by Heidegger in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” [*Wegmarken* (GA9), G201 (96)] to the effect, in my alternate translation thereof (as above):

The question concerning the truth of essenz(ing) understands essenz(ing) verbally ...

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<sup>73</sup> For the abbreviated reference in the following [“43”] to “(WW, p. 25)”, see Heidegger’s “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” in *Wegmarken* (GA9), G200 (96).

In Richardson's rendition of the remark, by contrast, Heidegger says [p. 240]:

"... The question about the truth of Essence understands Essence *verbally*. ..." <sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> "... Die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens versteht Wesen verbal. ..." (WW, p. 26)

That Richardson does not see fit to venture his most coherent rendering(s) of Heidegger's word *Wesen* in this excerpt by instead translating:

The question about the truth of essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing) understands essenc[-ing] / essenc(-ing) verbally. ...

is perplexing.

Here is Richardson's similarly perplexing interpretation of what he subsequently names "the famous text" contained in Heidegger's additional "Note" ["Anmerkung"] to his essay "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit"<sup>74</sup> [p. 564f]:

"... The question about the essence of truth finds its answer in the phrase: the essence of truth is the truth of Essence. ..." <sup>7</sup> We are told once more that the truth of "Essenc(-ing) is Being in its truth (ἁ-λήθεια), ...

<sup>7</sup> "... Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit findet ihre Antwort in dem Satz: *das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Wesens*. ..." (WW, p. 26). Heidegger's italics.

The thrice-mentioned word "Wesen", respectively "*Wesen*", in "the famous text" (Richardson) is thus needlessly rendered in two different ways here by the author of *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, twice as "essence" and once as "Essence", to which, in the amplification of his translation of the text (in light of what Heidegger's additional "Note" goes on to say), Richardson adds a third rendition: "Essenc(-ing)". The latter rendition—with upper-case initial "E" and the "-ing" of "Essenc(-ing)" contained in parentheses rather than square brackets—appears to be a one-off alternative to his one-off rendition with the word "essenc(-ing)" elsewhere in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* that likewise contains the "-ing" of "essenc(-ing)" in parentheses rather than square brackets but bears a lower-case instead of an upper-case initial.

Yet why not simplify and indeed clarify matters by consistently rendering the thrice-mentioned word 'Wesen' in this "famous text" especially, with one and the same word (bearing a lower-case initial "e" in each case) "essenc(-ing)"? And, while reinstating Heidegger's italics to the citation of the renowned

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<sup>74</sup> See above, under the heading "9. Note" [GA9, 201 (96)], for my alternate rendition thereof.

“sentence” [“Satz”]<sup>75</sup>, in the amplification thereof, why not continue to let go of, rather than muddy the waters with, capitalisation by dropping the unnecessarily substantifying initial capital “E” of Essenc(-ing) for “Wesen” and initial capital “B” of “Being” for “Sein” along the following lines? —

“... The question about the essenc(-ing) of truth finds its answer in the sentence: *the essenc(-ing) of truth is the truth of essenc(-ing)*. ...”<sup>7</sup> We are told once more that the truth of essenc(-ing) is being in its truth (ἀ-λήθεια), ...

Richardson subsequently suggests (title case) “Essenc-ing” instead of “Essence” with an initial capital “E” as an alternate English rendition of the principal word “Wesen” in the German phrase [sentence component: Satzglied], “die Wahrheit des Wesens” [“the truth of essenz(ing) / essenc(-ing) / essenc[-ing]” MAH] when he writes [p. 625]:

... the Heidegger of the early years was victimised by the metaphysics he was trying to overcome. That is why the latter part of SZ [Sein und Zeit MAH] never appeared and could not appear, any more than the intended complement to the essay “On the Essence of Truth” (which would have borne the title “The Truth of Essenc-ing”) was feasible. ...

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<sup>75</sup> Richardson’s choice of the English word “phrase” rather than, say, “sentence”, may not suffice to translate-cum-transport us into the (Heidegger’s) German word “Satz”. The latter distinguishes itself from the “Satzglied” or “phrase” understood as a small group or collocation of words in a sentence that expresses some notion or idea or sentiment as a component [Gglied] of the sentence [Satz] as a whole. Whilst neither “phrase” — < classical Latin *phrasis* diction, style, expression < ancient Greek φράσις speech, way of speaking (OED) — nor “sentence” — after Latin *sententia* opinion, maxim, etc. as a rendering of Greek γνώμη thought, judgment, opinion (OED) — can capture one of the incipient meanings of the German word “Satz” as “leap” or “bound” [“Sprung”], the word “sentence” does, perchance, retain remnants of something akin to “way of thinking”, “opinion”, “thought”, and “saying”, the latter also as “gnome” understood per the OED as “a short pithy statement of a general truth”. That understanding surely goes against the grain of Heidegger’s interpretation of Greek γνώμη, from γνῶ- root of γινώσκειν to know, as primordial and guiding “advice” or “counsel” [“Rat”], a preparative acquainting [Sinnen] and letting-encounter of the being as such that is so provident of the view and paving of the way that the being is forgathered and beholden aforeseen; see Heidegger, *Heraklit* (GA55), G348ff. It would also be going against the grain of Heidegger’s interpretation of German “Satz” to hear what is said in the saying articulated by him in the present context as a “mere sentence” [einen “bloßen Satz”] in the usual sense of a statement or proposition that could be handed over to the interrogation of logic; see §12 above in respect of Heidegger’s appraisal of what is worth(while)-hearing in the sentence [in dem Satz]: “The enpropriation enpropriates.” [“Das Ereignis ereignet.”] in his 1962 lecture “Zeit und Sein” [*Zur Sache des Denkens* (GA14), G29]. Indeed, were it not for the elucidation of what has thus far been said leading up to our hearing of the sentence (and leap of thought): “*the essenz(ing) of truth is the truth of essenz(ing)*.”, it may well be difficult for those of us unaccustomed to a more essential, less conventional, way of thinking and knowing, to remedy the impressive view, paradoxical only for ordinary doxa (opinion) [(Meinung)], so Heidegger [*Wegmarken* (GA9), G194ff (90ff)], that, as a way of speaking that is contrary to received opinion and discordant with what is ordinarily held to be established truth, this sentence [Satz] will likely be seen to be merely inverting a certain collocation of words to give the impression of paradox.

But what title would the erstwhile intended complement to the essay “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” titled, in Richardson’s most worthy translation thereof, not “On the Essence of Truth” but, say, “On the essenc(-ing) of truth”, have borne? Would not the formerly feasible complementary cast of thought “Von der Wahrheit des Wesens”, have more aptly borne the title, per Richardson’s finest rendition of *Wesen*, “On the truth of essenc(-ing)”?

To this extent Richardson in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* is himself responsible for not staying the course with his closest possible approximation to “das Wesen” but for instead, sur-rendering it to the oblivion of the power to name (or lack thereof) and the (un)settling arrangement of far less worthy contenders. By dispensing with his most inceptive and near consummate translation “the essenc(-ing)”, respectively “the essenc[-ing]”, in favour of the partiality of *either* “the essence” *or* “the essenc-ing”, or alternating words to this effect, Richardson’s venture in appreciative thinking after Heidegger to say and to think and to translate the German keyword *Wesen* in a manner beholden to its essenc(-ing), that is to say, *wesenhaft*, cannot but be buried in translation.

Either way, it would seem that the author of *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* is thereby disrupting and compromising his original insight into the full s(w)ay of the integral noun phrase *das Wesen* as, all at once, “the essenc(-ing)” ( or, alternatively, “the essenc[-ing]” ) and hence sur-rendering, in the sense of ‘giving in’, to the dark and obscure rather than ‘giving over’ to light and clear thinking the obfuscation of an equivocally translating language that is more characteristic for our idiomatic and conventional than for our essential rendering of the cognates of the *esse* in ‘(esse)ntia’ to translate those of the *wesen* in ‘*Wesen(heit)*’. And that this occurs every time the author abandons what is equivocally true to the German wording of the word *Wesen* as an integral whole for the sake of equivocating between the univocality and partiality of one fold of its twofold nominal-cum-verbal signification at the expense of the other.

Moreover Richardson tends rather to complicate than to explicate the shortcomings of his giving short shrift to an exceptionally good translation of *Wesen* by choosing with much greater frequency not just one or other of the abovenamed ill-befitting alternate renditions thereof but also others to which he has recourse that *conflate* into a composite reading his variant readings of Heidegger’s *distinguishment* of *Sein* as *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, and as *Anwesen*, respectively *Anwesung*; also when *Sein* or, in Richardson’s rendition, capital “B” “Being”, is, to use another of the author’s terms, “negated” in the following modes of what he calls “Being-as-negated”:



(1) “non-essence” [*“Un-wesen”*] or alternately: “a coming-to-presence (-wesen) that is profoundly negated (*Un-*)”<sup>76</sup>. But why does Richardson not render the “... (-wesen) that is profoundly negated (*Un-*)” in this alternate formulation of *Un-wesen* with “a coming-to-essence [(-wesen)]” rather than with “a coming-to-presence [(-?\*anwesen)]” in the vacant position? Why equate -wesen with -?\*anwesen, hence “non-essence” [*“Un-wesen”*] or ‘profoundly negated coming-to-essence’ [*‘Un-wesen’*] with ‘non-presence’ or ‘profoundly negated coming-to-presence’ [*‘Un-?\*anwesen’*]? Because so long as the two readings of “a coming-to-essence” for *Wesen* and “a coming-to-presence” for *Anwesen* are rendered by the composite English expression for *Anwesen* alone, the distinguishment in the German original between *Wesen* and *Anwesen*, also when -wesen is “profoundly negated” as *Un-wesen*, cannot but be extinguished in translation.

Bearing in mind, as we will consider further in (2) below, that Richardson elsewhere distinguishes between “come-to-presence” and “coming-to-presence” such that the former renders an identity between the verbal nouns *Wesen* and *Anwesen*, and their corresponding time words *wesen* and *anwesen*, whereas the latter renders the deverbal noun *Anwesung* (and incipiently -wesen) [‘-coming-to-essence’]), it would seem that the author is here obliquely overlaying his composite reading of ‘the -wesen of *Un-wesen*’ as (=) ‘the -?\*anwesen of *Un-?\*anwesen*’ with another set of equations and conflation of the German original: that of ‘the -wesen of *Un-wesen*’ = ‘the -wesen of *Un-?\*anwesen*’ and thus: = ‘the -?\*anwesen of *Un-?\*anwesen*’. And so we arrive at the deeply-buried and confounding composite reading of ‘-wesen as (=) -?\*anwesen’ that, for the unwitting English reader, ‘unassumingly’ essences / essences [-west], and shelters-conceals its essen(z)ing [-wesen], respectively essen(z)ing [-wesen], in Richardson’s alternate formulation of “non-essence” [*“Un-wesen”*] as “a coming-to-presence (-wesen) that is profoundly negated (*Un-*)”. Here and elsewhere the conflate expression “a coming-to-presence” translates not only *Anwesen* (-wesen) but also *Anwesen* (-?\*anwesen) and *Wesen* (-wesen), for all three of which also either “presencing” or “presenc-ing” without distinction.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Richardson, op.cit., p. 293.

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 262, 318, 336, 348, 350 (“coming-to-presence” for *Anwesen*); p. 498 (“coming-to-presence” for *Wesen*); pp. 313f (“presencing” for *Anwesen*), p. 424 (“the Presence is a coming” for *Anwesen* ?), p. 318 (“presenc-ing” for *Anwesen*), and pp. 446, 522, 536, 575, 584, 587 (“presenc-ing” for *Wesen*); also pp. 509, 573 (presenc-ing for *wesend*).



(2) “a coming-to-presence (*Anwesenung*) that is negated (*Abwesenung*)”<sup>78</sup>. For this interpretation of *Abwesenung* as a key mode of “Being-as-negated”, Richardson draws on his understanding of Heidegger’s appraisal of Aristotle’s conception of the Greek word for ‘[b]eing’ [Sein] φύσις as a kind of ‘beingness’ [Seiendheit] (οὐσία) that itself hails, “in essenz(ing) [im Wesen]”, from “the incipiently cast-open φύσις [der anfänglich entworfenen φύσις]”<sup>79</sup> as ἀλήθεια in the (Heidegger’s) sense of Heraclitus’ φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ., “The arising bestows favour on self-concealing. [Das Aufgehen dem Sichverbergen schenkt’s die Gunst.]”<sup>80</sup> On Richardson’s understanding of that appraisal, “the original [sense] of φύσις [der anfänglich entworfenen φύσις]” as we find it in Heraclitus, that of the ἀλήθεια [the unconcealedness through deconcealment, the revealing self-concealing of itself MAH] that belongs to being [Sein] (φύσις) and from which the beingness [Seiendheit] (οὐσία) itself “in its essence [im Wesen]” derives, is that of “Being-as-truth, comporting negativity (concealment) as well as positivity (non-concealment). Φύσις in this sense is also called οὐσία.”<sup>81</sup> As such, φύσις, on Richardson’s understanding, is “the origin and dominating force (ἀρχή)”<sup>82</sup> of “the being-ness (οὐσία) itself” by which, in short (and I am distilling-cum-paraphrasing), “beings [come-to-presence] in the presence [παρουσία ? MAH] that we call non-concealment”<sup>83</sup>; and by which, when ‘negated’, we might suppose, ‘beings [go-from-presence] in the absence [ἀπουσία ? MAH] that we call concealment’. On this interpretation after Heidegger, just *one* character of οὐσία itself “in its essence [im Wesen]”, and hence “the nature of φύσις as ἀλήθεια”<sup>84</sup>, is “the original sense of φύσις as non-concealment”<sup>85</sup> to reflect “the manifestive power that shines forth in beings as beings [that] we may call “positivity.””<sup>86</sup>

In other words: So long as we do not lose sight of ‘the arising (and setting) presenz(ing) [das aufgehende (und untergehende) Anwesen]’ (φύσις) incipiently

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78 *ibid.*, p. 310.

79 Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (GA9), G301 (371).

80 For an appreciable sense of Heidegger’s appraisal of key fragments of Heraclitus’ inceptual saying and thinking and the historic importance of *this very saying* (“fragment B123”) of “the incipiently cast-open” ἀλήθεια of being as φύσις at the inception of occidental thinking, see Heidegger’s 1943 lecture course, “Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens” [“The inception of occidental thinking”] in *Heraklit* (GA55), G110ff.

81 Richardson, *op.cit.*, p. 313f.

82 *ibid.*, p. 313.

83 *ibid.*, p. 311.

84 *ibid.*, p. 315.

85 *ibid.*, p. 314.

86 *ibid.*, p. 8f.

bestowing favour on the self-(de)concealing of its own *essen*z(ing), the revealing self-concealing ‘truth’ [Wahrheit] (ἀλήθεια) of being-as-φύσις itself, there is clear(ing)ly [lichtend] more to the revelatory character of the “nature [*Wesen* ? MAH]”, that is to say, the *essen*z(ing) / *essenc*[-ing] / *essenc*(-ing) [*Wesen*(heit), (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)], of φύσις as ἀλήθεια than meets the eye. And unless we do take steps after Heidegger to look in on [hereinblicken] and attend to what Richardson calls “the “not”-character of Being” or “negativity” that is “intrinsic to its very nature [*Wesen* ? MAH]”, we will remain oblivious to “the genuine sense of the word in Heraclitus, for whom φύσις is “inclined to conceal itself” sc. it is a coming-to-presence (*Anwesenung*) that is negated (*Abwesenung*).”<sup>87</sup>

After all, as Richardson has suggested from the outset:

In the simplest of terms: Heidegger’s whole effort is to interrogate the positive-negative process of ἀλήθεια, insofar as it gives rise to metaphysics. ...<sup>88</sup>

And later on, with a view to his understanding of Heidegger’s appraisal of the ‘positive-negative’ “Essence” [*Wesen*, *Wesung* ? MAH]” and “nature” [*Wesen*, *Wesung* ? MAH] of “φύσις as ἀλήθεια” in Aristotle, Richardson has this to say [p. 315]:

... Now for Heidegger, it is precisely the nature of φύσις as ἀλήθεια to withdraw, sc. to conceal *itself*, and even to conceal its own concealment (mystery). To the extent that Aristotle conceives φύσις as that which makes itself manifest, he remains faithful to the original sense of this word, but to the extent that he ignores the law of φύσις by which it conceals itself and conceals its own concealment, sc. the intrinsic negativity of φύσις, he is oblivious to the genuine meaning of ἀλήθεια.

What Heidegger writes to conclude his essay “Of the *essen*z(ing) and concept of Φύσις. Aristotle, *Physics* B, I.” or, in Richardson’s translation of the German

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<sup>87</sup> *ibid.*, p. 310. The question mark after the word *Wesen* in the interpolated square brackets “... [*Wesen* ? MAH]” where Richardson is alluding, in one instance, to “the original [sense] of φύσις”, respectively “the nature of φύσις as ἀλήθεια”, from which, ‘by nature’ or “in its essence [im *Wesen*]”, Aristotle’s φύσις as a kind of “being-ness (οὐσία)” itself derives, or, in another instance, to what is intrinsic to the “very nature” of ‘negated Being-as-truth’, is perhaps justified by the author’s rendition “nature” not just for *Natur* but also for *Wesen* here and elsewhere in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* [e.g. pp. 38, 510, 613; 451 (“native powers” for *Wesenskräfte*), etc.].

<sup>88</sup> *ibid.*, p. 9. Cf. pp.8f for Richardson’s discussion in the Introduction to his work of the ‘positivity-negativity’ terminology of which he says [Footnote “22”, p. 9]: “The terminology as such is not Heidegger’s, although we shall find a certain warrant for it in SZ [*Sein und Zeit*]. We are inclined to think of positivity and negativity here (if images of this kind do not do more harm than good) as two complementary components in a single movement, as in the composition of forces. In any case, the words must not be taken in any dialectical sense.”.

title: “On the Essence and Conception of Φύσις [in] Aristotle’s *Physics* B, I.”, including in the lead up to the essay’s bracketed closing remark, is most pertinent to Richardson’s understanding of the German thinker’s interpretation of Aristotle and so too Plato before him. Here is my tentative rendition of the relevant German text [*Wegmarken* (GA9), G301 (371)]:<sup>89</sup>

Being is the self-concealing deconcealing – φύσις in the incipient sense. The self-deconcealing is a-coming-forth into unconcealedness, and this means, to shelter-conceal firstly into *essenz(ing)* the unconcealedness as one such: unconcealedness is called ἀλήθεια – the truth, as we translate, is incipiently, and this means in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)*, not a character of human knowing and expressing / stating, nor is truth by any means a mere value or an “idea” whose realisation the human being – one really knows not why – is supposed to strive after; rather, truth belongs as self-deconcealing to being itself: φύσις is ἀλήθεια, deconcealment, and therefore κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.

[Because φύσις in the sense of the “Physics” is a kind of οὐσία, and because οὐσία itself, in *essenz(ing)*, hails from the incipiently cast-open φύσις, therefore ἀλήθεια belongs to being, and *therefore* the *presenzing* into the open(-reveal) of the ἰδεα (Plato) and of the εἶδος κατὰ τὸν λόγον (Aristotle), unveils itself as *one* character of οὐσία; *therefore* for Aristotle the *essenz(ing)* of the κίνησις as ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια becomes *visible*.]

For his alternate English rendition of this bracketed closing remark “[in] all its tortuous convolution” (Richardson), see Richardson, p. 313f.

By dint of the κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ that is incipient to the arising (and setting) *essenz(ing)* [das aufgehende (und untergehende) Wesen] of being itself as the self-deconcealing (φύσις), that is to say, a kind of *essenz(ing)* [Wesen] ( οὐσία (εἶναι) ) in the sense of *presenz(ing)* [Anwesen] ( παρούσία (παρεῖναι) ) as pre-senzing [An-wesung] (παρ-εἶναι) that itself hails, in -*essenzing* [in der -wesung] (-εἶναι), from “the incipiently cast-open φύσις” as ἀλήθεια at the inception of occidental thinking, being itself *also* bestows favour on the self-deconcealing ab-senzing [Ab-wesung] (ἀπ-εἶναι) of its own *essenzing* [Wesung] (εἶναι) as pre-senzing [An-wesung] (παρ-εἶναι).

Taking a somewhat different approach: By dint of the “negativity” intrinsic to “the very nature” of its “coming-to-presence [(*An-wesung*, -*wesung*)]” “Being” itself in “the original [sense] of φύσις” as a kind of οὐσία [(= εἶναι) = παρούσία (= παρεῖναι) ? MAH] that is itself “negated [(*Ab-*)]” for

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89 For his understanding of Heidegger’s (1939) essay (first published 1958) and (1940) seminar “On the Essence and Conception of Φύσις [in] Aristotle’s *Physics* B, I.” (Richardson), cf. Richardson, op.cit., pp. 309ff, and Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (GA9), G239 (309) ff]; and below.

being(-as-truth (ἀ-λήθεια) ) inclined, “in its essence [im *Wesen*]”, to self-conceal, involves *ipso facto*, in Richardson’s variant renditions of *Abwesenung* [absenzing (ἀπουσία (= ἀπεῖναι) ? MAH)], ‘a *not* coming-to-presence’, “a coming-to-presence (*Anwesenung*) that is negated (*Abwesenung*)”, “a going-from-presence (*Abwesenung*)”, “a dis-appearing”. Whereby “in its essence [im *Wesen*]” as “a going-from-presence (*Abwesenung*)” interior to the process of appearing (*Anwesenung*) through εἶδος [through “look”, durch “Aussehen” MAH], this dis-appearing [*Abwesenung*] “somehow or other” (πώς) through (lack or privation [Beraubung] (στέρησις) of the radiance of) εἶδος, is likewise conceived, on Richardson’s terms, to be ‘a *not* or *negated* coming-to-presence’.<sup>90</sup>

Again, we could bear in mind the author’s somewhat more discerning interpretation of what he conceives to be Heidegger’s “whole effort to interrogate the positive-negative process of ἀ-λήθεια”, and ask, in respect of the self-(de)concealing -wesen in *An-* and *Ab-wesen*, respectively the self-(de)concealing -wesen in *An-* and *Ab-wesenung*: Why conflate “a come-to-essence” (“*Wesen*”, “*wesen*”) that is negated (‘*Ab-wesen*’, ‘*ab-wesen*’), respectively ‘a coming-to-essence’ (‘*Wesung*’) that is negated (‘*Ab-wesung*’), with, in the author’s exact words on this occasion, “a coming-to-presence (*Anwesenung*) that is negated (*Abwesenung*)”? On Richardson’s interpretation, there would seem to be an identity but not one iota of difference here between “a coming-to-essence” / ‘an essencing’ [(*Wesung*)] and “a coming-to-presence” / ‘a presencing’ [(*Anwesenung*)] that is negated [(*Abwesenung*)]; nor elsewhere on other occasions between “a come-, coming-to-essence / an essenc-ing” (“*Wesen*”, “*wesen*”) and “a come-, coming-to-presence / presenc-ing” (“*Anwesen*”, “*anwesen*”) that is negated (‘*Abwesen*’, ‘*abwesen*’).

In these key modes of “Being-as-negated” (Richardson), we therefore observe the signs and transference of a stand-out composite reading of the ‘positively’ manifestive (“non-concealment”) sway of “Being” [*Sein*] as “come-to-presence” and “coming-to-presence” insofar as the former translates, per Richardson, not just *Anwesen* (and *anwesen*) but *Wesen* (and *wesen*) while the latter translates, or would accordingly translate, not just *Anwesenung* (and incipiently *an-wesen*) but *Wesung* (and incipiently *wesen*).

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<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 310 (“a coming-to-presence (*Anwesenung*) that is negated (*Abwesenung*)”); 312 (“a going-from-presence (*Abwesenung*)”); and, in oblique allusion to the latter as (‘a *not* or *negated* coming-to-presence (*Anwesenung*)’) “interior to the process of appearing through εἶδος”, 313 (“This dis-appearing”).

However, when it comes to conflating the full sway of the occidental train of thought, ‘Wesen(heit), (esse)ntia, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ with that of ‘Anwesen(heit), (praese)ntia, παρουσία (παρεῖναι)’, it is *not*, as one might expect by way of analogy, *Wesen* as *Wesenheit* (= *Anwesenheit*), i.e. “essence” (= “presence”), from Latin *essentia* (= *praesentia*) verbatim, that translates Greek οὐσία (= παρουσία); and vice versa: *Anwesen* as *Anwesenheit* (= *Wesenheit*), i.e. “presence” (= “essence”), from Latin *praesentia* (= *essentia*) verbatim, that translates Greek παρουσία (= οὐσία). For, in line with the additional con-fusion associated with Richardson’s composite reading, it is rather *Wesen* as *Wesung* (= *Anwesung*), i.e. “coming-to-essence” (= “coming-to-presence”), that, when expressed ‘equally-essentially’ (= ‘equally-presentially’) *but vice versa* in the ‘positively’ manifestive (“non-concealment”) sway of “Being” as such, to wit, as “coming-to-presence” (= “coming-to-essence”), translates German *Sein* as *Anwesung* (= *Wesung*), which in turn translates Greek οὐσία (= παρουσία ?), according to Richardson [p. 307]:

With “coming-to-presence” we translate *Anwesung*, which in turn translates here οὐσία.

[Richardson is referencing what he has been writing under the heading “*Truth and Idea*” in connection with Heidegger’s appraisal of the German *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, of Greek οὐσία as *Anwesung*. There is little doubt that Heidegger considers the incipient -*wesung* (-εἶναι) of Greek οὐσία (= παρ-ουσία ?) to be An-*wesung* (παρ-εἶναι). He says as much in his essay “Plato’s teaching of truth [Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit]” where he writes, specifically in regard to Plato’s conception thereof, “Plato conceives the presenzing (οὐσία) as ιδέα. [Platon begreift die Anwesung (οὐσία) als ιδέα.]”<sup>91</sup>

Now, for Heidegger, this conception heralds a change in the *essenz(ing)* [*Wesen*] (οὐσία (εἶναι) ?) of truth [*Wahrheit*] (ἀλήθεια) at the inception of occidental thinking where the presenzing [*die Anwesung*] (οὐσία (= εἶναι) = παρουσία (= παρεῖναι) ? MAH) was conceived to be [GA9, G233 (139): “the rise or emergence of the concealed into unconcealedness, and [where] the unconcealedness itself, as the deconcealment [*die Entbergung*], constitutes the fundamental trait of the presenzing [*Anwesung*].” For, in Plato’s conception of “*die Anwesung* (οὐσία) as ιδέα”, so Heidegger [G234 (139)], “the ιδέα does not subordinate to the unconcealedness while serving to bring the unconcealed to appear(ing). It is rather the other way around: the appearing or shining (self-showing) determines what, in its very *essenz(ing)* and with recourse unto itself alone, may then still be called unconcealedness.”

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<sup>91</sup> Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (GA9), G234 (139).



From this perspective, Plato's interpretation of the *essenz(ing)* [*Wesen(heit)*] of being(ness) [*Seiend(heit)*] (οὐσία (εἶναι)) in its "presenzing [*Anwesenung*] (οὐσία) as ἰδέα" (Heidegger), while still laying claim to something of the incipient but unknown *essenz(ing)* of ἀλήθεια, no longer appeals to truth (ἀλήθεια) in the original (incipient) sense: that of the unconcealedness and its self-concealing deconcealing as a fundamental trait of the *Greek* *essenz(ing)*, conceived as the (stanteous or bestanteous) presenzing [der (ständigen oder beständigen) *Anwesenung*], of being (εἶναι = παρεῖναι) itself as beingness in the sense of presence (οὐσία = παρουσία). "The change itself fulfils its purpose", according to Heidegger, "in the determination of the being of the being (in the Greek sense of: the presenzing of that which is (the) presenzing) as ἰδέα."<sup>92</sup> With this determination, there is a hidden shift in the *essenz(ing)* of truth: from the unconcealedness of the being [des Seienden] as that which is (the) presenzing [des Anwesenden] to the correctness of the viewing [Richtigkeit des Blickens] (ὀρθότης) thereof in its being [Sein] (εἶναι) as presenzing [*Anwesenung*] (παρεῖναι). Truth [Wahrheit] becomes the correctness of the adaptation or adjustment [Angleichung] of the ἰδεῖν to the ἰδέα,<sup>93</sup> of the gazing in view of, and in agreement or conformity with [Übereinstimmung] (ὁμοίωσις), the "look" ["Aussehen"] (εἶδος) of that which is (the) showing itself [des Sichzeigenden] (ἰδέα) in its being (= presenzing) [Sein (= *Anwesenung*)] (εἶναι (= παρεῖναι)) as beingness (= *presenz*) [*Seiendheit* (= *Anwesenheit*)] (οὐσία (= παρουσία)).

Taking all of this into consideration, the question arises: Is Heidegger's German word for our Latinate-English word "presenzing" or, in Richardson's terminology, "coming-to-presence", truly meant to translate Greek οὐσία itself? Or rather: the 'taken-for-granted' Greek *Wesen*, respectively *Wesung*, thereof? Is not German *Anwesenung* first and foremost a determination of the *essenzing* [*Wesung*] (εἶναι), in the Greek sense of presenzing [*Anwesenung*] (παρεῖναι), of Greek οὐσία and παρουσία in the German sense of (Heidegger's word-for-word translating thereof into) *Seiendheit* (*Wesenheit*) and *Anwesenheit* and our sense of "beingness" ("essence") and "presence" respectively? Still, on Richardson's interpretation, it would seem that "coming-to-presence" translates the *Anwesenung* [presenzing] that, according to Heidegger's *alternate* usage of this German word, *also* translates Greek 'beingness' ('essence') [*Seiendheit* (*Wesenheit*)] (οὐσία) [(='presence' [*Anwesenheit*] (παρουσία)?), *not* the ownmost *Anwesenung* (παρεῖναι) thereof.

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92 *ibid.*, G233 (139).

93 *ibid.*, G230 (136) ff.



In any case, the decisive point to be made, according to Richardson's reading of Heidegger's appraisal of the said change in the 'taken-for-granted' *Greek* *essenz(ing)* of truth [Wesen der Wahrheit], is that [p. 306]: "what dominates the conception of Plato is not that the Idea must be conceived as non-concealment (truth), but that non-concealment is conceived as Idea." And in consideration of Heidegger saying, in Richardson's translation of the relevant German extract from "Plato's teaching of truth", "... The *ιδέα* is pure shining-forth in the sense of the expression 'the sun shines' ..." <sup>94</sup>, the author continues his (confounding?) interpretive exegesis [with my interpolations] thus [p. 306]:

Hence the essence [(= presence), i.e. *Wesen* as 'Wesenheit, *essentia*, οὐσία' (= *Anwesen* as 'Anwesenheit, *praesentia*, παρουσία') ? MAH] of Idea lies in appearing and visible-ness, and it is thus that it accounts for the coming-to-presence [(= 'coming-to-essence'), i.e. "Anwesung" (= 'Wesung') ? MAH] of beings [des Seienden, i.e. *Anwesenden* (= *Wesenden*) ? MAH] as *what* they are [as *what* it, the being [das Seiende], *is* ? MAH]. Coming-to-presence [(= 'Coming-to-essence'), i.e. "Anwesung" (= 'Wesung') ? MAH], however, is precisely what is meant by the *essenc-ing* [(= *presenc-ing*), i.e. *Wesen* as *Wesung* (= *Anwesen* as *Anwesung*) ? MAH] of Being [des Seins ( εἶναι (= παρῆναι ) ? MAH]. That is why for Plato Being [as 'being-ness', *Sein* als 'Seiend-heit', ? MAH] consists properly speaking in [what-being *as* ? MAH] *what-ness*, the *quidditas* of which the schoolmen spoke, hence *essentia* [(= *praesentia*), *Wesen* as 'Wesenheit, *essentia*, οὐσία' (= *Anwesen* as 'Anwesenheit, *praesentia*, παρουσία') ? MAH] rather than *existentia*. ...

Note that Heidegger writes, in my translation of the German text from which Richardson draws, *not* "what-ness" ["Was-heit"] but "what-being" ["Was-sein"] as the kind of being (presenzing) in which, for Plato, the being of the being (the presenzing of that which is (the) presenzing) "has" ["hat"] its *essenz(ing)* proper *as the esse that is beholden to what is true* [my emphasis]: <sup>95</sup> "The *ιδέα* is the shinesome [das Scheinsame]. The *essenz(ing)* of the idea lies in the shinesome-, and visibleness [Schein- und Sichtsamkeit]. This accomplishes the presenzing, namely the presenzing of what ever a being is [was je ein Seiendes ist]. In the what-being of the being the latter presenzes at the time / in each case [jeweils]. But presenzing [Anwesung] is altogether the *essenz(ing)* of being [das *Wesen* des Seins]. That is why for Plato being has its *essenz(ing)* proper in what-being. Even the later naming divulges that the *quidditas*, the *esse* that is beholden to what is true [das wahrhafte esse], is the *essentia* and not the *existentia*."]

And there, in a nutshell, is a set of stand-out composite readings that we could perhaps dissect and amplify, also when 'negatived', as follows:

<sup>94</sup> Richardson, op.cit., p. 306; Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (GA9), G225 (131).

<sup>95</sup> Heidegger GA9, G225 (131).

With “coming-to-presence” (= “coming-to-essence”) we translate *Anwesung* (= *Wesung*), which in turn translates here οὐσία (= εἶναι) = παρουσία (= παρῆναι). And when “[b]eing” [Sein] in the intimation of “coming-to-presence” (= “coming-to-essence”) is ‘negatived’ as, say, “going-from-presence” (= “going-from-essence”), we translate *Abwesung*, which in turn translates here ἀπουσία (= ἀπεῖναι).

These composite English readings of German *An- und Abwesung* translating in turn composite readings of Greek οὐσία (= παρουσία) and ἀπουσία further undermine the author’s attempts at a somewhat more discerning English rendering of *Wesen* (and *wesen*) with “come-to-essence” as distinct from *Anwesen* (and *anwesen*) with “come-to-presence”; and, accordingly, one might surmise, of *Wesung* with “coming-to-essence” as distinct from *Anwesung* with “coming-to-presence”. Yet any distinction between “coming-to-presence” for *Anwesung* and “come-to-presence” for *Anwesen* utterly con-fuses in Richardson’s alternate formulation of *Un-wesen* as “a coming-to-presence (-wesen) that is profoundly negatived (*Un-*)”, blotted out by the composite reading “a coming-to-presence” for ‘a coming-to-essence’ *not*, on this occasion, to translate the incipient -wesen ( $\neq$  -?\*anwesen) that is “negatived” by the *Ab-* in *Ab-wesung* but rather: the incipient -wesen ( $\neq$  -?\*anwesen) that is “profoundly negatived” by the *Un-* in *Un-wesen*.

It would seem, therefore, that “the manifestive power” of “Being” [Sein] expressed ‘positively’ in conflate terms such as “come-to-presence” [*anwesen*, *wesen*, *Anwesen*, *Wesen*] and “coming-to-presence” [*Anwesung*, -?\*anwesen, *Wesung*, -wesen, *Anwesen*, -?\*anwesen, *Wesen*, -wesen] cannot but be expressions untowardly exaggerated and embellished for being composite English readings unbefitting a more discerning translation of their distinguished German (and Greek) counterparts. Nor can the English translation of key modes of “Being-as-negatived” (Richardson) such as *Unwesen* and *Abwesen*, respectively *Abwesung*, be immune from such exaggeration and embellishment in a manner unbecoming to their *essen*(ing), respectively *essen*ing, [*unwesenhaft*] insofar as they too are expressed in conflate terms of the kind: (1) “a coming-to-presence [(-wesen, -?\*anwesen)]” that is “profoundly negatived (*Un-*)” for *Un-wesen*; or (2) “a coming-to-presence [(-wesen, -?\*anwesen)]” that is “negatived [*(Ab-)*]” for *Ab-wesung*.

On this interpretation, the former conflation (1) appears to be Richardson’s composite reading of a more distinguished expression of *Un-wesen* that, *on his own terms*, is primordially inrooted in it, to wit, ‘a come-, coming-to-essence (-wesen) that is profoundly negatived (*Un-*)’. In other words, from an altogether different perspective, we could ask: Is there not primordially inrooted in a *presenz*(ing) (-?\*anwesen) that is ‘profoundly negatived (*Un-*)’ by an

‘un(doing-of-the)-presenz(ing) (*Un-?\*anwesen*)’ and, for that matter, in an absenz(ing) (*-?\*abwesen*) that is ‘profoundly negated (*Un-*)’ by an ‘un(doing-of-the)-absenz(ing) (*Un-?\*abwesen*)’, an archessential essenz(ing) [*-wesen*] that is ‘profoundly negated (*Un-*)’ by the very ‘un(doing-of-the)-essenzenz(ing) (*Un-wesen*)’ that is incipient to both?

And what remains us? *To let or not to let* this archessential essenz(ing) (*-wesen*) *be* the incipient essenz(ing) of all un(doing-of-the)-essenzenz(ing) [*das anfängliche Wesen alles Un-wesens*]?

On this interpretation, the latter conflation (2) appears to be Richardson’s composite reading of a more distinguished expression of *Ab-wesung* that, *on his own terms*, is primordially inrooted in it, to wit, ‘a coming-to-essence (*-wesung*) that is negated (*Ab-*)’. In this respect, from an altogether different perspective, we could ask: Is not ab-senzing [*Ab-wesung*], as a countervailing of pre-senzing [*An-wesung*], first and foremost a ‘negated’ -essenzenz [*-wesung*], to wit, the incipient essenzenz of all pre-senzing and ab-senzing [*die anfängliche Wesung aller An- und Ab-wesung*]? In the same vein, is not ab-senz(ing) [*Ab-wesen*], as a countervailing of pre-senz(ing) [*An-wesen*], first and foremost a ‘negated’ -essenzenz(ing) [*-wesen*], to wit, the incipient essenz(ing) of all presenz(ing) and absenz(ing) [*das anfängliche Wesen alles An- und Ab-wesens*]?

And what remains us? *To let or not to let* this archessential essenz(ing) *be* the incipient essenz(ing) of all pre-senz(ing) and ab-senz(ing); and that archessential essenzenz *be* the incipient essenzenz of all pre-senzing and ab-senzing?

Let us take a closer look, for a start, at the *not* letting-be [*das nicht Seinlassen*]—by dint of *an unthought-through blurring* throughout *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*—of the distinguishment in Heidegger’s language and thinking of *das Sein* [being] in the intimation of *das Wesen* [the essenz(ing)], respectively *die Wesung* [the essenzenz], in the sense of *das An-wesen* [the pre-senz(ing)], respectively *die An-wesung* [the pre-senzing]; and at *the confusion* that inevitably arises for our gleaning of the distinguished German cognates and agnates of *wesen*, v. in translation when these are rendered more or less indistinguishable or without due distinction by a conflate English text. We shall leave in abeyance for now any further consideration, from an altogether different perspective, of the author’s conflate reading of the key modes of “Being-as-negated” already addressed: (1) *das Un-wesen* [the un(doing-of-the)-essenzenz(ing)] by virtue of the primordial -(es)senz(ing) [*-wesen*] *das Wesen* being “profoundly negated”, so to speak, by the ‘*Un-*’; (2) *das Ab-wesen* [the ab-senz(ing)] insofar as the latter is countervailed to *das Wesen als An-wesen* [the essenz(ing) as pre-senz(ing)] by virtue of the

primordial -(es)senz(ing) [-*wesen*] that is incipient to both *An-* und *Ab-wesen* being respectively ‘positived’ and ‘negatived’, so to speak, by the ‘*An-* und *Ab-*’; and, likewise and otherwise, *die Ab-wesung* [the ab-senzing] insofar as the latter is countervailed to *die Wesung als An-wesung* [the essenizing as pre-senzing] by virtue of the primordial -(es)senzing [-*wesung*] that is incipient to both *An-* und *Ab-wesung* being respectively ‘positived’ and ‘negatived’, so to speak, by the ‘*An-* und *Ab-*’

To articulate the crux of the stand-out composite reading(s) mentioned above in other words:

It could be said that when he *directly* translates into English, the wording of the German word for ‘to be’ [*sein*] in the intimation of ‘to essence / essenz’ [*wesen*], perchance ‘to presence / presenz’ [*anwesen*], Richardson *tends to collapse his own English translation* of Heidegger’s distinguished use of the German time words *wesen* and *anwesen* into a composite reading of *sein* [to be] in the intimation of *wesen* [to essence / essenz] as ( = ) *anwesen* [to presence / presenz]; and concomitantly in regard to their corresponding verbal, respectively deverbal, nounings, of *Sein* [being] in the intimation of *Wesen* [essenzenz(ing)] as ( = ) *Anwesen* [presenz(ing)], respectively of *Wesung* [essenzing] as ( = ) *Anwesung* [presenzing]. So in contrast to Richardson’s attempts at a discerning English rendition of the respective distinctions between *wesen*, *Wesen*, *Wesung* and *anwesen*, *Anwesen*, *Anwesung*, these distinguished German words are frequently and inconsistently brought to fall, more or less without distinction or without distinction proper, under a con-fuse English rendition of *anwesen*, *Anwesen*, *Anwesung* alone.

In the same vein, Richardson *tends to collapse his own English translation* of Heidegger’s distinguishment of the German words for ‘to essence / essenz’ [*wesen*], ‘essenzenz(ing)’ [*Wesen*], ‘essenzing’ [*Wesung*] and ‘to presence / presenz’ [*anwesen*], ‘presenz(ing)’ [*Anwesen*], ‘presenzing’ [*Anwesung*] on the one hand, and for ‘to be’ [*sein*], ‘be-ing’ [*Seiend*], ‘being’ [*Sein*] on the other; and *to do likewise in respect of his own English translation* of Heidegger’s distinguishment of the nominal-participial German counterparts of ‘that which is (the) essenizing’ [*das Wesende*], respectively ‘that which is (the) presenzing’ [*das Anwesende*], on the one hand, and of ‘the being’ [*das Seiende*] on the other.

When *indirectly* translating into English by way of interpretive exegesis, Richardson also tends to complicate rather than to explicate any collapsing of his own distinguishment of such being-historic words; and again, to do so in a manner un beholden to the essenzenz(ing), respectively essenzing, of their German counterparts. A partly veiled partly unveiled complication of one such composite

reading is proposed and apparently condoned by Richardson when he attempts, as previously cited, the following explication [p. 228f]:

... “To be,” then, means “to essence”, sc. “to come-to-an-essence,” or, more idiomatically, “to come-to-a-presence.” Such, Heidegger claims, is the sense of the old German word *Wesen*, and such an understanding of it enables the author to say that his research has forced us to ask ourselves “... whether or not the question about the essence of truth must not be at the same time, indeed before all else, the question about the truth of Essence ...,”<sup>43</sup> where “Essence” [229] in the second position has the verbal sense of essenc-ing, coming-to-a-presence, Being.

<sup>43</sup> “... ob die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit nicht zugleich und zuerst die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens sein muß. ...” (WW, p. 25). We translate *Wesen*, when used to refer to Being as Presence, by “coming-to-presence,” or simply “presenc-ing.” For fuller treatment of *Wesen* in verbal sense, see ...

Hence Richardson does not try to veil but seeks rather to unveil his advocacy throughout *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* of a conflate reading of *his very own* variant English renderings of key German cognates and agnates of the being-historic time word *wesen* in the texts of Martin Heidegger, starting with his composite reading of the appreciable meaning and true sense of “the old German word *Wesen*” as a verbal nouning of *wesen*, v. in only its identity with, *not* at the same time its difference from, that of its German cognate *Anwesen* and agnate *Sein* as paradigmatic verbal nounings of *anwesen*, v. and *sein*, v. respectively.

Consider the long and the short of Richardson’s direct translation-cum-conflation of (*his own interpretation of*) Heidegger’s *distinguished* use of the select German keywords below:

1. *wesen* insofar as this time word is translated *not* with the author’s ““to essence”, sc. “to come-to-an-essence,” ” but, in his words, “more idiomatically”, *and* reading *anwesen* for *wesen* nigh on exclusively, with “to come-to-a-presence” / “(to) come to presence” / “(to) come-to-presence” or (reading *anwest* for *west*) “comes to presence” / “comes-to-presence”.<sup>96</sup>
2. *Wesen* inasmuch as this verbal nouning of *wesen*, v. is translated with *neither* “essenc(-ing) / essenc[-ing]” *nor* any of “essence” or “essenc-ing” or “Essence” or “a come-to-essence” or “a coming-to-essence”, etc. but, reading *Anwesen* (-? \**anwesen*) for *Wesen* (-*wesen*), with, respectively, any of “presence” or

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<sup>96</sup> reading *wesen* (*west*) as *anwesen* (*anwest*): *ibid.*, pp. 217, 243, 279, 348, 359, 392, 398, 413, 436, 453, 455, 476, 485, 493, 504, 518, 523, 525, 535, 536, 572, 575, 580.



“presenc-ing” or “Presence” or “a come-to-presence” or “a coming-to-presence”, etc.<sup>97</sup>

3. *Wesung* (-*wesung*) so far as this deverbal nouning of *wesen*, v. (if only in the form -*wesung*) is translated *not*, as might be expected per Richardson’s interpretation in other respects, with, say, “a coming-to-essence” but, reading *Anwesung* (-?\**anwesung*) for *Wesung* (-*wesung*) nigh on exclusively, with “a coming-to-presence”.

4. *das Wesende* when this nominal participle is translated *not*, according to Richardson’s interpretation in other respects, with, say, “what comes-to-essence / is coming-to-essence” or “that which comes-to-essence / is essent” but, reading *Anwesende* for *Wesende*, with “what comes-to-presence / is coming-to-presence” or “that which comes-to-presence / is present”.<sup>98</sup> Whereby the former renditions for *das Wesende* are being conflated in the author’s stalwart renditions for *das Anwesende* elsewhere in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*.<sup>99</sup> Note, however, a verbally-partial over a nominally-partial accentuation for *das Wesende*, apparently reading *Anwesen(de)* for *Wesende*, when *das Wesende des Seins* [that which is (the) essenizing *not* (the) presenizing of being] is at stake: For instance, “the presenc-ing process of Being itself” for “*das Wesende des Seins selbst*”; and “... in the coming-to-presence of the Being of Beings” for “... *im Wesenden des Seins des Seienden*”.<sup>100</sup> The former rendition, “the presenc-ing process”, conflates *das Wesende* with one rendition of *das Anwesen* elsewhere in the work while the latter rendition, “the coming-to-presence”, conflates it with another.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, the conflate expression “coming-to-presence” would appear to fuse together in the utmost con-fusion

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97 reading *Wesen* (-*wesen*) as *Anwesen* (-?\**anwesen*): *ibid.*, as cited and elsewhere; see also pp. 568 (“presence” for *Wesen*), 446, 522, 536, 568, 575, 584, 587 (“presenc-ing” for *Wesen*), 446f (“[to] let come-to-presence” for *Wesenlassen*).

98 reading *Wesende* as *Anwesende*: *ibid.*, pp. 437, 445f, 454, 501, 564, 570, 573.

99 For this stalwart rendition of *das Anwesende* with “what comes-to-presence / is coming to presence” or “that which comes-to-presence / is present”, see, for example, *ibid.*, pp. 214, 274, 418, 420, 519, 521; Cf. pp. 516f for Richardson’s alternate to my nomenclaturing of Heidegger’s distinction between “that which is (the) presenizing and absenizing” or “the / what is / that which is present(ing) and absent(ing)” for *das An- und Abwesende* on the one hand and “that which is present(ial)” for *das Gegenwärtige* and “that which is not present(ial)” for *das Ungegenwärtige* on the other [e.g. p. 517]: “In this paragraph, we use “that which comes-to-presence” for *das Anwesende*; “that which is present” for *gegenwärtig* [*das Gegenwärtige* ? MAH]; “that which is *not* present” for *ungegenwärtig* [*das Ungegenwärtige* ? MAH]; “that which does *not* come to presence” for *das Abwesende*.”

100 *ibid.*, pp. 437 and 564 respectively.

101 For example: “[The process of] presenc-ing (Being)” and “the process of coming-to-presence”, both for Heidegger’s *Anwesen*, *ibid.*, pp. XX, XXI.



*Anwesen* with *Wesen*, *Anwesung* with *Wesung*, and *Anwesende* with *Wesende*. The single appearance of “the presenc [-ing]” in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* to translate *not*, by analogy with the translation of *das Wesen* as “the essenc [-ing]”, *das Anwesen*, but instead: *das Wesende*—in the expression “das Wesende des Seins” [“the presenc [-ing] of Being”]—is a notable exception to any of Richardson’s other composite readings of *Anwesende* or *Anwesen(de)* for *Wesende*.<sup>102</sup>

5. *das Anwesende* when this nominal participle is translated *not* with any of, say, “what comes-to-presence / is coming to presence” or “that which comes to presence / is present” but, reading *Seiende* for *Anwesende*, with “beings” or “a being” and, in interpolated form: “[beings]” or “[a being]”. Correspondingly, when the verbal noun *Anwesen* is translated *not* with any of, say, “presence” or “presenc-ing” or “Presence” or “a coming-to-presence” but, reading *Sein* for *Anwesen*, with “Being” and, in interpolated form, “[Being]”.<sup>103</sup> Again, when

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102 For this isolate rendition “the presenc [-ing]” to translate *das Wesende*, see *ibid.*, p. 573. The significance, if any is intended, of the space between “presenc” and “[-ing]” for the fact that “the presenc [-ing]” translates *das Wesende* instead of *das Anwesende* or *das Anwesen(de)* or *das Anwesen*, only the latter by analogy with the translation of *Wesen* with “essenc [-ing]”, escapes me.

103 reading *Sein* for *Anwesen* and *Seiende* for *Anwesende*: *ibid.*, pp. 13 (“of [beings and Being]” for *von Anwesendem und Anwesen* in conjunction with “essence” for *Wesen*); 348 (“in its own proper [Being]” for *in sein eigenes Anwesen* in conjunction with “comes-to-presence” for *west*); 493 (“gathers all [beings] into [Being]” for *alles Anwesende ins Anwesen versammelt*); 497 (“[beings]” for *Anwesendes*); 522 (“the [Being of beings]” and “the relationship of [Being] to [beings]” for *das Anwesen des Anwesenden* and “the relation of Being to beings” for *die Beziehung des Anwesens zum Anwesenden* in conjunction with “Being” for *Sein*, “beings” for *Seienden*, and “in the presenc-ing of Being” for *das Wesen des Seins*: “... In χρεών, when [we] think it as the [Being of beings], somehow or other the relationship of [Being] to [beings] is thought, especially if the relation of Being to beings can only come from Being and rest in the presenc-ing of Being.” for “... Einmal, daß es das Anwesen des Anwesenden nennt, zum anderen, daß im χρεών, wenn es das Anwesen des Anwesenden denkt, irgendwie die Beziehung des Anwesens zum Anwesenden gedacht ist, wenn anders die Beziehung des Seins zum Seienden nur aus dem Sein kommen und im Wesen des Seins beruhen kann.”; on the same page, still on the theme [521]: “The importance of τὸ χρεών “is that it is not only a name for Being but that it expresses the relation between Being and beings” [522]: “The hand-ling process [of Being]” hands out ... [beings] ... for *Der Brauch händigt Fug und Ruch in der Weise aus*, and “... gathers them into itself and guards them as [beings] in their [Being]” for ... *zu sich versammelt und es als das Anwesende in das Anwesen birgt*); 523 (“The [Being] of [beings]” for ... *Anwesen des Anwesenden*); 524 (“[Being]” for *Anwesen*); 527 (Within this process [beings] can come to presence. ...” for *innerhalb dessen Anwesendes anwesen kann*. ...); 568 (“the presence [of beings]” for *die Anwesenheit des Anwesenden* in conjunction with “the [genuine] essenc [-ing] of a thing” for *das Wesen des Dinges*); 604 (“the [Being] of [beings]” for *das Anwesen von Anwesendem*); cf. 318: (“That-ness and what-ness [That-being and what-being ? MAH] reveal themselves as ways in which [beings] come-to-presence” for *Daß-sein und Was-sein enthüllen sich als Weisen des Anwesens*,

*Wesen* is translated *not* with any of, say, “essence” or “essenc-ing” or “Essence” or “a coming-to-essence” *nor*, in a conflate reading of *Wesen* with *Anwesen*, with any of, say, “presence” or “presenc-ing” or “Presence” or “a coming-to-presence” but, this time reading *Sein* for *Wesen* rather than *Anwesen*, with “Being” or “[Being]”.<sup>104</sup>

The conflate rendition “[beings]” for *das Anwesende* (= “beings” for *das Seiende*) accords with Richardson frequently rendering Heidegger’s distinctive language of the *presenz(ing)*, i.e. the *presenzing*, of that which is (the) *presenzing* [*das Anwesen*, d.h. *die Anwesung*, *des Anwesenden*] in terms of the German thinker’s distinctive language of the *be-ing*, i.e. the *being*, of the *being* [*das Seiend*, d.h. *das Sein*, *des Seienden*] alone. This is exemplified in Richardson’s reading of Heidegger’s *das Sein des Seienden* for his *das Anwesen des Anwesenden* such that the latter expression when equated with and conflated into the former is likewise translated into English with “the Being of beings”, usually rendered (when not translating the former expression) in the interpolated form “the [Being of beings]”, or words to that effect. However the collapse of his own English translation of the distinguished German cognates of *wesen*, v. and *sein*, v. is evident throughout *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* wherever Richardson, on his own initiative, clearly proffers to give a composite English reading of that distinguishment in the German language of his sources. The equating and conflating of *Anwesen* and *Anwesende* on the one hand with an interpolated-bracketed form of *Sein* and *Seiende* on the other is one such composite reading, a distinctive fusion leading to the inevitable con-fusion of a distinction without a difference: “[Being]” for *Anwesen* = “Being” for *Sein* and “[beings]” for *das Anwesende* = “beings” for *das Seiende*.

The confusion is exacerbated by the fact that Richardson’s English words “Being” or “[Being]” and “beings” or “[beings]” do not stand in only for German *Anwesen* and *Anwesende* (= and  $\neq$  *Wesen* and *Wesende*) instead of rendering, as usual, German *Sein* and *Seiende* respectively, since in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, the most reliable rendition into English of *das Sein* with “Being” and *das Seiende* with “beings” is often substituted for, sc. conflated with, significant other being-historic words

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apparently reading *das Seiende* [ “[beings]” ] for *das Anwesende* in the English expression “ways in which [beings] come-to-presence” instead of, say, (alternately, on his own terms): “ways in which [what is present / what comes-to-presence / what is coming-to-presence] comes to presence / is coming-to-presence” for the German expression *als Weisen des Anwesens*); and so forth.

104 reading *Sein* for *Wesen*: *ibid.*, pp. 450 (“the essential law of [Being-as-] mittance” for *das Wesensgesetz der Geschickes*), 603 (“[Being’s] demand for thought” for *dem ... verlangten Wesen des Denkens*).

pertaining to the manifold ways of saying, sc. of translating and distinguishing, the essenz(ing) [das Wesen], i.e. the essenizing [die Wesung], of the being [des Seins]—including as the being(ness) [d. Seiend(heit)] = the beingness [der Seiendheit]—of the being [des Seienden] in Heidegger’s language and thought.<sup>105</sup>

The prevalent inclination to collapse his own English translation of Heidegger’s distinguishment of the German cognates of *wesen*, v. on the one hand and those of *sein*, v. on the other seems to be drawn from Richardson’s alternately conflate reading of their otherwise distinguished correspondences and correlations. This can be gleaned from select passages highlighting how the composite reading “Being” for *das Anwesen* (= “Being” for *das Sein*) and “beings” or “a being” for *das Anwesende* (= “beings” or “a being” for *das Seiende*), might well be inspired by and indeed concur in many respects with suggestions of the like in the original German texts. These are most likely to be texts where, notwithstanding distinctive renderings of the German words for ‘to be’ [sein] and ‘to essence’ [wesen] and ‘to presence’ [anwesen] respectively, key cognates of *sein*, v. on the one hand and *wesen*, v. on the other *beseem* more concordant with their saying the same than something different in Heidegger’s *Seinsdenken*, respectively *Wesensdenken*. But what if there *is* still, *in essenizing*, the (preserved) ‘logic’ [‘Logik’] (λόγος) of a (forgotten) difference between saying ‘the be-ing, i.e. the being, of the being’ [das Seiend, d.h. das Sein, des Seienden] and saying ‘the presenz(ing), i.e. the presenizing, of that which is (the) presenizing’ [das Anwesen, d.h. die Anwesung, des Anwesenden]? What if the (hidden) absenizing [Abwesung] of the said difference in a composite saying, the not-letting-it-be-properly-essenizing as (= and ≠) presenizing (absenizing), an absent(ing) presenizing of the unsaid in what is said, were untrue [unwahr] to the otherwise distinctive wording of the words in question, were, in short, in our appraisal [Besinnung], ‘das Un-wesen der Wahrheit’, the un(doing-of-the-)essenz(ing) of ‘the (appreciable) meaning’ [‘der Sinn’], i.e. the true (sense) [d.h. das Wahre] (ἀληθές), of what, in other words, is altogether at stake?<sup>106</sup>

Thus far we have considered Richardson’s English translation and, *off his own bat*, conflation of Heidegger’s *distinguished* use within his own German language and thinking of select cognates of *wesen*, v. on the one hand and *sein*, v. on the other. To this end, we have turned our attention to the task of essentially [wesentlich] translating Heidegger translating *Wesen* in a manner

105 *ibid.*, pp. 409, 464, 481, 509, 510, 543f, 550, 586, 602, 608, 610, 616.

106 cf. Heidegger’s *Besinnung* [appraisal] in *Heraklit* (GA55) in connection with this English rendition of his expression [G274ff] “‘der Sinn’, d.h. das Wahre, ”.

beholden to the *essenzenz(ing)* whence of itself as the *essenzenz* of this being-historic word, that is to say, *wesenhaft* in the twofold signification of German *wesen-* as *Wesen(heit)* and *Wesung*. This has given us an inkling of the manifold ways of (yea-and-nay-)saying the distinguished *essenzenz(ing)* [*Wesen, Wesen(heit)*] (οὐσία (εἶναι)) and truth [*Wahrheit*] (ἀλήθεια) of our English word for ‘the being’ [*das Seiende*] (τὸ ὄν) as ‘be-ing’ [*als seiend*] (ἢ ὄν), and for ‘the be-ing’ [*das Seiend*], i.e. ‘the being’ [*das Sein*] (τὸ εἶναι), as ‘the being(ness)’ [*d. Seiend(heit)*] (ἡ οὐσία (τὸ εἶναι)) of the being [*des Seienden*] (οντος) *through* an appraisively-appreciative apprising of the unconcealedness [*Unverborgenheit*], or better: the deconcealedness [*Entborgenheit*], and deconcealment [*Entbergung*] (ἀλήθεια) of the *essenzenz* [*der Wesung*] (εἶναι), and that means: the *presenzing* [*der Anwesenung*] (παρεῖναι) *and* the *absenzing* [*der Abwesenung*] (ἀπεῖναι), of not just ‘the being’ [‘des Seienden’] but ‘(the) being’ [‘(des) Seins’]. It is noteworthy that unless we embrace and do not eschew *essenzenz* [*Wesung*] (εἶναι) as a distinctive paradigmatic inflection of being [*Sein*] (εἶναι) that is archessentially incipient to *presenzing* and *absenzing* alike, each according to its own, that is to say, its own historic mode of being (*and* time) in *essenzenz(ing)*, perchance in *presenz(ing)* *and* *absenz(ing)*, we may well be inclined, per Richardson, to identify *essenzenz* [*Wesung*] (εἶναι) with *presenzing* [*Anwesenung*] (παρεῖναι) alone as against *absenzing* [*Abwesenung*] (ἀπεῖναι).

With these considerations in mind, some questions arise: Is the seemingly uneschewable tendency to conflate the distinguishment of our *shared* occidental language and thinking of ‘the *essenzenz*’ and truth not just of ‘the being’ [‘des Seienden’] but ‘(the) being’ [‘(des) Seins’] entirely on Richardson’s own initiative? Or is he perhaps taking his lead here directly from Heidegger himself? And is Heidegger, for his part, discerningly taking his lead from the properly (enpropriatingly) historic *essenzenz* and truth of being (as *beyng*) itself?

To an appreciative thinking in this vein, it has to be said that the texts of Martin Heidegger do now and then call upon us to embrace a tantalisingly obscure mix of distinguished and (uneschewably ?) conflate renditions of be-ing, i.e. being, as (= and ≠) being(ness) [*Seiend, d.h. Sein, als (= und ≠) Seiend(heit)*] in the intimation of ‘*essenzenz(ing)*’ [*Wesen, Wesen(heit)*] for ‘οὐσία (εἶναι)’ as (= and ≠) ‘*presenz(ing)*’ [*Anwesen, Anwesen(heit)*] for ‘παρουσία (παρεῖναι)’ as against ‘*absenz(ing)*’ [*Abwesen, Abwesen(heit)*] for ‘ἀπουσία (ἀπεῖναι)’ (and incipiently ‘*essenzenz(ing)*’ [*Wesen, Wesen(heit)*] for ‘οὐσία (εἶναι)’); and so too: of ‘*essenzenz*’ [*Wesung*] for εἶναι as (= and ≠) ‘*presenzing*’ [*Anwesenung*] for παρεῖναι as against ‘*absenzing*’ [*Abwesenung*] for ἀπεῖναι (and incipiently ‘*essenzenz*’ [*Wesung*] for εἶναι). Is not Heidegger himself responsible at times for *an unthought-through* blurring of his more discerning gleaning of the

consorting (together) and all at once the disconsorting (together) of these distinguished *Greek* words for ‘being’ [Sein] (εἶναι) and their manifold ways of saying, each in their own way, the ver(ily) same essenz(ing) [Wesen as Wesen(heit)] (οὐσία (εἶναι) ), respectively essenzing [Wesung] (εἶναι), thereof within the original Greek and his own German language and thinking?

The question whether while translating-cum-conflating Heidegger’s *distinguished* use of the select cognates of *wesen*, v. and *sein*, v. Richardson is in some measure taking his lead directly from Heidegger himself, is especially relevant where the German thinker is translating what he considers to be the authentically philosophic language of Greek thinkers into his own German language and thinking *and*, at the same time, conflating it, be it wittingly or unwittingly, eschewably or uneschewably. In the event, the in-depth task of translating for the English-language interpreter becomes all at once, indeed before all else, to translate this distinguished *and* conflate translating of Heidegger’s, *this* thinking of being [Seinsdenken] into suitable English. After all, it is surely the latter’s venture in another way of saying *Greek* being [Sein] (εἶναι) in his own German language as ( = ) ‘arising (and awhile) presenz(ing)’ [aufgehendes (und verweilendes) Anwesen] (φύσις) and of thinking how φύσις as such (ἀλήθεια) presenzes [anwest] and shelters-conceals its presenzing [Anwesung] (παρεῖναι) as presenz(ing) [Anwesen(heit)] (παρουσία (παρεῖναι) ) unto presenz (= essenz) [Anwesenheit (= Wesenheit) ] (παρουσία (= οὐσία) ) that supposedly lays itself out for the interpretation giving rise to the English rendition — and set of stand-out composite readings suggested above — ‘a coming-to-and-a-going-from-presence’ translating the (Heidegger’s) *An-und-Abwesung* that, on Richardson’s interpretation, translates in turn Greek οὐσία (= παρουσία) and ἀπουσία.

The questions raised can now be refocussed and refined: To what extent is this very rendition of Richardson’s guided by the occasional composite reading on the part of Heidegger of an otherwise (potentially) distinguished interpretation of the ancient Greek language and thinking of our word for ‘being’ [Sein] (εἶναι) as being(ness) [Seiend(heit)] ( οὐσία (εἶναι) ) and for the manifold ways of saying Greek being as φύσις and the (arising and setting) essenz(ing) [das (aufgehende und untergehende) Wesen] of φύσις as ἀλήθεια *predominantly* in terms of “the arising presenz(ing)” [“des aufgehenden Anwesens”] thereof or, in Richardson’s translation of “des aufgehenden Anwesens”, “the process of emerging-into-presence”.<sup>107</sup>

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107 Richardson, op.cit., pp. 239f; Cf. pp. 17, 261, 263, 266-268, 272, 276ff for Richardson’s discussion of Heidegger’s interpretation of Greek being as φύσις and of φύσις as ἀλήθεια in the signification of [p. 261ff] “emergent-abiding-presence” for, one might surmise,



Take, for instance, the expression [*Wegmarken* (GA9), G279 (349)] “the unconcealed of the presencing” [“das Unverborgene der Anwesenung”] to render, in Heidegger’s translator’s square brackets: “[παρουσία = οὐσία (ἀπουσία)]”. This Greek rendition of the appreciable meaning and true sense of his German phrase “das Unverborgene der Anwesenung” is articulated by Heidegger in the same essay from which Richardson draws heavily with recourse to the key Latinate cognates of *esse*, v. ‘a coming-to-and-a-going-from-presence’ to translate into English German *An-und-Ab-wesung* such that these key German cognates of *wesen*, v. translate, in turn, the key Greek cognates of εἶναι, v.: οὐσία (= παρουσία) and ἀπουσία.

Heidegger’s Greek rendition of the German phrase “das Unverborgene der Anwesenung” is brought to the fore in his (1939) [1958] essay, “Of the *essenz(ing)* and concept of Φύσις. Aristotle, *Physics* B, I.” during an appraisal of how, even when linguistic usage in mathematics and partially in philosophy rightly holds on to something of the original signification and root meaning of the word λόγος, we can still fail to appreciate “the *essential* content” [“den *wesentlichen* Gehalt”] of the *Greek* word and to misinterpret the concept of λόγος in the hitherto customary sense. In consideration of this “*essential* content”, Heidegger points out, while translating the root signification of the Greek word into his highly distinguishing German, that the λόγος belongs to the λέγειν, “which means and is the same as our (German) word “lesen”—Weinlese [the glean or harvest of the grapes], Ährenlese [the glean or (in)gathering of the crop or ears of grain]: sammeln [to collect or gather]”. There he writes [*Wegmarken* (GA9), G279 (349)]:

“Lesen”, sammeln meint: mehreres Zerstreutes zusammen-bringen auf Eines und dieses Eine zugleich *beibringen* and *zu-stellen* (παρά). Wohin? In das Unverborgene der Anwesenung [παρουσία = οὐσία (ἀπουσία)].

In a tentative English rendition:

“To glean”, to gather means: to consort or bring-together the variously dispersed unto one, and, all at once, to bring *nigh* and deliver (*alongside*) of (παρά) this one. Whereunto? Unto the unconcealed of the presencing [παρουσία = οὐσία (ἀπουσία)].

And here, in the last sentence, is perchance a set of stand-out composite readings (gleanings) on Heidegger’s part of the variously dispersed meanings of the unconcealed essence / *essenz* [*Wesen* = *Wesenheit*] (οὐσία) pertaining to the

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“der aufgehenden-verweilenden Anwesenheit”; and the closely associated signification of [p. 17] German “aufgehenden and verweilenden Waltens”, “arising and awhiling holding sway / prevailing”, or, in Richardson’s translation thereof, “emergent-abiding Power”; and, in short, [p. 276ff]: “emergent / emerging Power” for “aufgehendes Walten”.



archessential essenz(ing) [Wesen = Wesen(heit)] ( οὐσία (εἶναι) ) whence of itself (ἀρχή) as essenzing [Wesen = Wesung] (εἶναι) of being [Sein] (εἶναι) as beingness [Seiend = Seiendheit] ( οὐσία ) unto one ‘παρουσία = οὐσία (ἀπουσία)’ forgathering [Versammlung] (λόγος) of a more distinguished wording of ‘the (appreciable) meaning’ [‘der Sinn’], i.e. the true (sense) [d.h. das Wahre] (ἀληθές), of the Greek words for “the unconcealed of the presenzing” [“das Unverborgene der Anwesenung”] that we might more discerningly dissect and amplify in the first instance, with an alternate gleaning [Lesung, lesen] (λέγειν) of the Greek words in translator’s square brackets, as follows:

Unto the unconcealed [παρουσία = οὐσία (ἀπουσία)] of the presenz(ing) [παρουσία (παρεῖναι) = οὐσία (εἶναι) ( ἀπουσία ( ἀπεῖναι ) )] as presenzing [παρεῖναι = εἶναι (ἀπεῖναι)].

Or, with the German corresponding to the Greek in translator’s square brackets, in a more distinguished glean after Heidegger’s imparting of just *one* (conflate ?) reading of these diverse *Greek* words for the true (sense) [das Wahre] (ἀληθές) that belongs as self-deconcealing to the ‘the οὐσία (εἶναι)–character’ of being itself as ‘the arising (and setting) presenz(ing) = essenz(ing) ( absenz(ing) )’ [‘das aufgehende (und untergehende) Anwesen = Wesen (Abwesen)’] (φύσις as “the incipiently cast-open ἀλήθεια”) in his own language and thinking, as follows:

Unto the unconcealed [Anwesenheit = Wesenheit (Abwesenheit)] of the presenz(ing) [Anwesen(heit) = Wesen(heit) ( Abwesen(heit) )] as presenzing [Anwesenung = Wesung (Abwesenung)].

And, to re-translate this *more distinguished glean* of the German translating the Greek wording of the words in translator’s square brackets into English:

Unto the unconcealed [presenz = essenz (absenz)] of the presenz(ing) [= essenz(ing) (absenz(ing))] as presenzing [= essenzing (absenzing)].

Re: “the true (sense) [das Wahre] (ἀληθές)” of “the incipiently cast-open” Greek essenz(ing) of (the λόγος and the λέγειν of) ἀλήθεια as “the unconcealed and that which is (the) deconcealing” [“das Unverborgene und das Entbergende”], here is my provisional translation of an excerpt from Heidegger’s appraisal in *Parmenides* (GA54) of the historic change in the shape of the *Greek* essenz(ing) of ἀλήθεια from the time of Plato and Aristotle [G72ff]:

Since Plato and above all through the thinking of Aristotle a change fulfills its purpose within the Greek essenz(ing) of the ἀλήθεια that in a certain respect the ἀλήθεια itself obliges. Ἀληθές is from early on the unconcealed and that which is (the) deconcealing. The unconcealed can only be deconcealed as one such as it is for

and by the human being in that their deconcealing manner of comporting keeps its hold on and agrees with the unconcealed. For this comporting, Aristotle uses the word ἀλήθεύειν: to keep its hold deconcealingly on the unconcealed in the saying that is letting-appear. This agreeing with the unconcealed while keeping its hold thereon is called in Greek ὁμοίωσις – the deconcealing-wise corresponding that gives expression by responding expressly to the unconcealed. This corresponding takes the unconcealed for and holds it to be that which it is. To hold or consider something to be something is in Greek called οἶσθαι. The λόγος, which now signifies the expression or statement [die Aussage], obtains the constitution of the οἶσθαι. This deconcealing-wise correspondence still maintains its hold and fulfils its purpose wholly in the space of the essencing of ἀλήθεια as unconcealedness.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, however, the ὁμοίωσις, i.e. the agreeing-wise corresponding, as the way to fulfill the purpose of the ἀλήθεύειν takes over, as it were, the authoritative, standard-setting “representation” of ἀλήθεια. The latter, as the not-dissembling [Nicht-Verstellen] of the being, is the adaptation or adjustment [Angleichung] of the deconcealing-wise saying to the self-showing, is the ὁμοίωσις. From henceforth, ἀλήθεια presents itself in nothing else besides this shape of essenz(ing) and will only ever be taken thus.

<sup>4</sup> Concerning ὁρθός and ὁρθότης cf. below G119 f.

It is worth noting that because the beyng-historic change in the shape of the *Greek* essenz(ing) of ἀλήθεια that presents itself [sich darstellt] at the inception of occidental thinking pervades the whole truth of our (re)presentative [vorstellenden] thinking of being as being(ness) in the occident, beginning with the thought of Plato and Aristotle right through to the present (= essent !) day, it remains, in essenz(ing), that which is incipiently worth(while)-thinking.

It is beyond the scope of this [essay](#) to delve the λόγος and the λέγειν of the abovenamed crucial sentence in Heidegger’s gleaning of Aristotle’s conception of the Greek word for ‘being’ [Sein] φύσις as a kind and mode of beingness and essence [Seiendheit und Wesenheit] (οὐσία) unto the one “παρουσία = οὐσία (ἄπουσία)” forgathered that, as “the unconcealed of the presencing” [“das Unverborgene der Anwesenung”], itself hails, in essenz(ing) [im Wesen], respectively in essencing [in der Wesung], from “the incipiently cast-open φύσις” as ἀ-λήθεια at the inception of occidental thinking.

Nor is this the place to explore any inkling of the extent to which the German thinker’s (conflate ?) gleaning of the consorting and disconsorting together of the variously dispersed meanings of the respective Greek words for just the οὐσία –, *not* the οὐσία (εἶναι) – character of φύσις as ἀ-λήθεια, the latter gleaned archessentially as the coming-forth into unconcealedness *and* the sheltering-concealing firstly into essenz(ing) [Wesen] ( οὐσία (εἶναι) ) whence of itself (ἀρχή) as essencing [Wesung] (εἶναι), may well confound his own *discernment* of this incipiently cast-open *Greek* essenz(ing) of φύσις as ἀ-λήθεια.

from (= and ≠ ?) the presenz(ing) [Anwesen] ( παρουσία (παρεῖναι) ) thereof whence of itself as presenzing [Anwesung] (παρεῖναι) and, in a countervailing sense: the absenz(ing) [Abwesen] ( ἀπουσία (ἀπεῖναι) ) thereof whence of itself as absenzing [Abwesung] (ἀπεῖναι).

Suffice it to say, that the exploration of yet other potentially *unthought-through* conflate readings of the kind on Heidegger's part, still in connection with (but by no means restricted to) the thought of Aristotle, could include, I suggest, the following iterations [*Wegmarken* (GA9), G261 (331)]:

Wenn die Griechen das Sein bald als In-sich-stehen ὑπόστασις – substantia, bald als Vorliegen ὑποκείμενον – subjectum fassen, dann gilt beides gleich viel, weil sie darin das Eine und Einzige im Blick haben: das von sich her Anwesen, die Anwesung. Der entscheidende Leitsatz des Aristoteles bezüglich der Auslegung der φύσις lautet: die φύσις muß als οὐσία, als eine Art und Weise der Anwesung begriffen werden.

While the Greeks sometimes regard being as standing-under-its-own-steam, ὑπόστασις – substantia, and sometimes as lying-in-front-of, ὑποκείμενον – subjectum, both are considered to be equally true, because in such regard they have the one and the only one in view: the presenz(ing) from whence of itself, the presenzing. The leading principle that decides and guides Aristotle's interpretation of the φύσις is the sentence: the φύσις must be conceived as οὐσία, as a kind and mode of presenzing.

And [G283 (353)]:

Früher stießen wir auf den entscheidenden Leitsatz: die φύσις ist οὐσία, eine Art der Seiendheit, will sagen, der Anwesung.

Earlier we came upon the crucial leading sentence: the φύσις is οὐσία, a kind of beingness, that is to say, of presenzing.

Also, perhaps, in regard to Heidegger's appraisal of Greek absenzing [Abwesung] as a lack or (de)privation [Beraubung] (στέρησις) of Greek presenzing [Anwesung] through the εἶδος, the look [Aussehen], that, after Aristotle, is κατὰ τὸν λόγον, commensurate with the λόγος, hence, due to (the essenz(ing) of) this lack, εἶδος πῶς, a somewise look and presenz(ing) of one kind or another, so that, while looking to be an "absent(ing) or absenzing presenzing [abwesende Anwesung]" (Heidegger), (un)veils itself through this absent(ing) or absenzing presenzing into the open(-reveal) of the ἰδέα (Plato) and the εἶδος κατὰ τὸν λόγον (Aristotle) in a 'nay-saying' [Ab-sagen] of the 'yea-saying' [zu-sagenden] essenz(ing) [Wesen] of the φύσις as "οὐσία, as a kind of beingness, that is to say, of presenzing" [G296f (366f)]:

Bedenken wir, daß οὐσία Seindheit besagt: Anwesenung, dann bedarf es keiner umständlichen Erörterung mehr, um auszumachen, wohin die στέρησις als Abwesenung gehört.

Und dennoch gelangen wir gerade jetzt an einen Gefahrenpunkt des Begreifens; man könnte sich den Sachverhalt leicht machen und die στέρησις (Abwesenung) für das bloße Gegenteil der Anwesenung nehmen. Allein die στέρησις ist eben nicht einfachhin Abwesenheit, sondern als Abwesenung ist die στέρησις gerade die στέρησις zur Anwesenung. ... Στέρησις als Abwesenung ist nicht einfach Abwesenheit, sondern [G297 (367)] Anwesenung, diejenige nämlich, in der gerade die Abwesenung — nicht etwa das Abwesende — anweist. Die στέρησις ist εἶδος, aber εἶδος πως — ein irgendwie geartetes Aussehen und Anwesen. Wir Heutigen sind allzu geneigt, dgl. wie die abwesende Anwesenung in ein leichtfertiges, dialektisches Begriffsspiel aufzulösen, statt ihr Erstaunliches festzuhalten; denn in der στέρησις verhüllt sich das Wesen der φύσις.

Should we bear in mind that οὐσία, beingness, means: presenzing, then there is no further need for a situating discussion to make out whereunto the στέρησις as absenzing pertains.

And yet right now we get to a danger point of catching on; one could make the state of affairs easy for oneself by taking στέρησις (absenzing) for nothing but the opposite of presenzing. However the στέρησις is by no means straightforwardly absence but rather, as absenzing, the στέρησις is precisely the στέρησις toward presenzing. ... Στέρησις as absenzing is not simply absence but rather [G297 (367)] *presenzing*, namely, the kind in which precisely *the absenzing* — not just that which is (the) absenzing — is presenzing. Στέρησις is εἶδος, but εἶδος πως — a somewise look and presenz(ing) of one kind or another. Nowadays we are all too inclined, to dissolve the like of the absent(ing) or absenzing presenzing into an ill-considered dialectical play of the concept instead of holding fast to what is therein astonishing; for in the στέρησις the essenz(ing) of the φύσις veils itself.

Re: “(but by no means restricted to) the thought of Aristotle”, see my earlier discussion of another inkled iteration of Heidegger’s confounding of his own discernment of the incipient *-wesung* (*-εἶναι*) of *Greek* οὐσία (= παρ-ουσία ?) as *An-wesung* (παρ-εἶναι) in his appraisal of Plato’s thought of “the presenzing [die Anwesenung] (οὐσία)” as ἰδέα; and of the hidden shift in the *essenz(ing)* of truth [*Wesen* der Wahrheit] that this thought entails insofar as the correctness of the adjustment of the seeing, or knowing look, in view of, and in conformity with the look of that which is (the) showing itself as a being in its being (= presenzing) as idea [Idee] (ἰδέα), conceived as a character of human knowing (seeing, witting), no longer appeals to the incipiently cast-open φύσις as ἀ-λήθεια at the Greek inception of occidental thinking: that of the unconcealedness and its self-concealing deconcealing first into *essenz(ing)* [*Wesen*, *Wesen(heit)*] (οὐσία (εἶναι) ), conceived as stanteous or bestanteous [ständige oder beständige] presenzing [*Anwesenung*] (παρεἶναι), and hence: a

fundamental trait of being (εἶναι = παρεἶναι) itself as ‘beingness’ (‘essenz’) [Seiendheit (Wesenheit)] and ( = ) ‘presenz’ [Anwesenheit] (οὐσία = παρούσα).

But what has all of this got to do with our appraisal of Richardson’s approach to ‘translating Heidegger translating *Wesen*’ into English, be it in a manner beholden or un beholden to the essenz(ing) of the translating that is always already taking place within the original German language? Why digress from what is at stake in the task of essentially [*wesentlich*] translating from German into English by trying to trace inkled conflate English readings (gleanings) of a distinguished German text on the part of Richardson back to inkled conflate readings (gleanings) of the otherwise distinguished Greek on the part of Heidegger? After all, in essenz(ing) [im *Wesen*], there *is*, i.e. *essenzen* (and shelters-conceals its essenzing [*Wesung*]) *as* ( = and ≠ ) presenzing (absenzing) [Anwesung (Abwesung)], the least inkling of that trace to venture, nothing to prove however.

In his 1954 title “What calls for thinking?” [“Was Heisst Denken?”]<sup>108</sup>, Heidegger himself ventures that we would err should we take the view that the hitherto taken-for-granted essenz(ing) of the being of the being signifies only and for all time: the presenz(ing) of that which is (the) presenzing; and that, when it comes to our giving heed to what is worth(while)-thinking, “the essenz(ing) of the presenz(ing) alone [schon das *Wesen* des Anwesens]” gives us sufficient, albeit thus far unheeded, pause for thought [WD, G143]:

The thinking of the Greeks dwells in the holding sway [Walten] of the [saying of the word] εἶν as the presenz(ing) of that which is (the) presenzing even before it’s beginning [to give heed and a name of its own to (the whiling of) the unsaid in what the language is already saying]. Only thus can the thinking be awakened and called upon to take heed of that which is (the) presenzing in respect of its presenz(ing) [das Anwesende hinsichtlich seines Anwesens]. If this comes to pass — and it does come to pass in the thinking of the Greek thinkers from Parmenides until Aristotle — then it is a-coming-to-pass that, as it happens, in no way yet avouches for such thinking bringing into the word with all possible clarity in every respect the presenz(ing) of that which is (the) presenzing. By way of such thinking it is in no way decided whether in respect of the “presenz(ing) of that which is (the) presenzing” that upon which the presenz(ing) of that which is (the) presenzing rests will come to light. It would be a mistake, therefore, to take the view that being of the being signifies only and for all time: presenz(ing) of that which is (the) presenzing. Of course the essenz(ing) of the presenz(ing) alone gives us enough pause to think. And not once have we inquired sufficiently pursuant to *this*—to what the presenz(ing) of that which is (the) presenzing might be meaning to say after its Greek sense.

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108 Martin Heidegger “Was Heisst Denken?”, Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, 1984 (first edition 1954) (hereafter cited as “WD”).



In the meantime, let us shift our focus back to Richardson's approach to the essential [wesentlichen] discernment of the German original and the task of suitably translating-cum-transporting into English key cognates of *wesen*, v. in a manner beholden to their *essenz(ing)* [wesenhaft].

So far as Heidegger's distinguishment of German *wesentlich* and *wesenhaft* is concerned, Richardson directly conflates it by indiscriminately transposing both into Latinate-English 'essential(ly)'. Whilst Heidegger's adjectival use of *wesenhaft* and *wesentlich* appears to be rendered in equal measure with the same word "essential", thereby blurring their distinguishment in the German original, the author of *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* appears to reserve "essentially" for Heidegger's adverbial use of *wesenhaft*; in this vein, adverbial *wesentlich* is on one occasion converted into adjectival "essential".<sup>109</sup>

It could be said that Richardson indirectly transports us into the con-fusion of his conflation of *wesentlich* and *wesenhaft* even when he is not directly translating-cum-transposing and transcribing these distinctive German words into English. Whether it be through his direct translation of Heidegger's more distinguished language and thinking or, in an oblique manner of speaking, through his paraphrasing and circumscribing thereof in a (translative) exegesis of his own, the author's wont when it comes to his hermeneutic use of the Latinate-English word 'essential(ly)' and cognates will inevitably be in play through his entire interpretation (translation) *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, a work for which, as Heidegger in his *Preface / Vorwort* to the work reminds Richardson, "you alone bear the responsibility".<sup>110</sup> And, as Heidegger might remind us all, only by attending to the translating always already taking place within your own English language can you responsibly turn your attention to the usually easier and more limited task of translating the foreign word into one of your own.

To add to the confusion, the word *wesentlich* is also directly translated into English by Richardson with "foundational" [grundlegend, grundlegend?], notably whenever he inconsistently chooses, which he does from the outset, to render Heidegger's phrase *das wesentliche Denken* with "foundational thought"

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109 For his direct translation of Heidegger's (1) adverbial use of *wesenhaft* with "essentially", see Richardson, op.cit., pp. 46, 79, 96, 185, 205, 324; with "by its very essence", p. 234; with "always", p. 74; (2) adjectival use of *wesenhaft* with "essential", see pp. 69, 398, 425, 441, 571; (3) adverbial use of *wesentlich* with (*not* "essentially" but) "essential", see p. 224; (4) adjectival use of *wesentlich* with "essential", see pp. 224, 225, 241, 331, 425, 450; and with "foundational", pp. 16, 480, 545, 546, 637.

110 "... Ihr Werk, für das Sie allein die Verantwortung tragen ... . Cf. the *Preface / Vorwort* by Martin Heidegger to Richardson, op.cit., pp. XXII / XXIII.



or “foundational thinking” instead of, what we might be entitled to expect from his translating-cum-interpreting in every other respect, “essential thought” or “essential thinking”. This correlates with the author’s novel take in this instance on the *Wesen* of metaphysics—this time, selectively, without recourse to any of the trusted cognates of *essentia* upon which he mainly relies—to translate the German word as “foundations (*Wesen*)” [p. 16]:

The thought which interrogates the foundations (*Wesen*) of metaphysics we call simply “foundational” thought (*das wesentliche Denken*).<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> ... *Denken* is literally an infinitive. Used as a noun (more often in German than in English) it implies the activity or process of thinking. In English, this is more easily rendered by the participle than by the infinitive. Hence we translate it usually as “thinking,” occasionally as “thought,” intending this always to mean “thought” in the active sense, sc. as in the process of accomplishing itself. *Wesentliche* comports the full verbal sense of *Wesen*, which can be appreciated only as we proceed.

The suggestion here, it would seem, essentially [*wesentlich*], is that “foundational” rather than “essential” is to be regarded as the more suitable English approximation to German *wesentliche* when it comes to appreciating the “full verbal sense” of the *wesen-* in the *wesentliche* that is adjoined to “thinking” and the said “thought” [*Denken*] because “foundational” (“*foundational*”?) is *foundationally* [*wesentlich*?] more capable of translating-cum-comporting “the full verbal sense of *Wesen* [(*Wesung*?)])” as (=) “foundations” [“*Grundlagen*”?]. Or should that be: as (=) “founding” [“*Begründung*”]<sup>111</sup>? Whereas “essential” (“*essential*”?) will *essentially* have to be relied upon to comport, so it seems, only the nominally-partial sense of *Wesen* [(*Wesenheit(en)*?)]) as (=) “essence(s)”. But can “foundational” (“*foundational*”?) instead of “essential” (“*essential*”? and / or “*essential*”?) for “*wesentliche*” (“*wesentliche*”? and / or “*wesentliche*”?) in the phrase “*das wesentliche Denken*” ever comport *either* (1) the full sway of the advancing nominally-partial and retreating verbally-partial sense of *Wesen* [(*Wesen(heit)*?)]) as (=) “essenc(-ing)” / “essenc[-ing]”?; *or*, alternately, (2) the said “full verbal sense of *Wesen* [(*Wesung*?)])”, per Richardson’s reverse-thrust, verbally-partial take on the prevailing-nominal-cum-unprevailing-verbal sway of the [*W*]*esen-* in [*W*]*esentliche*, as (=) “essenc-ing” or ‘coming-to-essence’ or, alternatively, (supposed) “Essence”?

It almost staggers belief to think, in the English parlance of *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, how the incipient sway of the various cognates of *wesen*, v. in a German phrase of the ilk: ‘*das Wesen*, d.h. *die Wesung*, *des*

111 See Richardson, op.cit., p. 161 “founding” [“*Begründung*”]; pp. 167-168 “found” [“*Begründen*”].

wesentlichen Denkens' [the essenz(ing), i.e. the essenizing, of essential thinking] *can*, likewise and otherwise, be appropriately rendered in a manner beholden to the *essenizing* [*wesenhaft*] of our closest possible approximation to the archessential wording of the words in question *with none other than* the incipient sway of the various cognates of *esse*, v..

How, then, to reconcile the incongruence for “foundational thinkers” (Richardson) or, from a different perspective altogether, “essential thinkers” [*wesentliche Denker*] of, on the one hand, “[t]he essence of thought” *or*, alternatively, “the nature of thought” *or*, alternately, “the essenc-ing of thought” for *das Wesen des Denkens*,<sup>112</sup> and, on the other, “foundational thought” or “foundational thinking” for *das wesentliche Denken*?<sup>113</sup> Whereunto the gleaning of the ineptual arrangement or adjustment or jointure of the *essenz(ing)* [*Wesensfügung*] of what is *essentially* worth(while)-thinking [*des wesentlich Zu-denkenden*] in the distinguished wording of the respective words?

Indeed, by alternately rendering the cognates of *wesen*, v. either with or without *the appropriate* cognates of *esse*, v., Richardson may well have introduced into the primordial mix a similarly insurmountable translation difficulty to the one that plagues Emad and Kalary’s interpretation of “the appreciative thinking” [*das sinnende Denken*] that interrogates the *essenz(ing)* [*Wesen*, *Wesen(heit)*] whence of itself (ἀρχή) as *essenizing* [*Wesung*] of metaphysical thinking from a beyng-historic perspective and that we also call, after Heidegger, “essential thinking” [“(das) wesentliche Denken”]. And what is it that archessentially lays itself out for the interpretation as “the incipiently worth(while)-thinking” [*das anfänglich Zu-denkende*] in a beyng-historic interrogation of metaphysics guided by essential thinking? Is it not, perchance, the whence and wherefore of an enigma of ‘Wesen = essentia, οὐσία’ and ‘Wesen ≠ essentia, οὐσία but rather: = esse, εἶναι’ that, for an essential thinking, *is* [*ist*], i.e. *essenzes* [d.h. *west*] and shelters-conceals its *essenizing* [*Wesung*] in this very thinking *as*, a primordial inception of ‘the (appreciable) meaning’ [*der Sinn*], i.e. the true (sense) [*das Wahre*] (ἀληθές) of beyng itself?

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112 *ibid.*, p. 509 (“[t]he essence of thought”); pp. 246, 268, 282, 416, 495, 502, 504, 509, 528, 617 (“the nature of thought”, also for *das Wesen des Denkens* ?); p. 511 (“the essenc-ing of thought”).

113 *ibid.*, pp. 543, 544, 545 (“foundational thinker”); pp. 543, 546 (“foundational thinkers”); pp. XXVI, XXVIII, 16, 19, 21, 22, 24, 47, 51, 66, 94, 97, 103, 105, 106, 146, 204, 229, 246, 253, 297, 363, 380, 382, 386, 391, 400, 404, 419, 420, 421, 439, 440, 443, 475, 478, 479, 481, 482, 485, 488, 501, 508, 541, 546, 550, 551, 562, 576, 580, 581, 591, 607, 614, 617, 619, 620, 628, 640, 648 (“foundational thought”); pp. 20, 22, 69, 178, 386, 480, 485, 489, 500, 546, 551, 566, 576, 611, 628, 635, 637 (“foundational thinking”).

Here is how Richardson subsequently explains, as best he can under the circumstances, his sole recourse, as far as I can tell, to “essential” rather than “foundational” to translate the *wesentliche* in Heidegger’s term *das wesentliche Denken*. The explanation occurs well into *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* during discussion, under the heading “*Being as Spirit*”, of what Richardson apparently considers to be a somewhat inept use of the term by Heidegger in the second of his Hölderlin-interpretations stemming from an oft-repeated lecture in 1939–40 that treats of a poem without title, composed by Friedrich Hölderlin in 1880, beginning: “Wie wenn am Feiertage ...”, “As on a holiday ...” or, in Richardson’s English rendition thereof: “As when upon a day of rest ...”.<sup>114</sup> Richardson is commenting on Heidegger’s appraisal of Hölderlin’s poetizing of being as “nature (φύσις)” and of nature (φύσις) as spirit [Geist] when he writes, incidentally, in a footnote:<sup>115</sup>

Heidegger uses the term *wesentliche Denken* but we translate as “essential” rather than “foundational,” since clearly we are considering the pattern of the to-be-thought, before thought itself comes-to-pass in There-being.

This passing remark confirms that, for Richardson, “essential thought” and “essential thinking” are the more appropriate English expressions of Heidegger’s term *wesentliche Denken* than are the well-trusted expressions “foundational thought” and “foundational thinking” in the isolate situation where, “clearly we are considering the pattern of the to-be-thought before thought itself comes-to-pass in There-being”. It is, presumably, only when “the pattern” [“das Gefüge” ?] of “the to-be-thought” or, alternatively, “the thought-worthy” [“das, was zu denken gibt” ? “das Zu-denkende” ?] is considered to be ‘the thought itself coming to pass in There-being’, that the word “essential” (“*essential*” ?) can be dispensed with in favour of “foundational” (“*foundational*” ?) in order better to comport the full verbal sense of the *wesen*- in Heidegger’s term *das*

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114 See Richardson, Chapter III, pp. 423–433, for a discussion of Heidegger’s essay by the same name, “As on a holiday ...” (Hamburger), respectively, “As when upon a day of rest ...” (Richardson). The German text, titled “Wie wenn am Feiertage ...”, appears in Martin Heidegger “Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung” [“Elucidations with regard to Hölderlin’s Poetizing”], being Volume 4 of the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* [hereafter abbreviated: “Hölderlin (GA4)”), Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1981. A first edition of the text, presented as a public lecture by Heidegger on several occasions in 1939 and 1940, was published in 1941. The alternate English rendition of the beginning of the poem, “As on a holiday ...”, with its subtle allusion to a holiday being a holy-day, is aptly suggested by Hamburger in his bilingual edition *Friedrich Hölderlin Poems & Fragments translated by Michael Hamburger*, Anvil Press Poetry, 1996 (1994), p. 395.

115 Richardson, op.cit., p. 425, footnote “6”.

*wesentliche Denken* which, according to Richardson at the present juncture, “can be appreciated only as we proceed”.

A point to note here, firstly, is that Richardson translates Heidegger’s turn of phrase *das, was zu denken gibt* with both “the to-be-thought” and “the thought-worthy” [lit. German for the latter: *das Denkwürdige*; however Richardson’s “the eminently thought-worthy” renders Heidegger’s *das Bedenklichste*]; and secondly, that the closely associated turn of phrase *das Zu-denkende (das zu Denkende)* [that which is worth(while)-thinking (that which is worth(while) thinking)] is likewise rendered by variations on “the to-be-thought” in connection with *das wesentliche Denken*, including “the Being-to-be-thought by / in foundational thinking” or “Being as the to-be-thought in foundational thinking”.<sup>116</sup> Let us pause for a moment to consider some implications were the noun phrase “the to-be-thought” or similar to be equated with Heidegger’s highly distinguishing nominal participle *das Zu-denkende* or similar in conjunction with *das wesentliche Denken*, be the phrase intended to render what is worth(while)-thinking in the while of “foundational” thinking / thought *as a rule* or of “essential” thinking / thought *as the exception*.

To give heed to the occasion for Richardson’s isolate rendition of the *wesentliche* in Heidegger’s phrase *das wesentliche Denken* with “essential” (“*essential*” ?) rather than “foundational” (“*foundational*” ?), here is how Heidegger’s Hölderlin-interpretation delineates ‘the (appreciable) meaning’, i.e. the true (sense) [‘der Sinn’, d.h. *das Wahre*] (ἀληθές) of his phrase in German<sup>117</sup>:

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116 *ibid.*, pp. IX, X (“what-is-to-be-thought” for *das zu Denkende*); XVI, XVII, (“that which is to-be-thought” for *jenes zu Denkende*); pp. 484, 489, 500 (“the Being-to-be-thought by / in foundational thinking” / “Being as the to-be-thought in foundational thinking” for *das zu Denkende* in conjunction with *das wesentliche Denken*, drawing especially on Heidegger’s “Nachwort zu: “Was ist Metaphysik?”” [“Afterword to: “What is metaphysics?””] in *Wegmarken* (GA9) [G303 (103) ff] ); 576 (“Being (Λόγος, World, Near-ness) as to-be-thought” [for, indirectly, *das zu Denkende* MAH ?] in conjunction with “foundational thought” for, presumably, *das wesentliche Denken*); 597-598 (“Being as “eminently thought-worthy” (*das Bedenklichste*), sc. that which imparts to thought its to-be-thought” for *das, was eigentlich zu denken gibt, ist das Bedenklichste ...* ); 598 (“What [Being as thought-worthy] grants ... ” for *Was dieses zu denken gibt ...* ; 602 (“... that we simply think that which solely and properly is to-be-thought.” for *daß wir einfach denken, nämlich das, was eigentlich und einzig zu denken gibt.*); 602 (“... thought thinks when it responds to [Being as] the eminently thought-worthy ... ” for *Das Denken denkt, wenn es dem Bedenklichsten entspricht ...* ); 608 (“that which properly gives [us] the to-be-thought, [sc.] is [Being-as-] eminently-thought-worthy. ... ” for *das was eigentlich zu denken gibt, ist das Bedenklichste.*); 615 (“the Thought-worthy” for *das Bedenklichsten*); and so forth.

117 Heidegger, *Hölderlin* (GA4), G60 (59).

Das Lichte läßt alles hervorgehen in sein Erscheinen und Leuchten, auf daß jedes Wirkliche, von ihm selbst befeuert, in seinem eigenen Umriß und Maß steht. Dergestalt in sein eigenes Wesen unterschieden, ist alles Erscheinende vom Geist durchstrahlt: be-geistert. Die Natur be-geistert alles als die allgegenwärtige, allerschaffende. Sie ist selbst »die Begeisterung«. Be-geistern kann sie nur, weil sie »der Geist« ist. Der Geist waltet als die nüchterne aber kühne Aus-einandersetzung, die alles Anwesende in die wohlgeschiedenen Grenzen und Gefüge seiner Anwesenheit einsetzt. Solches Auseinandersetzen ist das wesentliche Denken. Das Eigenste »des Geistes« sind die »Gedanken«, durch die alles, weil auseinandergesetzt, gerade zusammengehört. Der Geist ist die einigende Einheit. Sie läßt das Zusammen alles Wirklichen in seiner Versammlung erscheinen. Der Geist ist deshalb wesentlich in seinen »Gedanken« der »gemeinsame Geist«.

And to translate into English Heidegger's delineation of "das wesentliche Denken" as "the essential thinking" whose (essential) "thoughts" in a manner beholden to the ownmost "of the spirit" are, essentially, the "collective spirit" that, inspired by the unveiling of the *essenz(ing)* [die Wesensenthüllung] of being as "Natur (φύσις)" and of nature (φύσις) as "the arising and awakening spirit [der aufgehende und erwachende Geist]", lets the belonging-together of one and all of that which is (the) appearing appear in the forgathering illumine of its own *essenz(ing)* through a *distinguished* setting apart of one among, sc. in the ming(l)ing of, another:

The light and clear lets all go forth into its appearing and luminating so that any actual being, befired from whence of itself, rises to stand in its own contour and measure. So distinguished in its own *essenz(ing)*, all of that which is (the) appearing is shone through from the spirit: be-spirited. Nature be-spirits all in the omni-present(ial), all-creative. Nature is itself "the inspiration" ("the enthusiasm"). Nature can only inspire (enthuse) or be-spirit because it is "the spirit". The spirit prevails as the sober yet venturesome setting-of-one-among-another-apart [Aus-einandersetzung] that mings the setting [einsetzt] of all of that which is (the) presencing into the well-differentiated bounds and conjuncture as arranged of its presencing. Such setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another [Auseinandersetzen] is the essential thinking [das wesentliche Denken]. The ownmost "of the spirit" are the "thoughts" by which all belongs together precisely because of one being set apart among, sc. in the minging or engaging of, another [weil auseinandergesetzt]. The spirit is the unifying unity. It lets the together of all that is actual appear in its forgathering. The spirit is therefore in its "thoughts" in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)* the "collective spirit".

The task of arriving at a suitable English translation of being-historic German words associated with Heidegger's keyword *Aus-einandersetzung*, and especially, in the present context, in conjunction with the sentence: *Solches Auseinandersetzen ist das wesentliche Denken*, is formidable. A venture in "the essential thinking" as "[s]uch setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another" is nonetheless indispensable if we are to appreciate how the term "essential thinking / thought [*wesentliche Denken*]" (Richardson) is itself being cast-open



[entworfen] in association therewith. That is to say, in association with the unveiling of the *essenzenz*(ing) of being as “Natur (φύσις)” and of nature (φύσις) as “the arising and awakening spirit” that be-spirits to prevail in the while of essential thinking as “the sober yet venturesome setting-of-one-among-another–apart” [die nüchterne aber kühne Aus–einandersetzung] that lets the belonging-together of one and all of that which is (the) appearing appear in the forgathering illumine of its own *essenzenz*(ing) *as* that which is (essentially) worthwhile-thinking [das (wesentlich) Zu-denkende] or, in Richardson’s nomenclature, *as* “the (Being) to-be-thought”.

Retrieving something of the etymology (per online Oxford English Dictionary) of our English word “among” in conjunction with mingle, v. and the appreciable, albeit “obsolete” (OED), meaning of “to ming” and “minging,”<sup>118</sup> Heidegger’s noun phrase *die ... Aus–einandersetzung*, rendered in the above passage “the ... setting-of-one-among-another–apart, could also be translated as “the ... setting-of-one-in-the-ming(l)ing-of-another–apart” with the sense: “the ... setting-of-one-in-the-engaging-of-another–apart”.

From here, the expression *die nüchterne aber kühne Aus–einandersetzung* could be translated along the lines: “the sober yet venturesome dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement”.<sup>119</sup> This is all very well. But the translation per se does not tell us how, when the spirit prevails as such, that is to say, as “the sober yet venturesome dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement that mings the setting of all of that which is (the) presenzing into the well-differentiated bounds and conjuncture as arranged of its presenzing”, it distinguishes itself, for Heidegger, precisely by

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118 OED, among, *prep.* and *adv.*: ... “Etymology: originally a phrase *on in + gemang* mingling, assemblage, crowd (< *gemengan* to mingle, combine: see MING v.<sup>1</sup>); hence, with a noun in the genitive, ‘in the assemblage or company of,’ ... A. ... In the mingling or assemblage of; hence surrounded by and associated with ...”; also “II. †5. ... †b. ... *among that*: during the time that, whilst. *Obs.* ...; B. *adv.* ... †2. Betweenwhiles ... *Obs.* ...; OED, ming, v.<sup>1</sup>: ... “1. ... †b. To mix or mingle ... . Frequently with *together*. *Obsolete* ...”; also “†2. a. ... To bring ... together; to cause to associate ...; to unite ...; to engage ...; to join ... *Obsolete*.”.

Whence my provisional English translation of the increasing demands of the original German passage as follows: (1) “the ... setting-of-one-among-another–apart” for “die ... Aus–einandersetzung”; (2) “that mings the setting of all of ... into the ...” for “die alles ... in die ... einsetzt”; (3) “Such setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another” for “Solches Auseinandersetzen”; and (4) “... because of one being set apart among, sc. in the minging or engaging of, another” for “... weil auseinandergesetzt”.

119 Regarding the alternation of “dis(cerning)–” and “critical–”, see OED entry †critic, *adj.* ... < Greek *κριτικός* critical, < *κριτός* decerned, *κριτής* a judge; < *κρίνειν* to decide, judge.”; and the Greek entry *κρίνω*, Latin *cerno*, to separate, part, put asunder, distinguish—and much more besides—in ΛΟΓΕΙΟΝ / LOGEION, the online Perseus Digital Library collection of separate Greek and Latin databases; there are links to online OED and ΛΟΓΕΙΟΝ / LOGEION on my [Links](http://archessenzenz.com) page at [archessenzenz.com](http://archessenzenz.com).



“[s]uch setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another [[s]olches Auseinandersetzen]”, as “the essential thinking [das wesentliche Denken]”.

So how, in essenizing [in der Wesung], does *this* “Auseinandersetzen” and hence *this* “wesentliche Denken” distinguish itself for the German thinker as such that is essentially worth(while)-thinking?

In *Besinnung* [Appraisal] (GA66), under the heading [G68ff], “15. The self-appraisal of philosophy as (properly) historic dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement (The setting–of-one-among-another–apart between metaphysics and beyng-historic thinking),”<sup>120</sup> there is a strong hint of that which is essentially worth(while)-thinking [das wesentlich Zu-denkende] in the while of essential thinking: *des wesentlichen Denkens*. And what is at stake and will become, so Heidegger, “the *single* necessity [die *einzig*en Notwendigkeit]” for “philosophy, as essential thinking” in the requisite appraisal unto itself *as* a thinking of being, is incomparable to what is at stake in the while of ordinary or normal or conventional thinking: *des gewöhnlichen Denkens*. For one thing, unlike the latter, essential thinking, the most highly distinguishing *Auseinandersetzen*, is not doomed to the oblivion of what truly matters to ‘the collective spirit’ in a thinkerly appraisal unto its ownmost setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another by the habit of any *ordinary historical bent* [*historischen Neigung*]. And thus it distinguishes itself therefrom as “the (*properly*) *historic* dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement”: “die *geschichtliche* Auseinandersetzung”. And right t/here (for t/here-being ?), is, in Heidegger’s own words (author’s emphasis throughout) an appraisively-appreciative hint of “the *single* necessity” of that which is essentially worth(while)-thinking in the adventual while of essential thinking [GA66, G80]:

*Die Aus–einander–setzung: diejenige zwischen der Metaphysik in ihrer Geschichte und dem seynsgeschichtlichen Denken in seiner Zukunft.*

*The setting–of-one-among-another–apart: the one between metaphysics in its history (proper) and beyng-historic thinking in its future.*

The surmise consequent upon Richardson’s partial reading of the cited passage from the second of Heidegger’s Hölderlin-interpretations where “‘the (appreciable) meaning’, i.e. the true (sense) [‘der Sinn’, d.h. das Wahre]” (Heidegger) of the kind of “Auseinandersetzen” that distinguishes itself as “das wesentliche Denken” is cast-open, appears, in view of this partiality, to be ill-founded. For, the reading takes account of only *one* delineated character of the “collective spirit” and hence the letting-be of “the essential thinking” that is the

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120 “15. Die Selbstbesinnung der Philosophie als geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung (Die Aus-einander-setzung zwischen der Metaphysik und dem seynsgeschichtlichen Denken)”.

setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another and the inspiration [Begeisterung] of the “unifying unity” [der einigenden Einheit] and the “forgathering” or, in Richardson’s translation, “collectedness” [Versammlung] of nature (φύσις) as spirit [p. 425]:

Nature is spirit, and insofar as it renders all beings present, it be-spirits them all. This be-spiriting Spirit of nature is the unifying unity that holds sway over all and lets the whole ensemble of beings appear in its collectedness, drawing all beings-that-appear into the unity of its own Omni-presence.

It takes no account of the specified “Aus–einandersetzung” that belongs to what Richardson calls “the pattern of relationships (δίχην)”<sup>121</sup> which, on my reading of Heidegger here, is *das Gefüge der ... Aus–einandersetzung*, the conjuncture as arranged of the ... setting-of-one-among-another–apart. Yet it is the very setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another [Auseinandersetzen] that, in Heidegger’s delineation of the term, is, in essenz(ing) [im Wesen], “the essential thinking” [“das wesentliche Denken”]. So that in the forgathering (λόγος) that belongs to the gleaning (λέγειν) of the “collective spirit” in its (essential) “thoughts” in a manner beholden to the ownmost essenz(ing) thereof, we could say that the prevailing inspiration of the essenz(ing) of being<sup>122</sup> and of essential thinking<sup>123</sup> are one? Here is Richardson’s alternate reading of why Heidegger uses the term [p. 425]:

This unification of all beings into unique Presence is a dynamic process that arranges all beings into a pattern of relationships that Heidegger calls “essential thought.” Why is the term used here? Possibly because of the spontaneous tendency to associate Spirit with thought which is commonly taken to be the characteristic of Spirit. If this surmise be valid, then the unifying arrangement will be the Spirit’s “[essential ? MAH] thinking” and the pattern of relationship its “[ownmost ? MAH] thoughts”.

So the question arises: Is this surmise regarding the whys and wherefores of the German thinker’s use of the term “das wesentliche Denken” on this occasion *also* beside the point in light of Heidegger’s giving heed *not* conventionally [gewöhnlich] *but* essentially [wesentlich] to any “spontaneous tendency to associate” spirit with thought that is always already whiling in the usual way —

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121 Richardson, op.cit., p. 431.

122 “of being” *as* “nature (φύσις)” and of nature (φύσις) as the arising and awakening spirit “that prevails as the sober yet venturesome setting-of-one-among-another–apart that mings the setting of all of that which is (the) presenzing into the well-differentiated bounds and conjuncture as arranged of its presenzing.”

123 “and of essential thinking” *as* “[s]uch setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another”, a critical thinking whose ownmost “thoughts” in a manner beholden to the essenz(ing) of the “collective spirit” are discerningly those “by which all belongs together precisely because of one being set apart among, sc. in the minging or engaging of, another.”

albeit as unheeded intimations of being antecedent to any moment of adventual deconcealment proper in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)*<sup>124</sup> — in what Heidegger elsewhere calls *das gewöhnliche Denken*? There is, after all, a point of divergence in the casting-open of what is worth(while)-thinking [des Zu-denkenden] when it comes to the appreciable meaning and true sense of what is meant by the *wesen-* in “*wesentliche Denken*” as distinct from the *gewöhn-* in “*gewöhnliche Denken*”. We could try to delineate the same point of divergence in our own language by giving heed to the appreciable meaning and true sense of what is meant by the *esse-* in “*essential thinking*” as distinct from, say, the *ordin-* in “*ordinary thinking*” or the *norm-* in *normal thinking* or the *convention-* in “*conventional thinking*”. To be properly historic [geschichtlich], however, as distinct from historical in the ordinary / normal / conventional sense [historisch], any venture in dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement between ordinary / normal / conventional thinking on the one hand and essential thinking on the other, will necessarily (as “the *single* necessity” ?) be guided by none other than essential (beyng-historic) thinking.

How, then, does Richardson’s reasoning stack up? Why is the word *wesentliche* in the term *wesentliche Denken* as used by Heidegger here to be translated into English, by way of exception, with the supposed less than full verbal sense of “essential” rather than the supposed full verbal sense of “foundational”? Because, from the way in which Heidegger uses the term in the above context, we clearly are *not* considering “a pattern” [das Gefüge ?] of “the to-be-thought” [das, was zu denken gibt ? das zu Denkende ? MAH] *before* thought itself (in the full verbal sense) comes-to-pass in t/here-being. Rather, we are taking heed of how the conjuncture as arranged of the (sober yet venturesome) setting-one-among-another-apart [das Gefüge der ( ... ) Aus–einandersetzung] unveils itself, in *essenz(ing)*, as that in essential thinking which is *essentially* worth(while) thinking [das ... *wesentlich* Zu-denkende] *while* the essential thinking in Heidegger’s sense of the term *das wesentliche Denken* comes-to-pass in the letting-be of our being-t/hereunto. Whereunto? Unto the very setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another [Auseinandersetzen] that is the essential thinking of being itself in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)* whence of itself as the *essenzing*, to wit, the be-spiriting, of nature (φύσις) in the sense of the presenzing of all of that which is (the) presenzing. Hence, to an appreciative thinking, the full verbal sense of the *esse-* in the *essential thinking* for the *wesen-* in *das wesentliche Denken* *can* prevail as such that, so distinguished in its own *essenz(ing)*, is *itself*: that which is *essentially* worth(while)-thinking [das *wesentlich* Zu-denkende].

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124 cf. Richardson, op.cit., p. 432.

If ever a received wisdom were applied to the direct or indirect, explicit or implicit, translation of Heidegger's nominal-participial noun phrase *das Zu-denkende*, then "the to-be-thought" would likely be adopted and approved as an English standard. By the same standard, we might be satisfied with "the to-be-said" for *das Zu-sagende* [that which is worthwhile-saying(-and-affirming)], "the to-be-known" for *das Zu-wissende* [that which is worth(while)-knowing], and so forth.<sup>125</sup> But what if this received English standard were all at once unreceptive to setting the original standard of its German counterpart in the same measure? Would such an English translation be truly deserving of the commanding authority it has traditionally been afforded to say and to think and to know *by the same standard as the German original* what is *essentially* worth(while)-saying and -thinking and -knowing [*das wesentlich Zu-sagende und Zu-denkende und Zu-wissende*]?<sup>126</sup>

In light of these considerations, the question arises: Can "the to-be-thought" in / by "foundational thinking" be regarded as a suitable English rendition of *das Zu-denkende* [that which is worth(while)-thinking] *in der Weile des wesentlichen Denkens* [in the while of essential thinking], worthy of an interpretation commensurate with the standard set by Heidegger's original translating within his own German language and thinking? That is to say, t/here where the (essential) thinking [*das (wesentliche) Denken*] is not vis-à-vis that which is (essentially) worth(while)-thinking in the while of (a sober yet venturesome) dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement [*Aus–einandersetzung*] but is the latter itself as a beyng-historic coming-to-pass in t/here-being [*Da–sein*] of the essenzing (whiling) of being itself. In the present context: "of being itself [*des Seins selbst*]" as "nature ( $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ )" and of nature ( $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ) as the arising and

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125 "and so forth"; here is a selection from Heidegger's *Heraklit* (GA55) of what is essentially worth(while)-translating-cum-transporting [*des wesentlich Zu–übersetzenden*] with the same diligence, i.e. in an English rendition that gives preference to the original standard set by Heidegger's rendition of its German counterpart rather than any received German or English standard: G170 "das ... Zu–durch–messende"; G198 *das Zu–lernende*; G260 "das Zu–hörende"; G268 "das zu Bewahrende"; G268-9 "das Aufzubewahrende"; G282 "das Zu–sammelnde"; G290 "das Zu–wahrende"; G348 "[des anfänglich denkend] zu erfahrenden Seins"; G352: "das Zukommende"; G368: "das Zu–entbergende"; G373: *das zu–lesenden ...*"; etc.

126 Cf A. Emad & Kalary, *Mindfulness*: (1) pp. 61, 97, 201, 350 (what / that which is to be thought, ...) [Heidegger, *Besinnung* (GA66), G76, 116, 227, 396 (*das zu Denkende / Zudenkende*)]; (2) pp. xxi, 42, 267 (what is / needs to be said / the "to be said" citing Emad & Maly, *Contributions*, p. 4 [Heidegger, *Beiträge* (GA65), G4, and *Besinnung* (GA66), G51, 299 (*das zu Sagende / Zusagende*)]; (3) pp. 46, 81 (what / that which is / wants to be known) [GA66, G55, G97 (*das zu Wissende*)]; B. Emad & Maly, *Contributions*: (1) pp. 42, 60, 265, 272 (what is to be thought) [*Beiträge* (GA65), G85, 86, 422, 462 (*das Zudenkende / zu-Denkende / zu Denkende*)]; (2) pp. 4 (what is said [= to be said ? MAH] / the "to be said") [G4 (*das zu Sagende*)]; (3) p. 28 (what is to be known) [G64 (*das zu Wissende*)].

awakening spirit whose ownmost are the “thoughts” in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)* thereof “by which all belongs together precisely because of one being set apart among, sc. in the minging or engaging of, another”. The sober yet venturesome “collective spirit” of a *beyng-historic* casting-open “of being itself” in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)* whence of itself as the *essenzing* thereof, *lets* the properly historic belonging-together of one among all of that which is (the) *essenzing be* in the forgathering illume of the conjuncture as arranged of its own *essenzing*. And it is *through* such setting apart of one among, sc. in the ming(ing) of, another, that the dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement of essential thinking distinguishes itself from that of ordinary / normal / conventional thinking as that which is essentially worth(while)-thinking-through.

When measured against an altogether different interpretation of “that which is worth(while)-thinking [das Zu-denkende]” in the while of *essential* [*wesentlichen*] as distinct from *ordinary / normal / conventional* [*gewöhnlichen*] thinking, the isolate idea of “[*(Being-as-)*] the to-be-thought” *before* thought itself comes-to-pass in *There-being*” (Richardson) is, so far as *essential* (*beyng-historic*) thinking in its future is concerned, one of the main attractions *as* such that is essentially worth(while) thinking. For, it is only in the whiling of *essential* thinking that *the historic oblivion* of *ordinary / normal / conventional* thinking to the unheeded intimations of *beyng* antecedent to any moment of adventual deconcealment proper in *essential* thinking, can be given its proper due: *through* a sober yet venturesome setting apart of one among, sc. in the minging or engaging of, another. And that means ‘rendered’ in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)* thereof—from the horizon of a *beyng-historic* casting-open of our human being as *Da-sein*—as one of the greatest metaphysical distractions hitherto, albeit redundant and inconsequential so far as our *ordinary / normal / conventional* thinking in its history (proper) is concerned.

Leaving in abeyance for now the continual friction of all that remains thought-worthy [*denkwürdig*] in the received idea at the foundation of Richardson’s justification for his alternate rendering of the phrase word *wesentliche* in Heidegger’s phrase *wesentliche Denken*, let alone for his having resort in this particular instance to the ostensibly less than full verbal sense of the phrase word “essential” (“*essential*” ?) in the phrase “essential thought” (or “essential thinking”) in favour of the impliedly full verbal sense of the phrase word “foundational” (“*foundational*” ?) in the phrase “foundational thought” (or “foundational thinking”), it might be worth briefly noting what if any influence this to-and-fro switch from “essential” to “foundational”, and vice versa, in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*—especially with regard to the phrase-word *wesentliche* in Heidegger’s phrase *wesentliche Denken*—may or



may not have exerted on later interpreters; in particular, on Emad and Kalary in *Mindfulness* (2006) and, by contrast, on Emad and Maly in *Contributions* (1999).

From the discussion thus far it has not become evident the extent to which Emad and Kalary by no means take their bearings in the main, let alone almost exclusively, from the two translations to which they expressly commit themselves in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness*, of *Wesen* with “sway” or, “in relation to man”, with “ownmost”. Indeed, apart from chopping and changing all but indiscernibly from one to another variant translation of *Wesen* throughout *Mindfulness*—“sway” and, ‘in relation to man’, “ownmost” being the two specified among those left unspecified by the translators—Emad and Kalary regularly take their bearings from two alternate translations to which they equally commit themselves in the main body of the text, albeit only implicitly and obscurely, since in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness* the translators omit mentioning how thoroughly their interpretation of Heidegger’s appraisal of *Wesen* in *Besinnung* (GA66) also relies upon these alternates to “sway” and “ownmost”. They do so by advancing, to name one such translation, not just an occasional and patent (as per Richardson) but a frequent and latent rendition of *Wesen* with “foundation” or rather, via conversion, with “foundational”. This occurs repeatedly in Emad and Kalary’s ‘unassuming’ translation of compounds of *Wesen* where this German word is converted to an adjectival form in English that is not just consistent with but identical to their ‘unassuming’ translation of both *wesentlich* and *wesenhaft* with “foundational”<sup>127</sup>; or, coincidentally and somewhat indiscriminately, with “fundamental”.

I say “somewhat indiscriminately” due to the preferential treatment that is afforded by the interpreters to “fundamental” over “foundational” as the more prevalent rendition of *Wesen* in such compound words where the latter is converted to an adjectival form in English consistent with and identical to their

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127 See, for example, Emad & Kalary, op.cit.: “the foundational consequence” for “Wesensfolge”, pp. 13, 16 [GA66, G17, 21]; “foundational trait of power” for “Wesenseigenart der Macht”, p. 14 [G19]; “foundational call of be-ing” for “Wesensruf des Seyns”, p. 18 [G23]; “the foundational domination” for “die Wesensherrschaft”, p. 20 [G26]; “is foundationally fulfilled” for “Wesenserfüllung geleistet”, p. 20 [G26]; “the foundational task” for “die Wesensaufgabe”, p. 28 [G37]; “all foundational time-spaces” for “aller Wesenszeiträume”, p. 32 [G41]; “foundational distress” for “die ... Wesensnot”, p. 40 [G48]; nota bene, “foundational mindfulness” for “Wesensbesinnung”, p. 52 [G63]; “no foundational determination of truth” for “keine Wesensbestimmung der Wahrheit”, p. 61 [G75]; “foundational fullness” for “Wesensfülle”, p. 83 [G99]; “foundational domain” for “Wesensbezirk”, p. 91 [G109]; also in respect of *wesens-*, “the “foundationally proper history” for “der allein wesensgerechte Geschichte”, p. 28 [G37].



more prevalent translation of both *wesentlich* and *wesenhaft* with “fundamental”.<sup>128</sup>

Even though it stares them in the face without let-up from start to finish, Emad and Kalary are wont to leave their readers in the dark about the vast extent—and associated shortcomings—of their apparently ill-advised venture to translate into the English of *Mindfulness* without (their having to have?) resort to *the appropriate* cognates of the *esse* in *essentia* to the purpose, the inceptive and consummative force of Heidegger’s translating into the German of *Besinnung* (GA66) the enigma of ‘Wesen = *essentia*, οὐσία’ and ‘Wesen ≠ *essentia*, οὐσία but rather: = *esse*, εἶναι’. One way they do so, is by not notifying us, their readers, either directly (through the very wording of their translating words) or indirectly (through their “Translators’ Foreword”, inclusion of the German in translators’ square brackets, footnotes, etc.), of the most salient point:

Only by our first having recourse to the appropriate cognates of the *esse* in (*esse*)ntia, to translate the *wesen*, so to speak, in *Wesen*(heit), can we begin to appreciate the extent to which the cognates of “foundational” and, alternatively, “fundamental” along with those of “sway” and “ownmost” are, each in their own way, unbefitting our suitably translating into English Heidegger’s ownmost [eigenste] translating of the metaphysical problematics *and* the beyng-historic interplay of the *distinguished* words *Wesen* [essenz(ing)] and *Wesung* [essenzing], and so too, *wesentlich* [essential(ly)] and *wesenhaft* [(in a manner)

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128 Beside those compounds of *Wesen* already mentioned thus far, see, for example, Emad & Kalary, op.cit.: “fundamental hints” for “Wesenswinke”, p. 38 [GA66, G47]; “fundamental danger” for “Wesensgefahr”, p. 43 [G52]; “fundamental trait” for “Wesensart”, p. 63 [G78]; “fundamental decision” for “Wesensentscheidung”, p. 70 [G84]; “fundamental consequence” for “Wesensfolge”, pp. 73, 99 [G88, 118]; “fundamental enquiry” for “Wesenserfragung”, p. 82 [G99]; “the fundamental projecting-opening unto clearing” for “der Wesensentwurf der Wahrheit zur Lichtung”, p. 91 [G109]; “fundamental delimitation” for “Wesensumgrenzung”, p. 91 [G109]; “fundamental bestimmung” for “Wesensbestimmung”, p. 92 [G110]; “fundamental origins” for “Wesensursprünge”, p. 95 [G113]; “fundamental decidedness” for “Wesensentschiedenheit”, p. 95 [G114]; “fundamental calling” for “Wesensberufung”, p. 103 [G123]; “fundamental remembrance” for “Wesenserinnerung”, p. 115 [G135]; “the fundamental ground “of” man” for “des Wesensgrundes “des” Menschen”, p. 123 [G145]; “fundamental sphere” for “Wesensraumes”, p. 151 [G173]; “fundamental completion” for “Wesensvollendung”, pp. 159, 208 [G181, 235]; “fundamental unfolding of the sway of truth” for “Wesensentfaltung des Wesens der Wahrheit”, p. 188 [G213]; “fundamental designation” for “Wesenskennzeichnung”, p. 198 [G224]; “fundamental claims” for “Wesensansprüche”, p. 203 [G229]; “fundamental worthiness of man” for “Wesenswürde des Menschen”, p. 216 [G245]; “fundamental character” for “Wesenscharakter”, p. 274 [G308]; “fundamental connection” for “Wesenszusammenhang”, p. 337 [G380]; also, in respect of adverbial *wesensmäßig* and *wesensgerecht*, “the fundamentally historical uniqueness” for “die wesensmäßig geschichtliche Einzigkeit”, p. 61 [G75]; and “fundamentally” for “wesensgerecht”, p. 62 [G76].

beholden to the *essenz*(ing), respectively *essenzing*], within his own German language and thinking, be it in *Besinnung* (GA66) or elsewhere. That goes for the English translation and interpretation of all of the other cognates of *wesen*, v. in Heidegger's *Besinnung* (GA66) and elsewhere to boot.

Richardson's select relinquishment of the cognates of *essentia* to translate *wesentlich* with "foundational(ly)" rather than "essential(ly)" to the purpose of rendering, in particular, Heidegger's expressions *das wesentliche Denken* and *der wesentliche Denker* with "foundational thinking" and "foundational thinker", may well be the interpretation on which Emad and Kalery partly rely when, in *Mindfulness*, they rejuvenate these English renditions to translate the same German expressions in Heidegger's *Besinnung* (GA66)<sup>129</sup>. In a similar vein, the *Wesens-* of the German compound *Wesensbesinnung* [appraisal of the *essenz*(ing)] in *Besinnung* [Appraisal] (GA66) is likewise translated with "foundational" to achieve the English rendition "foundational mindfulness" in *Mindfulness*.<sup>130</sup>

However, in contrast to Richardson, who in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* is by no means adverse per se to Latinate-English "essential(ly)" as an alternate, indeed as by far the most suitable, English rendition of German *wesentlich* (and / = *wesenhaft*), Emad and Kalery are on a mission, if possible, to avoid altogether their translation of Heidegger's *Besinnung* (GA66) having to resort to this (appropriately translating-cum-transporting) cognate of Latin *essentia*. To this end, "fundamental(ly)" is used to a certain extent interchangeably with "foundational(ly)" throughout *Mindfulness* as the most trusted of their alternate English renditions of German *wesentlich* (and / = *wesenhaft*) in *Besinnung* (GA66). And the attempt at a nuanced interchange between "foundational" and "fundamental" (and the remaining English renditions) is necessary since, in their own right, neither of these (nor any of the other) transpositions of the German original in *Mindfulness* can do all of the heavy lifting of our *singular* and *distinguished* beyng-historic Latinate-English words "essential(ly)" for *wesentlich* ( $\neq$  *wesenhaft*) and "(in a manner) beholden to the *essenz*(ing), respectively *essenzing*," for *wesenhaft* ( $\neq$  *wesentlich*). It is no surprise, then, that when it comes to translating-cum-transposing *das wesentliche Denken* and *der wesentliche Denker*

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129 *ibid.*: "foundational thinking" for "wesentliche Denken", pp. 33, 41, 57 [G42, 49, 70]; "foundational thinker/s" for "der / die wesentliche Denker", pp. 32, 61 [G41, 75].

130 *ibid.*, p. 52 [G63]. But why not at least distinguish between the English rendition of German *wesentlich* (and *wesenhaft*) on the one hand and *Wesen*[s-] on the other by rendering the *Wesens-* of *Wesensbesinnung* with "foundation" (pace Richardson) to arrive at an English rendition of the German compound (and many others of that ilk) that is more in line with the German syntax, to wit, on this occasion: "mindfulness of the foundation"?

of *Besinnung* (GA66) into the English of *Mindfulness*, it may well be to Emad and Kalary's behoof, more than benefit, to alternate between "foundational thinking" and "fundamental thinking" for the former and between "foundational thinker" and "fundamental thinker" for the latter.<sup>131</sup>

A not-insignificant, shall we (es)say, insurmountable, translation difficulty for Emad and Kalary is therefore how to reconcile the utter confusion of, on the one hand, their undeclared rendition of *wesentlich* and *wesenhaft* (and *Wesens-* and *wesens-*) with "fundamental(ly)" or "foundational(ly)" or even "strict(ly)" and, on the other, their declared rendition of *Wesen* with "sway" or "ownmost" and undeclared rendition with "fundamental" or "foundational". Their incongruent interpretation of the compound cognates of *wesen*, v., of *an-* und *abwesen*, v. especially, only adds to a good deal of confusion in Emad and Kalary's nonetheless esteemed work *Mindfulness* (2006) as *the* (one and only licensed and to all intents and purposes a most authoritative) English translation of Heidegger's *Besinnung* (GA66).

Whereas, in *Contributions* (1999), as already indicated, Emad and Maly before them were still somewhat reluctantly translating *wesentlich* with "essential(ly)" and hence the German phrase *wesentliche Denken* in Heidegger's *Beiträge* (GA65) with "essential thinking"<sup>132</sup>. It appears that the then well-established "foundational thinking" promoted by Richardson in the early 1960s and observed soon afterwards right up to the present day in the English parlance of reputable translators and interpreters of Heidegger's (essential) thought had not yet fully captured the imagination.

In this essay, *essenz(ing)* is a word that homes in on and hones William J. Richardson's original insight into 'translating Heidegger translating *Wesen*' with "essenc(-ing)", respectively "essenc[-ing]". It does so in the course of trying and testing the 'better' if not 'best' Latinate-English cognates of the *esse* in (*esse*)ntia to convey, in as close approximation as possible, the complementary German cognates of the *wesen* in *Wesen(heit)*. Here the translating-cum-transposing [*Übersetzen*] of Heidegger's German word *Wesen* ventures a translating-cum-transporting [*Übersetzen*] of the standard Latinate-English interpretation of *das Wesen* in the nominally-partial sense of "the essence / *essenz*" into the full sway of its advancing nominal and retreating verbal signification as *the essenz(ing)*.

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131 cf. Emad & Kalary, *Mindfulness*, p.211 "in fundamental ... thinking" for "im wesentlichen ... Denken" [*Besinnung* (GA66), G238]; pp. 64, 267 "... fundamental thinkers" for "wesentliche Denker" [G78, 299].

132 cf. Emad & Maly, *Contributions*, pp. 7, 14, 15, 33; *Beiträge* (GA65), G8, 19, 21, 47.

In the course of translating Heidegger translating *Wesen* thus, our usual reading of what *the language of the essenz(ing)* [*die Sprache des Wesens*] says and thinks is conveyed from familiar to unfamiliar territory, from the ordinary to the out-of-the-ordinary environ of a gleaning that *also* attends to how *the essenz(ing) of the language* [*das Wesen der Sprache*] shall embrace the not-so-apparent in what is so apparently true to the word. In the elevatory language of appreciative thinking, the little-known environ of translating-cum-*transporting* our saying and thinking in a manner beholden to the *essenzenz* [*wesenhaft*] of the language, is one where, after Heidegger [*Heraklit* (GA55), G44f], “the words must receive their power to name and their arrangement from the already-prevailing troth to the integral word, i.e. to the whole of a saying”.

Having been conveyed to the lesser-known bank of a Latinate-English wording of a German word for ‘being’ [‘*Sein*’] that incipiently lays itself out for the interpretation in a manner beholden to the *essenzenz(ing)* whence of itself as the *essenzenz* thereof, through an established occidental train of thought no less, our long since well-known and accepted interpretation of *Wesen* in the nominally-partial sense of ‘*Wesenheit*, *essentia*, οὐσία’ no longer so apparently speaks for itself without further ado as an accurate measure of *all* that is true to the word. Rather, in the while of setting apart our ver(il)y own among another, more familiar, manner of speaking, the latter distinguishes itself as the more enigmatic for only ever being known and taken for granted as true to the word ‘in *essenzenz*’ [‘im *Wesen*’] in oblivion to what is worth(while)-knowing as true to the word in *essenzenz(ing)* [im *Wesen*]. In a word, *essenzenz(ing)* translates-cum-*transports* into a dis(cerningly)–, or critically–engaging thinking and saying “of being” [“des *Seins*”] that *lets* the not-so-apparently true enigma of *Wesen* as ‘*Wesen(heit)*, (*esse*)*ntia*, οὐσία (εἶναι)’ *be*, i.e. *essenzenz* [*läßt ... sein*, d.h. *wesen*], as that which, in the while of essential thinking [des *wesentlichen Denkens*], is essentially worth(while)-thinking [das ... *wesentlich Zu-denkende*].

In light of this venture in appreciative thinking after Heidegger, any exercise in ‘translating Heidegger translating *Wesen*’ without recourse to what lays itself out for the interpretation as the *esse* in (*esse*)*ntia* to expound the *wesen* in *Wesen(heit)* would appear to render itself essentially [*wesentlich*] question-worthy: worth(while)-questioning for not translating-cum-*transporting* what is incipiently said and thought in a manner beholden to the *essenzenz(ing)* [*wesenhaft*] of and to what is true [*wahrhaft*] to the integral wording of the word *Wesen* as such in respect of the whole of its saying, standardly beset, as this translating-cum-*transposing* must surely be, with the many pitfalls of interpretation outlined above.

Whilst I inkle that my translating of *das Wesen* with “the essenz(ing)” — and of *das An- und Abwesen* with “the presenz(ing) and absenz(ing)” — attests to the giving rise of an interpretation that is exceptionally true to the word, I am not saying it is perfect! By no means. A not-so-poor (initiating or else consummating) translation of what so near(ing)ly lays itself out for the interpretation in our given-and-taken-for-granted words for “the said” [“das Gesagte”] and “the thought” [“das Gedachte”] of being [*des Seins*] at the inception of occidental thinking, may well come close to saying and to thinking in manifold ways such that in the wording of the *very* words is *verily*, in the sense of *essentially* [*wesentlich*] true to the word [*wortgetreu*]. But in the domain of essential thinking after Heidegger, all translations, however eloquent or accomplished or complementary in this regard, are either not so poor or very poor or somewhere inbetween; they are always poor and thus imperfect. This does not, however, preclude our giving heed to one not-so-poor translation-cum-interpretation among the verily said and thought being ‘better’ or ‘worse’, more or less fitting, than another of the same ilk.

To hear but a dim inkling of the necessary and stanteous imperfection of our ver(il)y own language and discourse as, all at once, translating *and* interpreting, *can* set us on a path and guide the way to even clearer, more appreciative and original, thinking. In offering us a quiet reminder to have a care in this regard, I take heed of, and heart from, another passing remark of Heidegger’s on the task of translating, and shall let him have the last word on the topic [*Heraklit* (GA55), G62ff]:

An incidental remark on the task of translating should briefly indicate that one can easily find fault with any translation but then only seldom replace it with a ‘better’ one. With plenty of experience this may succeed from time to time. ... Any translation, taken just by itself without the accompanying interpretation, is at the mercy of all manner of possible misunderstandings. For any translation is inherently already an interpretation. Implicitly it carries with it all rudiments, aspects, and layers of the interpretation from which it stems. The interpretation itself is in turn nothing but the enacture of the translation that is still observing silence, that has not yet entered into and left its mark on the consummating word, on the word as fully accomplishing to this end. To their core in essenz(ing) [ [I]n ihrem Wesenskern ] interpretation and translation are [but one and] the same. And given that the very words and writings of the mother tongue are frequently in need of interpretation, there is therefore a translating necessarily and stanteously whiling even within our own language. All saying, discourse, and response are a translating. That on the occasion of translating mostly a dialogue is taking place between two different languages is therefore not what is essential [*das Wesentliche*] to translating. To understand Kant’s “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” [“Critique of pure reason”], for instance, we have first to translate it each time. This by no means signifies: to transpose-cum-depreciate [*herabsetzen*] the elevatory language of the work to the common or garden level of standard language, but means: to translate-cum-*transport*

[*übersetzen*] the thinking of this work into a dis(cerningly)–, or critically–engaging [*ein auseinandersetzendes*] thinking and saying. ... [N]othing but original thinking shelters and recovers that treasure within itself that remains forever inimitable and can be understood ‘better’ each time, i.e. differently than the drift of the text is meant to be saying at first hand. Where the standard is mediocre on the other hand, there is only the understandable and ‘obviously’ nothing of the kind that would stanteously necessitate a more original understanding and interpreting and that could itself call forth the times when thinking is again obliged to discern and to translate what is supposedly long since well-known.

...

Only the verily thought, that which is thought in a manner beholden to what is true, [*das wahrhaft Gedachte*], has the good fortune to be understood time and again even ‘better’ than it understood itself. In the event, however, this better understanding is never thanks to the expounding of the interpreter but is the gift of that which is expounded or laid out for the interpretation.

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### Afterword: Translating Heidegger translating *Besinnung*

In their Translators' Forward to *Mindfulness* (2006), Emad and Kalary's English translation of Martin Heidegger *Besinnung* (GA66), the translators make special mention of "the word *mindfulness* itself, which appears in the title as well as throughout this translation as the English rendition of Heidegger's word *Besinnung*."<sup>133</sup>

This begs the question: How does our nominal adjective *mindfulness* < *mindful* adj., + -ness suffix [*Besinnlichkeit* < *besinnlich*, adj., + -lich suffix ?] render itself *a suitable, the most suitable*, "English rendition of Heidegger's word *Besinnung*" commensurate to the full sway of his essentially *deverbal wording* of the German word? And therefore: Can the English rendition of the title *Besinnung* (GA66) with *Mindfulness* translate-cum-transport us into Heidegger's "thinkerly appraisal [denkerische *Besinnung*]" therein of 'the (appreciable) meaning' ['der Sinn'], i.e. the true (sense) [das Wahre] (ἀληθές), of 'the word *Besinnung* itself' in a manner beholden to its essenizing *as* a deverbal nouning of the time word (*sich*) *besinnen*?

Perhaps it cannot because "the English rendition of Heidegger's word *Besinnung*" in *nothing but* the nominally-partial, deverbifying sense of *Besinnung* [appraisal] as ( = ) *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness] *is not* commensurate to our *suitably* 'translating Heidegger translating *Besinnung*' in the incipient sense [im anfänglichen Sinne] of *Besinnung* [appraisal] as, *essentially*, (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)], since, for a start, the latter ≠ "to be mindful [besinnlich sein ?]" — pace Emad and Kalary's translation thereof — and the former deverbal nouning does not equate to a nominal(ized) adjective in the vein of German *Besinnlichkeit* or English *mindfulness* therefor.

Alternately, in the manner beholden to its essenizing *as* a deverbal nouning of our English time word *to appraise (itself)* translating, as its ownmost German counterpart, (*sich*) *besinnen*, 'the word *appraisal* itself' can be inkled as an English rendition that *is* commensurate to the incipiently (de)verbal sense of 'the word *Besinnung* itself' and, concomitantly, to "Heidegger's word *Besinnung*" *per (es)se*.

Of this there can be no *scientific* [(*sprach*)*wissenschaftliche*] proof under the (etymo-)logical strictures (upon thinkerly knowing) of Indo-European linguistics, only an inkling to be heard in our true appreciation for [Sinn für] the forgoing [Versammlung] (λόγος) of Heidegger's *philosophic* interpretation of the

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133 Emad and Kalary, *ibid.*, pp. xxiii-xxv.

appreciable meaning and true (sense) of ‘the word *Besinnung* itself’ within his own German language and thinking; and for how the (beyng-historic) thinking he names *Besinnung* properly lays itself out for the interpretation in his forgathering phrase *denkerische Besinnung* as “thinkerly appraisal”, *not*, pace Emad and Kalary’s alternate rendition of the phrase, as “thinking mindfulness [denkende Besinnlichkeit ?]”; a thinkerly appraisal being, in Heidegger’s own appraisal ( $\neq$  mindfulness) thereof, a thinking [ein Denken] that, in a manner befitting a thinker, i.e. *denkerisch* ( $\neq$  *denkend*, i.e. “thinkingly”), appraises itself (appreciatively) unto itself, *besinnt sich (sinnend) auf sich selbst* [ $\neq$  “is (ponderingly /deliberatively?) mindful of itself” pace Emad and Kalary<sup>134</sup>], as an appraisively-appreciative, i.e. *be-sinnendes* ( $\neq$  *be-sinnliches*, i.e. “mindfully- ... ?”) thinking *of* beyng [Denken *des* Seyns].

The possible significance of the supplemental conflation in the English of *Mindfulness* of the essential distinction in *Besinnung* (GA66) between adj. (adv.) *denkerisch* [thinkerly, (in a manner) befitting a thinker] and adj. (adv.) *denkend* [thinking(ly)] is addressed below.

Consistent with their primary conflation of *Besinnung* [appraisal] and *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness], Emad and Kalary also pay little attention to the appreciable meaning and true sense of Heidegger’s essential distinction between adj. (adv.) *besinnend* [appraisive(ly) / appraising(ly)] and adj. (adv.) *besinnlich* [mindful(ly)] by rendering both adjectives with “mindful” and, by implication, both adverbs with “mindfully”.<sup>135</sup>

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134 So far as I can tell, Heidegger in *Besinnung* (GA66) does not expound, in so many words, as occurs elsewhere in his thought ( e.g. in *Heraklit* (GA55) ) the *essential* distinction between adj. (adv.) *besinnend* [appraisive(ly) / appraising(ly)] and adj. (adv.) *sinnend* [appreciative(ly) / appreciating(ly)], so it is speculation to surmise how Emad & Kalary might distinguish their English rendition of *sinnend* as ... ? from that of *besinnend* as “mindful(ly)”. However, insofar as they acknowledge the rare distinction in *Besinnung* (GA66) between *sinnen* and *besinnen* — rather than conflating it in *Mindfulness* by translating both German words into English with “to be mindful” — Emad and Kalary translate *sinnen* with “to ponder” [p. 214; G243] or “to deliberate (upon)” [p. 307; G345] and *besinnen* with “to be mindful” or (rarely and somewhat reluctantly) “to reflect (reflecting)” [p. 184; G208]. Accordingly, we could surmise, they might acknowledge the analogous distinction between *sinnend* and *besinnend* in Heidegger’s *express* language and thought, should it arise in *Besinnung* (GA66), by rendering *sinnend* with “pondering(ly) / deliberatively” as distinct from *besinnend* with, in the main, “mindful(ly)”.

135 In respect of explicit adjectival use, for example: (1) *ibid.* p. 58; GA66, G71 (“a mindful and thorough scrutinizing” for “der besinnlichen Durchmusterung”); (2) pp. 46 and 310; G56, 348 (reading *besinnend* as *besinnlich*: “a mindful thinking” for [G56] “ein Denken ..., als ein besinnendes” and for [G348] “des besinnenden Denkens”).

[ Incidentally, just as “mindfulness” is one among other potential English counterparts of German *Besinnlichkeit*, so “mindful(ly)” is one among other potential English counterparts of German *besinnlich*. For the latter, and while confusing the essential distinction in Heidegger’s German language and thinking between *besinnlich* and *besinnend*, ordinary ( $\neq$  essential) thinking could also countenance a variety of more familiar verbal and denominal adjectives (and adverbs), including, and there are others: “contemplative(ly)”, “reflective(ly)”, “thoughtful(ly)”, and even, at a pinch, as suggested here for *besinnend* alone, “appraisive(ly) / appraising(ly)”. Correspondingly, for the nominal(ized) adjective *Besinnlichkeit*, and while analogously conflating the essential distinction in German between *Besinnlichkeit* and *Besinnung*, we might alternate quite happily without further ado between the following English renditions respectively: “contemplativeness” and “contemplation”, “reflectiveness” and “reflection”, “thoughtfulness” and *what* ? (“consideration” ?); even, at a long stretch, i.e. haply but not-quite-so-happily, “?\*appraisiveness” or “?\*appraisingness” and “appraisal”. ]

Why speak of Emad and Kalary’s English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung* as “*nothing but* the nominally-partial, deverbifying sense of *Besinnung* [appraisal] as ( = ) *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness]”?

Perhaps because, at its inception, the word *Besinnlichkeit* itself is, equally-essentially with its (commensurately) translating English counterpart *mindfulness* < *mindful*, a nominal(ized) adjective formed from its incipient adjective *besinnlich*, the latter being a word, however, that *does not say the same* as *besinnend* < (*sich*) *besinnen* [appraisive / appraising < to appraise (itself)]. From a beyng-historic perspective, the rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung* as ( = ) German *Besinnlichkeit*, respectively the latter’s (potential) English counterpart *mindfulness*, can be interpreted as a veiled bestance of the essenizing [Beständigkeit der Wesung] of *Besinnung* [appraisal] as (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] in the all-too-prevailing shape and dominion of our metaphysical thinking of being [des Seins] as, in essence [in der Wesenheit], beingness [Seiendheit]. That means: under the constraint of the essen(z)ing of being as beyng refusing itself in the full sway of its (self-deconcealing) truth and its (inceptual) grounding whence of itself and wither the same as essenizing. As such, *mindfulness* translating, say, *Besinnlichkeit* instead of, say, *appraisal* translating *Besinnung*, can never be fully relieved of the distress [Not] into beyng of its appreciable meaning and true sense as too constrained a translating word to approximate the essenizing bestantiation [die wesende Beständigung] of *Besinnung*, respectively *appraisal*, as a thinking of beyng (“beyng-historic genitive”, as Heidegger likes to say).

Thinking through our appraisal unto the veiled essenizing of *beyng* as the essen(ing) of the essen of being in the sense of beingness, the word *mindfulness* itself for German *Besinnlichkeit* (as distinct from the word *appraisal* itself for German *Besinnung*) is always already incipiently engaged (by *beyng*) to appraise but can hardly engage to appraise itself, so to speak, — at least *not* as a *suitable* alternate to the same deverbal wording of the word *appraisal* itself for “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” — in the kind of “thinkerly appraisal [denkerische Besinnung]” and “*inceptual* self-appraisal [anfängliche Selbstbesinnung]” and “appraisal of the essen(ing) [Wesensbesinnung]”,<sup>136</sup> required of it, on Heidegger’s interpretation, as “philosophy” [als “Philosophie”]. That is to say, as “philosophy”, i.e. “essential thinking” [d.h. “wesentliches Denken”],<sup>137</sup> as a thinking of being “in the appraisal unto itself [in der Besinnung auf sich selbst]”<sup>138</sup> and “in the dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement<sup>139</sup> with its history proper (as meta-physics) [in der Auseinandersetzung ihrer Geschichte (als Meta-physik)]”. As Heidegger writes (GA66) [G49f]:

The appraisal of philosophy unto itself belongs to philosophy because appraisal is required by that which philosophy, as essential thinking, has to think – by being. ... The appraisal of philosophy unto itself belongs to the thinking of being.

Why “*not* as a *suitable* alternate to the word appraisal itself for “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” ”?

Essentially because, like its commensurate English counterpart *mindfulness* < *mindful* once again, the word *Besinnlichkeit* itself, as the nominal adjective that it is with its ownmost “‘chain of derivation’ ” < *besinnlich* (≠ *besinnend* < (*sich*) *besinnen*), cannot come so close to approximating the same ‘*beyng*-historic’

136 ≠ “thinking mindfulness [denkende Besinnlichkeit ?]” and “*inceptual* self-mindfulness [anfängliche Selbstbesinnlichkeit ?]” and “foundational mindfulness [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]” respectively per Emad and Kalary, *ibid.*, (1) pp. 18 & 19, 31, 51, 184; GA66, G24, 41, 62, 208] (“thinking mindfulness [denkende Besinnlichkeit ?]” for *denkerische Besinnung* [thinkerly appraisal]; (2) p. 51; G62. (“*inceptual* self-mindfulness [anfängliche Selbstbesinnlichkeit ?]” for “*anfängliche* Selbstbesinnung [*inceptual* self-appraisal]”; (3) p. 52; G63 (“foundational mindfulness [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]” for *Wesensbesinnung* [appraisal of the essen(ing)]).

137 ≠ i.e. “foundational thinking” [d.h. “grundlegendes Denken” ?] or i.e. “fundamental thinking” [d.h. “fundamentales / grundsätzliches Denken” ?] in line with Emad and Kalary’s trusted rendition(s) of *wesentliches Denken* [essential thinking], *ibid.*, pp. 33, 41, 57; G42, 49, 70 (“foundational thinking”); p. 211; G238 (“fundamental thinking”).

138 ≠ “in mindfulness of itself [in der Besinnlichkeit auf sich selbst ?]” pace Emad and Kalary’s translation of Heidegger’s phrase *in der Besinnung auf sich selbst*.

139 ≠ “dissociating exposition [dissoziierende Auslegung ?]” per Emad and Kalary’s trusted rendition of Heidegger’s word *Auseinandersetzung*.

language and thinking through of the primordial inception and provenance of the word *Besinnung* itself in a manner beholden to its essenizing [wesenhaft] *as* an archessentially deverbal nouning of the time word (*sich*) *be-sinnen* < *sinnen*. And because it is, perchance, only from thence that we inceptively derive the appreciable meaning and true sense of the word *besinnlich* itself unto its nominal(ized) adjective *Besinnlichkeit* in a manner beholden to the veiled bestance of the essenizing [Beständigkeit der Wesung], to wit, essence / essenz of the essenz(ing) [Wesenheit des Wesens], of this very word. And therewith: that what Emad and Kalary in the English of *Mindfulness* are calling “the thoughtful thinking [das gedankenvolle Denken ?]”, albeit as their rendition of *das denkerische Denken*, and “the foundational mindfulness [die grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]”, albeit as their rendition of *die Wesensbesinnung*, that pertain to philosophy “in mindfulness of itself [in der Besinnlichkeit auf sich selbst ?]”, albeit as their rendition of philosophy *in der Besinnung auf sich selbst*, that all of this belongs to the thinking of being as, in essence [in der Wesenheit], beingness [Seiendheit], that is: to meta-physics. *Whereas*: “the thinkerly thinking [das denkerische Denken]” and “the appraisal of the essenz(ing) [die Wesensbesinnung]” that pertain to philosophy “in the appraisal unto [≠ mindfulness of] itself” *and*, all at once [zugleich], “in the dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement with [≠ dissociating exposition of] its history proper (as meta-physics)”, that all of this belongs to the thinking of being as, in essenizing [in der Wesung], beyng, that is: to beyng-historic thinking.

[ I am grateful to Anglist Hans Bangerter for his “ ‘chain of derivation’ ” inkling of the inception and provenance of the German word *besinnlich* itself in the distinctive jointing together of Sinn, n. and (be-)sinnen, v., and not just as a matter of or in conformity to ‘(the science of) linguistics [der Sprachwissenschaft]’; rather, as “the gift of that which is expounded or laid out for the interpretation” (Heidegger, *Heraklit* (GA55) [G64]) in the while of essential knowing [in der Weile des wesentlichen Wissens].

For *an appreciative thinking* [*ein sinnendes Denken*], the question of inception and provenance of the wording of the word itself cannot be truly decided by whether, etymologically speaking, *besinnlich* can be verifiably derived from Sinn, n. rather than from (be-)sinnen, v., or vice versa, in an ordinary historical sense [historisch]. From the latter standpoint we might be inclined to the view that *besinnlich* evidently derives from the noun rather than the verb owing to the fact that while, on the one hand, the substantive *Sinn* has historically been accompanied at the same time by the strong verb *sinnen*, on the other, the noun, which is identical to the stem word *Sinn*, is attested earlier than the verb *sinnen*; and therewith, its compound *be-sinnen*. From this point of view, then, there may



be no question *of our ascertaining* that, since the noun and the stem word *Sinn* are identical, all words in the Indo-Germanic *Sinn* family of words, i.e. those with the same etymological root, including the verb *sinnen* (Old High German & Old English *sinnan*), are derived from the noun.

From a beyng-historic perspective [seynsgeschichtlich gesehen], however, a thinkerly appraisal of ‘the (appreciable) meaning’ [‘der Sinn’], i.e. the true (sense) [das Wahre] (ἀληθές), of the word *besinnlich* itself might attend to how, through the *distinguishable* and thus *distinctive* jointing together of Sinn, n. and (be-)sinnen, v. in an appreciable “ ‘chain of derivation’ ” that to a native German speaker bearing all of this mindfully in mind [besinnlich im Sinn] makes more or less sense, or is nonsense, for good reason [aus gutem Grund mehr oder weniger Sinn macht oder Unsinn ist], the word *besinnlich* itself primordially derives its own self, i.e. sense [Sinn], in a gathering of the appraising [einer Sammlung des Besinnens], so to speak, in a manner beholden to its essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) [wesenhaft], from the [S]inn(en) of the time word (*sich*) *be-sinnen* [Hans Bangerter, letter to author of 29/07/2020]:

Shall I try to develop a ‘chain of derivation’? Or various ones and see which one makes sense?

- a) Sinn → sinnen → besinnen → sich besinnen → besinnlich. (makes sense, in a sense)
- b) Sinn → sinnlich → besinnlich. (makes much less sense)
- c) Sinn → besinn (nonsense) → ... no. ]

Only in a thinkerly appraisal and *inceptual* self-appraisal *of* beyng in essen<sup>z</sup>ing [des Seyns in der Wesung] can the word *appraisal* itself “as the English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” — and not just in *Besinnung* (GA66) — be meant or inkled *alternately* to Emad and Kalary’s rendition thereof as: the essen<sup>z</sup>ing bestantiation [die wesende Beständigung] of the bestance of the essen<sup>z</sup>ing [der Beständigkeit der Wesung] of the word *mindfulness* itself being, *essentially*, the English rendition of its nearly commensurate German counterpart *Besinnlichkeit*.

Which is why “Heidegger’s word” is “*Besinnung*” — *not* “*Besinnlichkeit*” — in the title and throughout his *Besinnung* (GA66); and why, when it comes to translating-cum-transporting into our own English language and thinking the full sway of his *deverbal* nouning of the time word (*sich*) *be-sinnen* in the German original, it is a matter of ‘translating Heidegger translating *Besinnung*’ in way that is not just *besinnlich* [*mindfully*] word for the word *Besinnlichkeit* but *besinnend* [*appraisively / appraisingly*] true to the word *Besinnung* as such.



From this horizon, we could venture to say, perchance, of the “thinkerly thinking” that Heidegger names *denkerische Denken*, that it is *only through and in conjunction with* the (beyng-historic) interplay of cognates (and agnates) of the incipient German time words (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] and *sinnen* [to appreciate], along with their respective *verbal* nounings (*das*) *Besinnen* [(the) appraising] and (*das*) *Sinnen* [(the) appreciating], that Heidegger’s appreciation for [Sinn für] what is essentially true to the inception [Anfang] and to the worthing (or worthying) [Würdigung] of beyng-historic thinking itself as *Besinnung* [appraisal] — in his inceptively *deverbal* sense of the word — archessentially lays itself out for the interpretation befitting a thinker as *philosophy*. That is to say, for Heidegger in *Besinnung* (GA66), as *philosophy*, i.e. *essential thinking*, “in the appraisal unto itself” *and*, all at once, “in the dis(cerning)—, or critical—engagement with its history proper (as meta-physics)”.

In *Besinnung* [Appraisal] (GA66), as already suggested, the noun phrase “*die Besinnung*” [“the appraisal”] in Heidegger’s phrase *die Besinnung der Philosophie auf sich selbst* [“the appraisal of philosophy unto itself”] can be read as short for *die denkerische Besinnung*, “the thinkerly appraisal”, where “thinkerly” for *denkerisch* has the sense of “befitting a thinker”, so that the amplified German phrase could be rendered in English as “the thinkerly appraisal of philosophy unto itself” — *not*, pace Emad and Kalary’s alternate rendition of *denkerische Besinnung* with “thinking mindfulness [denkende Besinnlichkeit ?]” — as (supposedly) ‘philosophy’s thinking mindfulness of itself [die denkende Besinnlichkeit der Philosophie auf sich selbst ?]’.<sup>140</sup>

Why “*not*”? For a start, because, in the while of thinking ‘mindfully [besinnlich]’ *and*, all at once, ‘appraisively / appraisingly [besinnend]’, *denkende Besinnlichkeit* [thinking mindfulness] ≠ *denkerische Besinnung* [thinkerly appraisal]. And it is the latter alone that Heidegger will have us bearing ‘mindfully in mind [besinnlich im Sinn]’ through the casting-open of ‘a forgathering (λόγος) of the appraising [einer Versammlung (λόγος) des Besinnens]’, so to speak, in the title and during the whole course of his *Besinnung* [Appraisal] (GA66) where, if I am not mistaken, Heidegger makes no mention at all of ‘the word *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness ?] itself’ and does not use the term ‘*denkende Besinnung* [thinking appraisal ?]’ or its equivalent. Which does not preclude the distinguishment of *Besinnung* [appraisal] from *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness] and *denkerisch* [(in a manner) befitting a thinker]

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140 For Emad and Kalary’s reading of *denkerische Besinnung* [thinkerly appraisal] as *denkende Besinnlichkeit* [“thinking mindfulness” or “thinking-mindfulness”], see *Mindfulness*, *ibid.* pp. 18 & 19, 31, 51, 184; GA66, G24f, 41,62, 208; and below.

from *denkend* [thinking(ly)] in his essential language and thinking, on the contrary.

In Emad and Kalary's English rendition of Heidegger's phrase *denkerische Besinnung* as "thinking mindfulness" (or "thinking-mindfulness"), there appears, to all intents and purposes, to be a two-pronged, 'reverse-thrust' composite (mis-?)reading at work. How so? In the sense [Im Sinne] that the unbefitting (because unthinkerly [undenkerische] and *thus* unthinking [undenkende] from a beyng-historic horizon) *conflation* of the primordial distinction in Heidegger's "philosophy, as essential thinking [Philosophie, als wesentliches Denken]," between *Besinnung* [appraisal] and *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness] is overlaid with another: that between *Besinnung* [appraisal] as *denkerische* [thinkerly] and *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness] as *denkende* [thinking].

What is the meaning [der Sinn] of this supplemental superimposition of the second conflation on to the first?

Could it be indicative of a perceived need on Emad and Kalary's part for a supplementary translating-cum-*transposing* device to the purpose of making good the (at times irrefragable ?) deficiency of "the word *mindfulness* itself" as a nominally-partial and '(de)verbally-oblivious', hence an inherently *unsuitable*, English rendition of "Heidegger's word *Besinnung*"?

Considered in that light, the translators cannot but find themselves in the awkward predicament into which they have brought themselves and from which it will not be easy to extricate themselves of having to grapple not just mindfully [besinnlich] but appraisingly [besinnend] — yet in oblivion to the illume of the word *appraisal* itself for *Besinnung* — with the debility of purpose and reluctance of appreciation for [Sinn für] the word *mindfulness* itself to mind, appreciatingly [sinnend], this essential German word. That would mean having to grapple with minding thus, i.e. appreciating [Sinnen], in a forgathering (λόγος) of the appraising [des Besinnens], the polyarchic interplay of all of the other cognates (and closely associated agnates) of the incipient time word (*sich*) *besinnen* and its verbal nouning *Besinnen* within Heidegger's German language and thinking. And it would entail grappling with the task of translating these essential words, each according to its own *essenz*(ing), in a manner befitting a "thinkerly appraisal [denkerische Besinnung]" of (Heidegger's interpretation of) their appreciable meaning and true sense when no 'thinking mindfulness [denkende Besinnlichkeit]' thereof will suffice.

Were it not due to a marked appreciation on Emad and Kalary's part of *their having to embrace* the uneschewable translation difficulty brought about by their deverbifying selection of English *mindfulness* for German *Besinnung*, the

question arises: Whence comes the distress [Not], even necessity [Notwendigkeit], of their translation decision to conflate Heidegger's denominal adjective *denkerische* [thinkerly] and his verbal adjective *denkende* [thinking] in order, by this artificial (?) means, to translate-cum-transport his phrase *denkerische Besinnung* into suitable English?

It is noteworthy that this 'secondary' conflation is operative in the English of *Mindfulness* irrespective of whether or not it is deliberately intended to remedy or compensate for any inadequacy that may (or may not) from time to time be detected by Emad and Kalary themselves in "the word *mindfulness* itself" as "the[ir] English rendition of Heidegger's word *Besinnung*". Still, in their having (to have ?) recourse to the rendition "thinking mindfulness" as the answer to the question of how, suitably, to translate Heidegger's phrase *denkerische Besinnung* [thinkerly appraisal] into English, Shakespeare's probing question in *Merry Wives of Windsor* (1623) v. v. 228f seems to loom large:

Well, what remedy? ... What cannot be eschew'd, must be embrac'd.

After all, *mindfulness* < *mindful*, like its commensurate German counterpart *Besinnlichkeit* < *besinnlich*, is a nominal adjective deriving, in lieu of its own verb, *only* of and unto its corresponding other-than-verbal adjective. And, in respect of 'translating Heidegger translating *Besinnung*', the nominal adjective *mindfulness* [*Besinnlichkeit*] is a bestance of the essenizing (in want) of (its own verb for the deverbal nouning of) (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)]. Hence, in the English of *Mindfulness*, where "the word *mindfulness* itself" is expounded in the title and throughout their translation of *Besinnung* (GA66) "as the English rendition of Heidegger's word *Besinnung*", Emad and Kalary's incongruous exposition [Auslegung] of *Besinnung* [appraisal] as *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness] cannot but render itself a question-worthy interpretation [Auslegung] thereof. On what grounds? On the grounds of dissociating itself from the '(appreciable) meaning' ['der Sinn'] and the true (sense) [das Wahre] of the German word for the (thinkerly) thinking [(denkerische) Denken] of beyng that Heidegger names *Besinnung* [appraisal] as a deverbal noun deriving of and unto the full sway of its incipient time word (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)]. Moreover, the composite (mis-?)reading of Heidegger's denominal adjective *denkerische* [thinkerly] as (=) his verbal adjective *denkende* [thinking] only adds to the confusion of Emad and Kalary's primary fusion of two readings: *Besinnung* and *Besinnlichkeit*, thereby rendering, to my way of thinking, the reverse thrust of their nominally-partial and hence '(de)verbally-oblivious' translation of *Besinnung* with *mindfulness* all the more question-worthy.

It is as if, by this roundabout means, Emad and Kalary are seeking thus to imbue their ‘dissociating exposition’ of “the word *mindfulness* itself ... as the English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” with a verbal character that this English translation of ‘*Besinnung* as (=) *Besinnlichkeit*’ properly lacks as an essentially *deverbalizing* nominal adjective *in want of its own verb*.

Incidentally, with regard to my placement-cum-suspension of the term “‘dissociating exposition’ ” in (s)care quotes: As yet to be probed, “dissociating exposition” is Emad and Kalary’s most trusted English rendition of *not*, say, *dissoziierende Auslegung*, but of Heidegger’s word *Auseinandersetzung*,<sup>141</sup> for which my most trusted alternate English rendition(s), in each and all of the following interpretations [Auslegungen] of *die Aus-einander-setzung*, was unfolded earlier, in §13:

- the setting-of-one-among-another-apart;
- the setting-of-one-in-the-ming(l)ing-of-another-apart, in the sense of:
- the setting-of-one-in-the-engaging-of-another-apart; and, in short:
- the dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement.

I say “*in want of its own verb*” because, while ‘to ?\*mindful (itself) [(sich) ?\*besinnlichen]’ for *besinnen*, v. [appraise, v.] is obviously a too far-fetching, maybe even nonsensical [unsinnige] association, so far as Emad and Kalary are concerned, the absenting of a suitable English verb corresponding to their inadequate choice of “the word *mindfulness* itself” as “the English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” in the title and through the whole course of *Besinnung* (GA66) does present their expounding thereof from the outset and throughout *Mindfulness* with an uneschewable translation difficulty to have to work around: how to render into English the German word’s incipient time word (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] in a way that is true to the word *without having to compromise* with the workaround exposition they mainly settle on: “to be mindful [*besinnlich sein* ?]”? Accordingly, how else but to compromise with a complementary workaround English rendition of (*das*) *Besinnen* [(the) appraising], Heidegger’s pre-eminent *verbal* nouning of *besinnen*, v. [appraise, v.], as “being mindful [(*das*) *Besinnlich-sein* / (*das*) *Seiend-sein als besinnlich* ?]”? In particular, when Emad and Kalary translate the section

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141 I say “most trusted” because, apart from “dissociating exposition” (or “dis-sociating ex-position”) as the English rendition of *Auseinandersetzung* (or *Aus-einander-setzung*): *ibid.* pp. v, 35, 40, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 64, 65, 73; GVI, 43, 48f, 68, 69, 70, 71, 76, 79f, Emad and Kalary also render this word: “contention”: pp. v, 35, 306; GVI, 43, 343; “discussion / encounter”: p. 54; G66; and “debate”: p. 57; G69.

heading for pages G307-330 of *Besinnung* (GA66), titled “XXVI Eine Sammlung des Besinnens [A gathering of the appraising]”, as [ibid. pp. 271-293]: “XXVI A gathering into being mindful”.

And thus we arrive, on our way to ‘translating Heidegger translating *Besinnung*’ at Emad and Kalary’s most trusted and yet, in our appraising of the (metaphysical ?) language of *Mindfulness*, most question-worthy English interpretation of a small but significant gathering of three essential words in the original German of Heidegger’s *Besinnung* [*Appraisal*] (GA66):

- “to be mindful” for his time word (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] as (=) *besinnlich sein* (?);<sup>142</sup>
- “being mindful” for his verbal noun (*das*) *Besinnen* [(the) appraising] as (=) (*das*) *Besinnlich-sein* or (*das*) *Seiend-sein als besinnlich* (?); and, the pervasive point of departure:
- “mindfulness” for his deverbal noun *Besinnung* [appraisal] as (=) *Besinnlichkeit* (?).<sup>143</sup>

By this interpretation, Emad and Kalary’s translation of *Besinnung* (GA66) could be said to bypass the requisite *thinkerly appraisal* ( $\neq$  *thinking mindfulness*) that, as a casting-open of the ‘philosophic’ beyng of the human being through their grounding in t/here-being [Da-sein], Heidegger will likely have us bearing mindfully in mind in the while of an appraisive translating of ‘the word *Besinnung* itself’ as a letting-be of the language of beyng *granting* and, all at once, *refusing* the rendering of itself in the essenizing of its (deconcealing) truth [(entbergenden) Wahrheit] and its (inceptual) grounding [(anfänglichen) Gründung]. In appreciative after-saying and after-thinking after Heidegger, that may well include embracing a rendering of beyng itself as the ab(yssal)-ground [Ab-grund] of t/here-being that will fitly refuse any appeal to the truth of its

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142 For variations on (1) “to be mindful [besinnlich sein ?]” or (2) “to become mindful [besinnlich werden ?]” for (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)], see, for instance, ibid. pp. 43, 369 [G53, G416] for the former and p. 300 [G336] for the latter; see also p. 45 [G55] (3) “is mindful” for *sinnt* [appreciates], thus reading *sinnen* (for *besinnen* ?) as *besinnlich sein / werden* too; and for *Besinnung* [appraisal] likewise, see pp. 108, 131 [G127, G153] (4) “to be mindful” and p. 96 [G114] “are mindful”; and p. 57 [G70] (5) “becoming mindful”, thus also reading *Besinnung* (for *besinnen* ?) as either *besinnlich sein* or *besinnlich werden*.

143 Again, I say “most trusted” because, apart from “the word *mindfulness* itself”, *Besinnung* is selectively rendered (as indicated in the previous footnote) (1) reading *Besinnung* (for *besinnen* ?) as *besinnlich sein* (?): “to be mindful” [ibid. pp.108, 131; G127, 153]; “(while we) are mindful” [p. 96; G114]; and (2) reading Heidegger’s {*einer*} *Besinnung* {*auf*} [{of an} appraisal {unto / of}] as, more or less, { ... } *besinnlich zu werden* { ... } (?): “{of} becoming mindful {of}” [p. 57; G70].



grounding in the veiled essence [Wesenheit] and beingness [Seiendheit], to wit, mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit], of the human being ( $\neq$  t/here-being) in wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [in der Besinnungslosigkeit].<sup>144</sup> The kind of *thinkerly appraisal* that is clear(ing)ly required to come anywhere near close to approximating “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” in a manner beholden to what is true to the word in an other-than-metaphysical sense, cannot keep clear of a purveyant translating that is behoven, archessentially, to appraise itself (appreciatively) unto itself in a manner befitting a thinker if it is to translate-cum-transport us into the *incipiently verbal character* of Heidegger’s beyng-historic language and thinking.

While hearkening unto such that is essentially worth(while)-translating, we may well appreciate our English word *mindfulness* as a good, albeit imperfectly good, approximation to the German word *Besinnlichkeit* for being not just (more or less) word for word, so to say, but true to the word. What is hard to fathom worthingly [würdigend], therefore, is how “the word *mindfulness* itself” — as an imperfectly good English approximation to German *Besinnlichkeit* — could be not just word for word but true to the beyng-historic German word *it is purportedly meant to be translating*, namely, to *Besinnung*. From this horizon, such that is not “properly (i.e. en-propriatingly) historic” in the English of *Mindfulness* cannot always go unnoticed but will from time to time unveil itself to appreciative English interpreters and readers alike as the uneschewable translation difficulty it essentially is for Emad and Kalary, one that, if not left unheeded, refuses to go away and is by no means so easily swept aside under the auspices of being not “actually historical, (i.e. en-owned)”<sup>145</sup>. It is hardly surprising, then, that while the hitherto solely licensed English translators of Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) are proprietorially at liberty to disregard this

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144 Re “... a letting-be of the language of beyng *granting* and, all at once, *refusing* the rendering of itself in the essenizing of its (deconcealing) truth [(entbergenden) Wahrheit] and its (inceptual) grounding [(anfänglichen) Gründung] ... that may well include embracing a rendering of beyng itself as the ab(yssal)-ground [Ab-grund] of t/here-being that will fitly refuse ...”, see *Besinnung* (GA66) where Heidegger writes [G52]:

No being is able to lend beyng its ground because beyng is the ab(yssal)-ground in which alone the predicament and distress of all that is groundless obtains its depth and the necessity of any grounding reaches its peak. To the clearing [Lichtung] of the ab(yssal)-ground and only thereto does philosophy belong while embracingly undertaking to say the simplest and the stillest: the word of the truth of beyng, the saying [Spruch] of the science-free knowing [des wissenschaftlosen Wissens] that is never a saying (dictum) of power [Machtspruch] and knows not of the want of power [die Ohnmacht].

Compare Emad and Kalary’s translation of the above passage in *Mindfulness*, *ibid.*, p. 43.

145 “properly (i.e. en-propriatingly) historic”  $\neq$  “actually historical, (i.e. en-owned)” pace Emad and Kalary’s rendition [*ibid.*, p. 312] of Heidegger’s expression [GA66, G351] “eigentlich (d.h. er-eignet) geschichtlich”.



unescapable translation difficulty of their own making when it rears its head, and to do so with the imprimatur not of the late author Martin Heidegger himself but his authorised legal representatives, as appreciative thinkers [sinnende Denker] they are behoven to embrace it for what it *essentially is*. In this regard, or so it seems, Emad and Kalary have little option but to improvise in one way or another to find a workaround solution of one sort or another to “the word *mindfulness* itself” each time it threatens to render itself (in oblivion to the illume of thinkerly appraisal and *inceptual* self-appraisal) *an unsuitable* English rendition of Heidegger’s beyng-historic word *Besinnung*.

Of course none of the above precludes Emad and Kalary separately deploying their question-worthy conflation of the smaller and greater verbal import (let alone the entirely different meaning), respectively, of Heidegger’s denominal adjective *denkerische* [thinkerly] and his verbal adjective *denkende* [thinking] as an aid to adjecting slightly less or more verbal force, as they see fit, to their English translation of a variety of key verbal, deverbal, and other nouns in the German original, irrespective of whether these are cognate, or not, with Heidegger’s distinctively verbal and deverbal nounings of the time word (*sich*) *besinnen*.

Indeed, in the English of *Mindfulness*, both the greater verbal import of our adj. (adv.) “thinking(ly) [denkend]” and the lesser of our adj. (adv.) “thoughtful(ly) [gedankenvoll, nachdenklich, even besinnlich]” are alternately employed by Emad and Kalary to render Heidegger’s mainly adjectival (and occasionally adverbial) use in *Besinnung* (GA66) of the German word *denkerisch* [thinkerly, (in a manner) befitting a thinker] in conjunction with various verbal, deverbal, and other substantives as well as verbs. For instance, among others, in the following (adjecting and adverbial) configurations, gradations, and conjunctural arrangements in English and German translation *and* interpretation respectively:

First, “thinking” for the denominal adjective *denkerisch*, evidently reading the latter as the verbal adjective *denkend*:

- “thinking inquiry” *not* for, say, *denkende Erfragung*, but for *denkerische Erfragen* [thinkerly inquiring];
- “thinking-saying” *not* for, say, *denkende-Sagen*, but for *denkerische Sagen* [thinkerly saying];
- “thinking knowing-awareness” *not* for, say, *die wissende-Bewußtheit als denkende*, or the like, but for *denkerische Wissen* [thinkerly knowing];

Alternately “thoughtful” for adjectival *denkerisch* as *gedankenvoll* et al:

- “thoughtful knowing” *not* for, say, *gedankenvolle Wissen* but again, for *denkerische Wissen* [thinkerly knowing, knowing as befits a thinker];
- “thoughtful thinking” (clearly in preference, and here lies the rub, to the tautological thought of ‘thinking thinking [denkende Denken]’) *not* for, say, *gedankenvolle Denken*, but for *denkerische Denken* [thinkerly thinking];
- “thoughtful dissociating exposition” *not* for, say, *gedankenvolle dissoziierende Auslegung*, but for *denkerische Aus–einander–setzung* [thinkerly dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement];

Also “thoughtfully” or, alternately, “thinkingly”, for adverbial *denkerisch* as *gedankenvoll* et al. or, alternately, as *denkend*:

- “{But in truth what seems to be an analysis is only the enactment of a dis-sociating ex-position that runs through the present and its exterior, and} in which, acted thoughtfully, {a decision on be-ing must be grounded and sustained.}” *not* for, say, { ... } *in der gedankenvoll gehandelt*, { ... }, but for {*Aber diese scheinbare Zergliederung [von Vorhandenem] ist in Wahrheit nur der in die Gegenwart und ihr Äußeres auslaufende Vollzug der Aus–einander–setzung, in der denkerisch gehandelt, {d.h. eine Entscheidung über das Seyn ergründet und ertragen} werden muß.* [ {But this seeming analysis [of the extant / present-at-hand] is in truth only the enactment of a dis(cerning)–engagement, a setting–of–one–in–the–engaging–of–another–apart, that culminates in the present and its outward appearance, and} where it will behove the critical–engagement to be conducted in a manner befitting a thinker, {i.e. where it will behove a decision on beyng to be grounded and sustained.} ]
- “{Be-ing as enowning} can and must be thoughtfully inquired ... ” *not* for, say, — *kann und muß { ... } gedankenvoll erfragt werden.*, but for — *kann und muß {das Seyn als Ereignis} denkerisch erfragt werden.* [ {Beyng as enpropriation} can and must be interrogated in a manner befitting a thinker ... ]
- “{Whether in order that such things enown themselves, be-ing, truth, godhood, human domain, history, and art} succeed to reach, primarily poetically and thinkingly, {the origin of their sway and their ownmost through the grounding of *Da-sein*.}” *not* for, say, { ... } *erst dichterisch und denkend { ... } finden*, but for {*Ob, damit solches sich ereigne, Seyn und Wahrheit, Gottschaft und Menschentum, Geschichte und Kunst} erst*

*dichterisch und denkerisch* {durch die Gründung des *Da-seins*<sup>146</sup> in den Ursprung ihres *Wesens*} finden. [{Whether for such to enproprieate itself, beyng and truth, godhood and humankind, history and art} will find their way {to the origin of their essenz(ing)} only poetically and in a manner befitting a thinker {through the grounding of *t/here-being*.}]

And so forth.<sup>147</sup>

Be that as it may, in the epoch of neoteric (let alone newfangled) mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit] in wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [in der Besinnungslosigkeit], “the appraisal of philosophy unto itself” and “in the dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement with its history proper (as meta-physics)” is the beyng-historic thinking that, in his decidedly deverbial nouning(s) of the incipient time word (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] as *Besinnung* [appraisal], *Selbstbesinnung* [self-appraisal], *denkerische Besinnung* [thinkerly appraisal], and, in all of this: *Wesensbesinnung* [appraisal of the essenz(ing)], Heidegger will have us not only bearing ‘mindfully in mind [besinnlich im Sinn]’ but appreciating [Sinnen] and appraising [Besinnen] as “an other than the first inception” of occidental thinking, the first “inception [Anfang]” being the one “that for the first time en(liveningly)-thought [er-dachte] being and named it φύσις”.

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146 “des *Da-seins*” – Heidegger’s italics for the word “*Da-seins*” only at GA66, G230; cf. Emad and Kalary, *ibid.*, p. 204. See next footnote for reference to the remaining citations.

147 For example: (1) reading adj. *denkend* [thinking] for adj. *denkerisch* [thinkerly, befitting a thinker], *ibid.*, pp. 18 & 19, 31, 51, 184; GA66, G24, 41, 62, 208 (“thinking mindfulness” or “thinking-mindfulness” for *denkerische Besinnung*); p. 7; G11 (“free-thinking interpretation” for *denkerische[r] Deutung*); p. 18; G24 (“thinking saying” for *denkerische Spruch*); p. 40; G48 (“Honouring as a thinking honouring” for *Würdigung als denkerische*); p. 51; G62 (“*thinking inquiry*” for *denkerische Erfragen* [Heidegger’s italics]); p. 238; G268 (approx. ‘the thinking meaning of inquiry’ for approx. ‘*das denkerische Sinn des Fragens*’); p. 42; G51 (“thinking knowing-awareness” for *denkerische Wissen*); pp. 46, 81, 238; G55, 97, 268 (“thinking-saying” for *denkerische Sagen*); p. 169; G191 & 192 (“the first thinking-beginning” for *der erste denkerische Anfang*); p. 371; G420 (“the actual dynamics of thinking itself” for *die eigentliche denkerische Bewegung selbst*); (2) reading adj. *gedankenvoll*, *nachdenklich*, even *besinnlich* [thoughtful, even mindful] ... for adj. *denkerisch* [thinkerly, befitting a thinker]: pp. 39, 63, 64, 186, 234, 242, 252, 318; G47, 77, 78, 210, 263, 272, 284, 358 (“thoughtful thinking” for *denkerische Denken*); pp. 318, 319; G358, 359 (“thoughtful questioning” for *denkerische Fragen*); p. 121; G142 (“a thoughtful decision” for *einer denkerischen Entscheidung*); p. 62; G76 (“thoughtful dissociating exposition” for *denkerische Aus-einander-setzung*); p. 320; G360 (“thoughtful knowing” for *denkerische Wissen*); pp. 318f; G358f (“the thoughtful questioning” for *das denkerische Fragen*); (3) reading adv. *gedankenvoll* et al. [thoughtfully] or, alternately, adv. *denkend* [thinkingly], for adv. *denkerisch* [in a thinkerly manner, a manner befitting a thinker] in conjunction with various verbs: p. 57; G70 (“acted thoughtfully” for *denkerisch gehandelt*); p. 70; G84 (“be thoughtfully inquired” for *denkerisch erfragt werden*); p. 204; G230 (“succeed to reach, primarily poetically and thinkingly,” for *erst dichterisch und denkerisch ... finden*).

The thinkerly appraisal of philosophy unto itself and its *inceptual* self-appraisal in the dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement with its history proper (as meta-physics), the kind befitting a thinker who thinks appreciatively and inceptively [sinnend und anfangend], is, for Heidegger, the one required of philosophy (and hence ‘the philosopher’) by that which, “as essential thinking [als wesentliches Denken]”, philosophy has to think, namely: being [Sein].

From the horizon of essential thinking, a thinkerly appraisal of “the word *mindfulness* itself” as a *question-worthy* English word-in-response to Heidegger’s German word-in-question *Besinnung* will be one where the setting apart of one (word) in the ming(l)ing of another [das Auseinandersetzen (der Worte)] attends diligently in the manner befitting a thinker [denkerisch] to the following:

- the beyng-historic rendering itself of the *essential* word *Besinnung* [appraisal] as a deverbal nouning of its incipient verb (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] that ‘lets beyng be’ as *granting* (and *refusing*) the rendering of itself in the essenizing of its (deconcealing) truth and its (inceptual) grounding;
- how “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” in the appreciable meaning and true sense of (*sich*) *besinnen* (and of the latter’s verbal nouning *Besinnen*) thus sets itself apart in a manner beholden to its (other-than-metaphysical) essenizing from any mindful yet unappraisive translation thereof in the vein of “mindfulness” with its *unthought-through* appeal to the veiled essenizing (absent-minding) of the language and thinking of beyng in its (ungrounded) truth and its (abyssal) grounding as “essence” and “beingness” of the (human) being, i.e. in a manner un beholden to what is not just (more or less) word for the word *Besinnlichkeit* but true to the word *Besinnung* itself in an appraisively-appreciative [besinnend-sinnende] beyng-historic language and thinking;
- the way in which, howsoever mindfully, Emad and Kalary may be hamstrung from the outset by their selection of “the word *mindfulness* itself” in want of and oblivion to the word *appraisal* itself as “the English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” owing to the nominal partiality and (de)verbal ‘absent-mindedness [Besinnungslosigkeit]’ of their English rendition being one that simply will not suffice to ‘let beyng be’ through a properly (i.e. en-propriatingly) historic appraisal — a thinkerly appraisal, an *inceptual* self-appraisal, in short: an appraisal of the essenizing, *of* beyng — as *refusing* the rendering of itself in the veiled essenizing (absent-minding) of its truth

and its grounding through the forgottenness [die Vergessenheit] of *mindfulness* [der *Besinnlichkeit* ?];

- that the wont(edness) of philosophy “in mindfulness of itself [in der *Besinnlichkeit* auf sich selbst ?]” — pace Emad and Kalary’s *unsuitable* English rendition “mindfulness” for Heidegger’s word “*Besinnung*” in the phrase *in der Besinnung auf sich selbst* [in the appraisal unto itself] — is quite at home in the want(edness) of and oblivion to appraisal [Besinnungslosigkeit] unto itself because, in essenizing [in der *Wesung*], ‘*Besinnung* [appraisal] ≠ *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness]’. Rather, in a manner beholden to the fully (de)verbal sway of beyng in the appraisively-appreciative essenizing of its truth and its grounding, ‘*Besinnung* [appraisal] = (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)]’.

Why hamstrung? Because, for being in want of its own, let alone its ownmost, verb, and notwithstanding any unthought-through appearance to the contrary, the nominally-partial and hence ‘(de)verbally oblivious’ rendering (giving again, back, in return) of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” with our increasingly popular yet hitherto unappreciated, unappraised, and unapprising English word *mindfulness* is untrue [unwahr, un(ge)treu] to our translating Heidegger translating the *essentially deverbal* rendering itself of the beyng-historic time word and associated thinkerly thinking of being as beyng that, in a manner beholden to the essenizing thereof as *appraisal*, Heidegger names *Besinnung*. The appraisal of the wording of our English word *mindfulness* itself in a manner beholden to the *whole* question-worthing of its essen(ing) as (an imperfectly good approximation to German) *Besinnlichkeit* (≠ *Besinnung*) would mean having to dis(cerningly)–engage with the essence / essen(z) [Wesenheit] and beingness [Seiendheit] and forgetfulness [Vergesslichkeit] of mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit] as such in a beyng-historic manner as a veiled essen(ing) of the dominion of being as beyng refusing itself in the essenizing of its truth and its grounding.

Pursuant to and purveyant of our (thinkerly) appraisal of the essen(ing) [(denkerische) Wesensbesinnung] of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*”, being the essential word of his essential thinking that it is,<sup>148</sup> and, in particular, of the

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148 (1) “(thinkerly) appraisal of the essen(ing) [(denkerische) Wesensbesinnung]” ≠ “(thinking) foundational mindfulness [(denkende) grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]”; (2) “Heidegger’s word” is “*Besinnung* [appraisal]” not “*Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness]”; and (3) since adjectival *wesentliche* [essential] ≠ adjectival *grundlegende* / *grundsätzliche* / *schweigende* / *eigenste* [foundational / fundamental / swaying / ownmost], so “being the essential word of his essential thinking that it is,” ≠ “being the foundational / fundamental /



appreciable meaning and true sense of the German word *Besinnung* itself as a deverbal naming of the time word (*sich*) *besinnen*, an intimation of the essentially [ $\neq$  foundationally or fundamentally or swayingly or ownmostly or ... <sup>149</sup>] *beyng-historic* import of how *beyng* may grant and refuse itself all at once in the *essen*z(ing) of its (deconcealing) truth and its (inceptual) grounding through *Besinnung* [appraisal] and *Besinnungslosigkeit* [wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal], and by contrast with Emad and Kalary's (metaphysical ?) reading of *Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness] and *Mangel an Besinnlichkeit* [lack of mindfulness] therefor, can perchance be gleaned from hints thereof in the following six excerpts drawn, and translated into two versions of comparable English, incompatible yet most worthy of comparison from these altogether different horizons, from Section III of *Besinnung* (GA66) under the following headings [GVff]:

### III PHILOSOPHY [DIE PHILOSOPHIE]

( Self-appraisal: (properly) historic dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement;  
beyng-historic thinking – metaphysics [Selbstbesinnung: geschichtliche  
Auseinandersetzung; das seynsgeschichtliche Denken – die Metaphysik] )

13 Philosophy [Die Philosophie] ... [G45]

14 Philosophy in the appraisal unto itself [Die Philosophie in der Besinnung auf sich selbst] ... [G49]

15 The self-appraisal of philosophy as (properly) historic dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement (The setting–of-one-among-another–apart between metaphysics and beyng-historic thinking) [Die Selbstbesinnung der Philosophie als geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung (Die Aus-einander-setzung zwischen der Metaphysik und dem seynsgeschichtlichen Denken)] ... [G68]<sup>150</sup>

*First*, in connection with the Section's opening commendation [GA66, G46ff] that the *Besinnung*, the appraisal, of philosophy unto itself, i.e. unto that in philosophy which is worthwhile en(livening)-thinking [das in ihr zu Erdenkende], must be, as decidedly as never before, the appraisal of philosophy unto its "time [Zeit]". Whereby it behoves the enquiring [das Erfragen] of this thinkerly appraisal of philosophy unto its "most question-worthy [Fragwürdigste]", so Heidegger, to know the present-day not as responsible for an "(ordinary) historical [historischen] situation" for the purpose of its practical promotion and alteration, but rather: "as hints of the *essen*z(ing) of the

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swaying / ownmost word of his foundational / fundamental / swaying / ownmost thinking that it is,"!

149 "or ..." — strictly, distinctly, importantly, principally, pace Emad and Kalary's multifarious (adverbial) rendition of Heidegger's word *wesentlich*.

150 Compare Emad and Kalary, *ibid.* Table of Contents, pp. vff for their alternate translation of these Section III headings.



beyng-historic essenz(ing) [als Wesenswinke des seynsgeschichtlichen Wesens]]” of the age of modernity. And here is what Heidegger says in respect of such that is essentially worth(while)-enquiring-of [des wesentlich Zu-erfragenden] in the while of the kind of essential thinking — or, in other words, “thinkerly appraisal [denkerische Besinnung]” and “*inceptual* self-appraisal [anfängliche Selbstbesinnung]”, to wit, “appraisal of the essenz(ing) [Wesensbesinnung]” of *beyng* — he ‘decidedly has in mind [entschieden im Sinn hat]’ [GA66, G48]:

Das Seyn ist als jenes Ent-scheidende zuvor dem Denken und stets das Fragwürdigste. Das diesem Gleiche kann nur die höchste Würdigung sein, jenes Vermögen, das Große größer zu entwerfen, damit es in seiner Größe aufgehe. Doch nur das Große besitzt die Kraft zur Vergrößerung, wogegen das Kleine sein Wesen darin verrät, daß es immer verkleinert, wenn auch »nur« so, daß es das Große jeweils als das Seine in Anspruch nimmt. Die reinste Vergrößerung ist *die* Würdigung, in der ein Würdigstes ganz ihm selbst gehört. Deshalb ist das Fragen im Sinne der Erfragung des Fragwürdigsten keine eitle Zudringlichkeit, sondern die Vereinfachung alles Wissens auf das Einzige; Würdigung als denkerische ist weder Anbiederung noch Übersteigung, sondern Aus-einander-setzung, die ihre eigene Wesensnot wagen muß. Die Aus-einander-setzung setzt das Fragen dem Seyn aus dergestalt, daß dieses als das Gefragte gewürdigt und seine Antwort in die Gründung des Da-seins übernommen wird.

As *that* which is (*the*) de-ciding, beyng is ahead of thinking and always the most question-worthy. The like of one such as this can only be the highest worthing (or worthyng), the kind of enabling that casts-open the great more greatly so that it rises to its grandeur. But only the great possesses the strength to greaten, whereas the small betrays its essenz(ing) in that it gets smaller every time, even if “only” so that it may at any time lay claim to the great as its own. The purest greatening of the great is *the* worthing in which one most worthy belongs wholly to itself. That is why the questioning in the sense of the inquiry, the interrogation, of the most question-worthy is no idle importunity but the simplification of all knowing unto the singular; worthing (or worthyng) as thinkerly is neither ingratiating nor exaggeration but dis(cerning)—, or critical-engagement that is behoven to venture the predicament and distress of its own essenz(ing). The dis(cerning)—engagement, the setting-of-one-in-the-engaging-of-another-apart, sets the questioning with respect to beyng apart, ex-poses it to beyng, in such a way that the latter as the questioned, the interrogated, will be worthed (or worthyed) and its answer, its word-in-response, accepted into the grounding of t/here-being.

Compare Emad and Kalary’s alternate English rendition of this German excerpt, including their translation of Heidegger’s: “jenes Ent-scheidende [*that* which is (*the*) de-ciding]” with “*that* de-ciding [*Ent-scheidende*]”, thereby ignoring the nominal-participial character of *Ent-scheidende* as distinct from its inrooted verbal noun *Ent-scheiden*; “Seyn [beyng]” (rather than *Seiend* [be-ing]) with “be-ing”; “sein Wesen [its essenz(ing)]” with “its ownmost [sein Eigenste ?]”; “alles Wissens [all knowing]” with “all knowing-awareness [aller wissende-Bewußtheit ?]”; “das “Würdigung als denkerische [Worthing (or

Worthyng) as thinkerly]” with “Honouring as a thinking [denkende ?] honouring”; “Wesensnot [predicament and distress of the essen<sup>z</sup>(ing)]” with “foundational distress [grundlegende Not ?]” (*not*, as might be expected according to the German syntax, “distress of the foundation [Not der Grundlegung ?]”); and “Aus–einander–setzung [e.g. dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement]” with “dissociating exposition [dissoziierende Auslegung ?]”, the latter being Emad and Kalary’s most trusted English rendition of this other essential word for essential thinking in the texts of Martin Heidegger [ibid. p. 40]<sup>151</sup>:

Prior to thinking and always the most question-worthy is be-ing, is *that* de-ciding [Ent-scheidende]. That which is ‘like’ be-ing can only be the highest honouring, it is the capability to project-open greatness still greater, so that what is great might be engrossed in its greatness. But only what is great possesses the strength to be greater, whereas what is small betrays its ownmost by always becoming smaller – even if it is “only” so that from time to time it claims greatness as its own. The sheerest furthering of greatness is the honouring wherein what is most worthy belongs entirely to itself. Therefore, questioning in the sense of inquiring into the most question-worthy is no idle intrusiveness but the unblending of all knowing-awareness unto what is sole and unique. Honouring as a thinking honouring is neither currying a favour nor transgressing, but a dissociating exposition that must venture its own foundational distress. Dissociating exposition exposes questioning to be-ing in such a way that the latter is honoured as what is interrogated and its response is taken over into the grounding of Da-sein.

*Second*, in a nutshell [GA66, G49]:

*Philosophie*: Dies einzige Ringen um das bildlose Wort “des” Seyns – im Zeitalter der Unkraft und Unlust zum wesentlichen Wort.

*Besinnung*: im Zeitalter der planetarischen Besinnungslosigkeit.

I. Die Philosophie in der Besinnung auf sich selbst.

II. Die Philosophie in der Auseinandersetzung ihrer Geschichte (als Meta-physik).<sup>b</sup>

*Beides ist Eines*: Geschichte des Seyns, gründende Zugehörigkeit zu ihr.

<sup>b</sup> Zu II. vgl. die Überwindung der Metaphysik (In: Metaphysik und Nihilismus. Gesamtausgabe Band 67), d. h. seynsgeschichtliche Entfaltung des Wesens der Metaphysik als der Geschichte der Wahrheit des Seienden als eines solchen im Ganzen Platon-Nietzsche.

*Philosophy*: This singular grappling with the imageless word “of” beyng – in the age of debility of purpose and reluctance to mind the essential word.

*Appraisal*: in the age of the planetary wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal.

I. Philosophy in the appraisal unto itself.

II. Philosophy in the dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagment with its history proper (as meta-physics).<sup>b</sup>

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151 See §13, pp. 146ff regarding the kind of essential *Auseinandersetzen* [setting apart of one in the ming(l)ing of another] that distinguishes itself for Heidegger as *das wesentliche Denken* [the essential thinking].

*Both are one*: history proper of beyng, grounding appertenance thereto.

<sup>b</sup> Re II. cf. “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik” in *Metaphysik und Nihilismus* (GA67), i.e. beyng-historic unfolding of the essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) of metaphysics as the history proper of the truth of the being as one such (as it is) in respect of the whole – Plato to Nietzsche.

Or alternately, per Emad and Kalary’s English rendition of the German text, including, among other alternates, their translation of the following essential words in Heidegger’s essential thinking: “Seyn [beyng]” with “be-ing [Seiend]”; “des Wesens der Metaphysik [of the essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) of metaphysics]” with “of the sway of metaphysics”; “zum wesentlichen Wort [to the essential word]” with “for the swaying word”; “Besinnung [appraisal]” with “mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit ?]”; “Besinnungslosigkeit [wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal]” with “lack of mindfulness” (thereby reading *Besinnungslosigkeit* as *Unbesinnlichkeit* in the sense of *Mangel an Besinnlichkeit* ?);<sup>152</sup> “Philosophie in der Besinnung auf sich selbst [philosophy in the appraisal unto itself]” with “Philosophy in mindfulness of itself”; and again, “Auseinandersetzung [e.g. dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement]” with “dissociating exposition”; also “seynsgeschichtliche [beyng-historic]” with “being-historical [seinsgeschichtliche ?]”; and “des Seienden als eines solchen im Ganzen [of the being as one such (as it is) in respect of the whole]” with “of “beings as such in the whole””; [ibid. p. 40f]:

*Philosophy*: this sole struggle for the imageless word “of” be-ing in an epoch of asthenia and lack of enthusiasm for the swaying word.

*Mindfulness*: in the epoch of the planetary lack of mindfulness.

I. Philosophy in mindfulness of itself.

II. Philosophy in the dissociating exposition of its history (as meta-physics).<sup>a</sup>

*Both are one*: history of be-ing, grounding belongingness to that history.

<sup>a</sup> For II, i.e., on the being-historical unfolding of the sway of metaphysics as the sway of the history of the truth of “beings as such in the whole” (Plato to Nietzsche), cf., “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik”, in *Metaphysik und Nihilismus*, (GA 67).

To reiterate the point made earlier: “Heidegger’s word” is “*Besinnung* [appraisal]” *not* “*Besinnlichkeit* [mindfulness]”. Add to that: “Heidegger’s word” is “*Besinnungslosigkeit* [wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal]” *not* “*Mangel an Besinnlichkeit* [lack of mindfulness]”. Emad and Kalary’s rendition of these two words alone is enough to *distort* what Heidegger is saying here out of all proportion.

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152 See also *Mindfulness* (1) Re *Besinnungslosigkeit*: ibid. pp. 40, 50, 60; GA66, G49, G61, G74 (“lack of mindfulness [Unbesinnlichkeit ? Mangel an Besinnlichkeit ? Abwesenheit der Besinnlichkeit ? Unfähigkeit, sich zu besinnen durch Beraubung der Besinnlichkeit ?]”; (2) (a) Re adverbial *besinnungslos*: p. 56; G68 (“mindlessly [unbesinnlich ? ohne Besinnung ? gedankenlos und unbesonnen ?]”; (b) Re adjectival *besinnungslos*: p. 79; G95 (“lack of mindfulness in explaining” for *die besinnungslose Erklärbarkeit*).

So which of the following is it to be? —

“*Appraisal*: in the age of the planetary wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal.” OR

“*Mindfulness*: in the epoch of the planetary lack of mindfulness.”

If “Heidegger’s words” were *Besinnlichkeit* and *Mangel an Besinnlichkeit* then there would be some merit in Emad and Kalary’s interpretation. But it is a stretch to say and to think that this is a suitable interpretation of the language of *Besinnung* and *Besinnungslosigkeit* that Heidegger’s *Besinnung* [*Appraisal*] (GA66) conveys as true to the words not just in an ordinary historical (metaphysical) but a properly (beyng-)historic sense. In the latter sense, it will surely behove the appraisal of the essen(z)ing of philosophy unto itself [die Wesensbesinnung der Philosophie auf sich selbst] and its “time” grappling with the imageless word “of” beyng in the neoteric age of mindfulness [*Besinnlichkeit*] and yet “debility of purpose and reluctance to mind the essential word”, to discerningly engage with and disengage itself from the epochal destiny(ng) of its own mindfulness of itself as such in the age of the planetary “wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [*Besinnungslosigkeit*]”. For, so long as philosophy’s *mindfulness* of itself as a thinking of being(ness) remains ‘absent-mindedly [*besinnungslos*]’ in wantedness of and oblivion to the *appraisal* unto itself as a thinking of beyng, and necessarily languishes thus in a manner beholden to the essen(z)ing [wesenhaft] of “the word *mindfulness* itself” as “the English rendition of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*”, the suggestion in the English of *Mindfulness* that Heidegger’s thinking in *Besinnung* (GA66) is geared to countering philosophy’s *lack* of mindfulness [*Mangel an Besinnlichkeit*] of itself with an *abundance* thereof [*Fülle der Besinnlichkeit*] — irrespective of whether philosophy’s mindfulness of itself per (es)se necessarily remains absent-mindedly in wantedness of and oblivion to its appraisal unto itself — will hardly suffice to translate-cum-transport us into the appreciable meaning and true sense of Heidegger’s words *Besinnung* and *Besinnungslosigkeit*.

Let us return to the above sketch of Heidegger’s opening commendation to the effect that (1) the *Besinnung*, the appraisal, of philosophy unto itself, must be, as decidedly as never before, the appraisal of philosophy unto its “time [Zeit]”; and (2) it behoves the enquiring [das Erfragen] of this thinkerly appraisal of philosophy unto (the essen(z)ing and truth of beyng as) its “most question-worthy [Fragwürdigste]”, so Heidegger, to know the present-day not as responsible for an “(ordinary) historical [historischen] situation” — shall we say here: the situation with the epochal destiny(ng) of philosophy’s mindfulness of itself, be it lacking or in abundance — for the purpose of its practical promotion and alteration, but rather: “as hints of the essen(z)ing of the beyng-historic

essenz(ing) [als Wesenswinke des seynsgeschichtlichen Wesens]” of the (‘absent-minded [besinnungslosen]’ ?) age of modernity.

When Heidegger speaks of “*Appraisal*: in the age of the planetary wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [*Besinnung*: im Zeitalter der planetarischen Besinnungslosigkeit]”,<sup>153</sup> we can probably take it that he means the kind of planetary “Besinnungslosigkeit” — no less true for our historic time proper than for his — that he subsequently sketches in a “mindful survey [or mustering up: besinnlichen Durchmusterung]” of prevalent forms of superficially dithering about in the long-since well-entrenched ways of unessentially [unwesentlich] relating and comporting ourselves to philosophy in the neoteric “age of modernity”, as outlined in five points [G71ff] under the heading [G68ff] “15. The self-appraisal of philosophy as (properly) historic dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement (The setting–of-one-among-another–apart between metaphysics and beyng-historic thinking)”. Whereupon he writes [G74f]:

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153 GA66, G49. The word “planetary” here refers back to an earlier mention of “the *planetary*” [das “*Planetarische*”]” being one among a stock of traditional metaphysical concepts that serve to characterize the superficial experience and interpretation of “the essen(z) of power [des Machtwesens]” in the age of modernity through the manifold appearances of “the overpowering itself of power [das Sichübermächtigen der Macht]” in the neoteric epoch. Under the heading [G16ff] “9. *The machination* (coercive force, power, dominion) [9. *Die Machenschaft* (Gewalt, Macht, Herrschaft)]”, Heidegger engages, discerningly, in a thinkerly appraisal of and disengagement from the metaphysics of “machination as the essen(z) of the being, as the way in which the being as one such (as it is) thoroughly *is*” in the modern epochal destiny(ing) of beyng; and where, as this essen(z) of the being, machination “impels the full unleashing of all of the forces that are capable of power and of transforming power into the overpowering itself of power”. These (metaphysical) characterizations (among others) are comprised of “the *dynamic*”, “the *total*”, the *imperial*”, “the *rational*”, and “the *planetary*”. Regarding the latter, Heidegger writes [G18]:

One points to the “*planetary*” and wants to say of the empowerings of power that not only are they on each occasion inherently “total” (in relation to a country, a people), but they set their limits only at the borders of the inhabited globe and its surrounding spheres of disposal (the atmosphere and stratosphere), which cannot but say all at once that the planet in respect of the whole is brought into “operation” or put to “use” as power-formation [Machtgebilde] and therefore that the discovery of a planetary opponent will be indispensable.

To paraphrase and translate what Heidegger will go on to say [G18f] with respect to all of the abovenamed (among other) metaphysical characterizations of the essen(z) of power in the neoteric epoch of occidental beyng: they will never suffice to discern, because they do not discern in a manner beholden to its essen(z), machination as such. That discernment would mean having to conceive of the latter in a beyng-historic manner as a form of the dominion [Herrschaftsform] of beyng as refusing itself and its ungrounded truth; for, Heidegger writes further [G19]: “such a conceiving fulfills its purpose only in a deciding [einem Entscheiden] through which the machination as such on the one side and therewith per (es)se in its veiled essen(z) first comes to a halt”. cf. *Mindfulness*, pp. 12ff.



Why do we say “wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [Besinnungslosigkeit]”? Nowhere in any of these “relation(ship)s” [or “comportments”: “Verhältnissen”] to philosophy does there prevail an *appraisal* unto the *essenz(ing)* of philosophy [eine *Besinnung* auf ihr *Wesen*] *in such a manner* that the like of *what* philosophy has to think would be *put into question* and taken on in its *whole* question-worthiness without prop and cover, without evasion, however with the *singular* willingness to encounter that *own necessity* of philosophy which hails from the singularity of its *essenz(ing)*. If such appraisal were at work, then none of the “philosophical literature” that has disseminated itself far and wide for decades now would have been allowed to proliferate.

Such appraisal is only possible as *critical-engagement* with *history (proper)* [*Geschichte*], the very *history (proper)* in which philosophy alone “*is*”. We must therefore learn to know more and more clearly what such *dis(cerning)-engagement* means (now more than ever in contrast to ordinary historical [historischen] refutation). Indeed, to know of the *critical-engagement* — and knowing this is surely an [G75] essential prerequisite for the full accomplishment thereof— that it does not “refute” and cannot be bent on refuting.

And so, for the purposes of this [essay](#), and while leaving all indulgence in ordinary historical refutation to its own devices, our thinkerly appraisal of the *essenz(ing)* of philosophy unto itself and its “time” must know and critically-engage with the *whole* question-worthiness of any present-day assertion (or indeed attempt to rebut the assertion) that according to Martin Heidegger 1) our neoteric age is one comprised of a planetary “lack of mindfulness [Mangel an Besinnlichkeit ?]”, being Emad and Kalary’s question-worthy English rendition of his word *Besinnungslosigkeit* [wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal]; and 2) since philosophy in our age of modernity is by no means exempt therefrom, it too needs to get its act together on ‘the mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit ?]’ score. How so? Presumably, as the English title *Mindfulness* for Martin Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) might suggest, by ‘having in mind [Vorhaben]’ some sort of ‘plan’ or ‘project’ to try to introduce the relatively newfangled word and concept of *mindfulness* in the modern Western context to modern Western philosophy itself so that it too may learn to take hold of its own mindfulness (or purported lack thereof) and become more abundantly mindful of itself than it has been thus far and ‘historically’ *is*.

But what if, in the age of the planetary wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [Besinnungslosigkeit], philosophy’s *mindfulness* of itself, pace Emad and Kalary’s rendition of “Heidegger’s word” *Besinnung* as ( = ) *Besinnlichkeit*, were in no way essential to *the appraisal* of philosophy unto itself [*die Besinnung der Philosophie auf sich selbst*] in Heidegger’s *Appraisal* [*Besinnung*] (GA66)? What if philosophy (as metaphysics ?) intertwining entirely with its sway / ownmost [Schwei / Eigenste ?] out of a “foundational mindfulness [(aus einer) “grundlegende Besinnlichkeit” ?]” were on another (beyng-historic) plane



altogether to philosophy engulfing itself purely in its essenizing [Wesung] whence of the “appraisal of the essen(zing)” [aus der “Wesensbesinnung”]?

In the event, and without trying to refute Emad and Kalary’s claim — by virtue of their English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnungslosigkeit* — that it is “lack of mindfulness [Mangel an Besinnlichkeit ?]” rather than “wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [*Besinnungslosigkeit*] that Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) deplores as characteristic of philosophy as metaphysics in the age of modernity, we might be able to appreciate our thinkerly appraisal of philosophy unto the mindfulness as such of itself and its “time” and, all at once, in its *inceptual* self-appraisal as (properly) historic dis(cerning)-, or critical-engagement with the *whole* question-worthying of its ‘absent-minding’ history proper (as meta-physics) for what it *essentially is*: an intimation of the essen(zing) of the beyng-historic essen(zing) of our neoteric age through which mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit] as such on the one side, and therewith per (es)se in the veiled essen(zing) of its wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [Besinnungslosigkeit], first illumines itself in its hidden forgetfulness [Vergesslichkeit] as such guided by none other than the *own necessity* of philosophy that hails from its appraisively-appreciative essen(zing) as essential (beyng-historic) thinking.

What is truly at stake in how we learn to know and to think the essen(zing) of beyng in the occident by way of thinkerly appraisal [denkerische Besinnung] is neither “mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit]” nor “lack of mindfulness [Mangel an Besinnlichkeit]” at all, at least not in terms of our most suitable English rendition of Heidegger’s words *Besinnung* and *Besinnungslosigkeit*. “Philosophy in mindfulness of itself [Philosophie in der Besinnlichkeit auf sich selbst]” ≠ “Philosophy in the appraisal unto itself [Philosophie in der Besinnung auf sich selbst]” because, unlike the latter, the former will never suffice to discern in a manner beholden to the *whole* question-worthying of its essen(zing), *mindfulness* as such. In appreciative after-thinking after Heidegger,<sup>154</sup> that discernment through the appraisal of philosophy unto itself would mean having to critically engage with and disengage from (the forgetfulness of) its own (absent-minding) mindfulness of itself in a beyng-historic manner as a form of the dominion of beyng as refusing itself in the veiled essenizing of its ungrounded truth.

That the wont(edness) of mindfulness is so used to being in want(edness) of and oblivion to appraisal? — is this not yet another hint, perchance, of the epochal destiny(ing) of our neoteric age that behoves essential thinking? For it would

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154 See previous footnote in connection with “machination” *Besinnung* (GA66), G18f.

seem that even a time of plenty in philosophy's mindfulness of itself can quite happily accustom it to a dearth of appraisal unto itself.

*Third*, as previously cited [GA66, 49f]:

Die Besinnung der Philosophie auf sich selbst gehört zu ihr, weil sie von dem gefordert ist, was die Philosophie als wesentliches Denken zu denken hat – vom Sein. ... Die Besinnung der Philosophie auf sich selbst gehört zum Denken des Seins.

The appraisal of philosophy unto itself belongs to philosophy because appraisal is required by that which philosophy, as essential thinking, has to think – by being. ... The appraisal of philosophy unto itself belongs to the thinking of being.

Here is Emad and Kalary's alternate translation of this German extract, including their iteration of "Die Besinnung der Philosophie auf sich selbst [The appraisal of philosophy unto itself]" as (=) "Philosophy's mindfulness of itself [Die Besinnlichkeit der Philosophie auf sich selbst?]" and of "wesentliches Denken [essential thinking]" as (=) "foundational thinking [grundlegendes Denken?]", [ibid. p. 41]:

Philosophy's mindfulness of itself belongs to philosophy because mindfulness is demanded by that which philosophy, as foundational thinking, has to think: by being. ... Philosophy's mindfulness of itself belongs to the thinking of being.

*Fourth* [GA66, G53]:

Das Denken des Seyns aber besinnt sich auf sich selbst, indem es Jenes in seiner Wahrheit er-denkt, dem es zugehört, weil es von ihm als *Er-eignis* er-eignet ist.

The thinking of beyng however appraises itself unto itself while it en(liveningly)-thinks that in its truth to which it appertains because it is thereof as *en-proprietation* en-propriated.

Emad & Kalary's alternate English rendition of this extract, including their iteration of Heidegger's word "Seyn [beyng]" (rather than his word *Seiend* [be-ing]) with "be-ing"; their interpretation of his phrase "besinnt sich auf sich selbst [appraises itself unto itself]" as (=) "is mindful of itself [ist besinnlich auf sich selbst?]" and their distinctive expounding of his expression, "von ihm als *Er-eignis* er-eignet ist [is thereof as *en-proprietation* en-propriated]" with "is enowned by that which is *en-owning*", is as follows [ibid. p. 43]:

But thinking of be-ing is mindful of itself since this thinking en-thinks that in its truth to which this thinking belongs because this thinking is en-owned by that which is *en-owning*.

*Fifth* [GA66, G53]:

Als Besinnung auf sich selbst *als* Denken *des* Seyns fängt dieses Denken an. Und dergestalt fängt die Philosophie mit sich selbst und so fängt sie selbst an: *ist* sie

Anfang. Aber ein anderer als der erste, der erstmals das Sein erdachte und es φύσις nannte.

As appraisal unto itself *as* thinking *of* beyng, this thinking incepts. And thus philosophy incepts to begin with itself and thus it incepts to begin itself: (this) philosophy *is* inception. But an other than the first inception that for the first time en(liveningly)-thought being and named it φύσις.

Compare Emad and Kalary's alternate English rendition of this German excerpt, including their reiteration of "Besinnung [appraisal]" as (=) "Besinnlichkeit [mindfulness]" and of "Seyn [beyng]" as "be-ing [Seiend]"; and their reading of "Anfang [inception]" as (=) "Beginn [beginning]" and of "anfangen [to incept / to incept to begin]" as (=) "beginnen [to begin]" [ibid. p.44]:

As mindfulness of itself, this thinking begins *as* thinking *of* be-ing. And in this manner philosophy begins with itself and thus it begins itself: philosophy *is* beginning. But philosophy is now a beginning that is other than the first beginning which for the first time en-thought being and called it φύσις.

*Sixth*, with regard to Emad and Kalary's *incongruous* English rendition of "Heidegger's word" *Wesensbesinnung* [appraisal of the essenizing] as "foundational mindfulness [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]", considered earlier in this [essay](#) in connection with the task of 'translating Heidegger translating *Wesen*', this interpretation can now be revisited in connection with that of 'translating Heidegger translating *Besinnung*' by asking: Why render *Wesensbesinnung* [appraisal of the essen(ing)] "foundational mindfulness [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]" in the first place, and *not*, per the syntax of the German original *and* on Emad and Kalary's own terms (or rather: not altogether tangentially thereto), say, "mindfulness of the foundation [Besinnlichkeit der Grundlegung ?]"? And what's wrong with "mindfulness of the sway / holding sway [Besinnlichkeit des Schweiens / Waltens ?]" or "mindfulness of the ownmost [Besinnlichkeit des Eigensten ?]" therefor?

Emad and Kalary's trusted conversional adjective "foundational" in their term "foundational mindfulness" for the verbal noun *Wesens-* in Heidegger's deverbal noun *Wesensbesinnung* has already been addressed as a prime example of their frequent yet latent conversion of the German word *Wesen*[s-] in compounds to an adjectival form in English that is not just consistent with but identical to their 'unassuming' translation of both *wesentlich* and *wesenhaft* with "foundational(ly) [grundlegend ?]"; or, alternatively, with "fundamental(ly) [fundamental, grundsätzlich ?]".

In the same vein, therefore, instead of their chosen term "foundational mindfulness [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]", could not Emad and Kalary just as easily replace their word "foundational" for the *Wesen*[s-] in Heidegger's

word *Wesensbesinnung* with their alternatively well-trusted conversional adjective “fundamental [fundamentale ? grundsätzliche ?]” in order to render the compound German word *Wesensbesinnung* “fundamental mindfulness [fundamentale / grundsätzliche Besinnlichkeit ?]”? Alternately, what’s wrong with substituting the adjective “swaying [schweibende ?]” in the term “swaying mindfulness [schweibende Besinnlichkeit ?]” or the adjective “ownmost [eigenste ?]” in the term “ownmost mindfulness [eigenste Besinnlichkeit ?]” therefor?

What is remarkable, even mind-boggling, is the unbecoming variance, i.e. discrepancy, of dis-associating ex-positions of *Wesen*, *wesen*, and *wesentliche* that are brought to bear *en masse* by Emad and Kalary on the sole passage where a suitable English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Wesensbesinnung* is required, because, nota bene, this German keyword appears (if I am not mistaken) only once in the entire discourse of Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) by comparison with the equally-essential, albeit far more prevalent, alternative turn of phrase *Besinnung auf das Wesen* [appraisal unto / of the *essenz*(ing)] (or the like).

The said passage is one where the thinker Heidegger essentially engages in a manner befitting a thinker (on his terms) with the appreciable meaning and true sense of the time-honoured naming of ‘the word *philosophy* [*Philosophie*] itself’ as “the love of wisdom [die Liebe zur Weisheit]”. As becomes its *essenz*(ing) thus, on Heidegger’s interpretation, that is to say, while thinking “whence of the appraisal of the *essenz*(ing) [aus der *Wesensbesinnung*]”, the “love” associated with the philosophy named: “love of wisdom [Liebe zur Weisheit]”, *essenzen* — in the while of the inceptive self-appraisal [*Selbstbesinnung*] that is essential to philosophy engulfing itself purely in its *essenz*(ing) — as the *worthing* / *worthing* [*Würdigung*] of what is called “wisdom [Weisheit]”. Whereby “wisdom”, for Heidegger here, “is the essential knowing, the stance-of-inabiding the truth of *beyng* [das wesentliche Wissen, die Inständigkeit in der Wahrheit des Seyns]”; and “love” is “the will to essential knowing [der Wille zum wesentlichen Wissen]” that “worthingly [*würdigend*]” lets “the beloved [das Geliebte]” *be* [*sein*], and *become* [*werden*], while finding its way to, and *essenzen* in, its own *essenz*(ing). Wherefore, “the *worthing*” of “wisdom” as “the loving-worthy [das Liebens-würdige]” involves, on this interpretation, “a singular preferential-love [*Vor-liebe*]” of *beyng* whose “beloved” — “that *beyng* “be” ” in the *essenzen* of its truth and its grounding — is the one that truly matters to *this* love of wisdom. That is to say, to *this* love of wisdom as philosophy in the appraisal unto itself and in the *dis*(cerning)-, or critical-engagement with its history proper (as meta-physics) in what Heidegger

calls [GA66, G49] “the age of the planetary wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal” [GA66, G63]:

Sobald die Philosophie anfängt, das Sein nicht mehr zuvor und nur auf das Seiende zu als dessen Seiendheit zu denken, sondern in die Wahrheit des Seyns vorzufragen, verschlingt sich erst die ihr scheinbar nur anhängende Selbstbesinnung rein mit ihrem Wesen. Philosophie heißt: »Die Liebe zur Weisheit«. Denken wir diesen Namen aus der Wesensbesinnung. Verlassen wir den Vorstellungskreis des Alltags und der Gelehrsamkeit, der Kulturbesorgnis und der Glückseligkeitslehre. Dann sagt das Wort: »*Liebe*« ist der Wille, daß das Geliebte *sei*, indem es zu seinem Wesen finde und in ihm wese. Solcher Wille wünscht und fordert nicht. Würdigend läßt er erst das Liebens-würdige als das Geliebte »werden«, ohne es doch zu schaffen. Das Liebens-würdige nennt das Wort die »Weisheit«.

»*Weisheit*« ist das wesentliche Wissen, die Inständigkeit in der Wahrheit des Seyns. Jene »*Liebe*« liebt daher in einer einzigen Vor-liebe das Seyn; dies, daß das Seyn »*sei*«, ist ihr Geliebtes; ihm, das ist, seiner Wahrheit und deren Gründung, gilt der Wille zum wesentlichsten Wissen. Das Seyn aber – ist der Ab-grund.

In a tentative English translation (including a modicum of amplification in square brackets):

As soon as philosophy inceptively begins to think being no longer prior to and only untoward the being as its beingness, but rather to enquire ahead into and in purveyance of the truth of being, and not beforehand, does the self-appraisal that is seemingly only appendant to philosophy engulf itself purely in its essen<sup>z</sup>(ing). Philosophy means (and calls for): “The love of wisdom”. Let us think this naming of philosophy whence of the appraisal of the essen<sup>z</sup>(ing). Let us quit the sphere of representation that pertains to the everyday and to learnedness, to the preoccupation with culture and the doctrine of happiness. Then the word says: “*Love*” is the will that the beloved *be*, while finding its way to, and essen<sup>z</sup>ing in, its own essen<sup>z</sup>(ing). Such a will does not wish / want or demand. Worthingly it lets the loving-worthy as the beloved, first “become”, as it becomes, but not while creating or trying to create it, as it does not become. The word “wisdom” names the loving-worthy.

“*Wisdom*” is the essential knowing, the stance-of-inabiding the truth of beyng. Whence that “love” loves beyng in a singular preferential-love; this, that beyng “be”, is its beloved; beyng, that is, its truth and its grounding, is [the essen<sup>z</sup>ing of] the [loving-worthy] beloved that truly matters to the will to essential knowing. Beyng, however, is the ab(yssal)-ground [Ab-grund].<sup>155</sup>

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155 Re “Beyng, however, is the ab(yssal)-ground [Ab-grund]”, see *Besinnung* (GA66) under the heading “16. *Beyng*” where Heidegger writes [G83; cf. *Mindfulness*, p. 69]:

Beyng – nothing godly, nothing human, nothing worldly, nothing earthly – and yet all in one the in-between – beyng essen<sup>z</sup>es unexplainably, without effect, outside of power and want of power.

Uneschewable for the human being, so that the human, theirselves a being, stands [abidingly] in the open(-reveal) of the being comporting, holding to the being.



Compare, in the English of *Mindfulness* below, ‘the dissociating exposition [die dissoziierende Auslegung ?]’ of the beyng-historic interplay of keywords in the above German passage of *Besinnung* (GA66) where, to my way of thinking, the *essential* thread of appreciable meaning and the true sense of Heidegger’s word *Wesensbesinnung* in association with his exposition of each and every one of the other cognates, respectively, of *wesen*, v., of (sich) *besinnen*, v., and of *sein*, v. in the German original, is altogether lost in Emad and Kalary’s English interpretation of the passage. Especially noteworthy in regard to this disturbing *dis-connect* betwixt and between the *essential* English rendition of *essential* German words is the rendition into the English language of (1) the verbal noun *Wesen* [essenz(ing)] as, variously, “sway [Schwei(en) ?]”, “ownmost [Eigenste ?]”, and “foundational [grundlegende ?]”; (2) the time word *wesen* [to essence / essenz] as “to sway [schweien ?]” in conjunction with “unto its ownmost” for *zu seinem Wesen* [to its own essenz(ing)]; (3) reading *wesentliche* [essential] and *Wesens-* [essenz(ing)-] alike as “foundational [grundlegende ?]”: (a) the adjective *wesentliche* [essential] as “foundational” in conjunction with rendering the verbal noun *Wissen* [knowing]” as “knowing-awareness” so that the phrase *das wesentliche Wissen* [the essential knowing] becomes “foundational knowing-awareness” [(die) wissende-Bewußtheit als grundlegende ?]; (b) the deverbal noun *Wesensbesinnung* [appraisal of the essenz(ing)] as “foundational mindfulness [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]”; and (4) the deverbal noun *Selbstbesinnung* [self-appraisal] in the nominally-partial, ‘(de)verbally oblivious’ sense of “self-mindfulness [Selbst-besinnlichkeit ?]” [ibid. p.52]:

No sooner does philosophy cease to think being in advance in the direction of beings and as their beingness, and instead inquires ahead into the truth of be-ing, than its self-mindfulness – seemingly only an *addendum* to philosophy – intertwines entirely with philosophy’s ownmost. Philosophy means “love of wisdom”. Let us think this word out of a foundational mindfulness by relinquishing the representational domains of everyday life, erudition, cultural concerns and doctrines of happiness.

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Beyng is never explainable whence of the being because the essenizing of beyng points to the ab(ysmal)-ground [das Abgründige] that refuses any appeal to the being (one and all) while the ab(yssal)-ground [Ab-grund] distresses singularly into beyng. Therefore the grounding of the truth of beyng belongs not to the extant and “living” human (being) but to *t/here-being* [Da-sein], to the stance-of-inabiding [zur Inständigkeit] in which human being [Menschsein] must at times transform itself.

Beyng is never at first and only thinkable *untoward* the being [auf das Seiende *zu* denkbar], even though the being initially and invariably lays claim to such.

That may well be the reason for the incipient push-to-the-fore and pre-eminence of the *presenizing* [Anwesenung] and of the “present [“Gegenwart”] and of the bestance [Beständigkeit], the very push-to-the-fore in which beyng (as enpropriation) will still refuse itself for a long while to come.



Then the word says: “love” is the will that wills the beloved *be*; the will that wills that the beloved finds its way unto its ownmost and sways therein. Such a will does not wish and demand anything. Through honoring, and not by trying to create the loved one, this will lets above all the loved one – what is worthy of loving – “become”. The word ‘love’ calls what is worthy to be loved “wisdom”.

“Wisdom” is foundational knowing-awareness; is inabiding the truth of be-ing. Hence that “love” loves be-ing in a unique ‘fore-loving’, [*Vor-liebe*]. This: that be-ing “be” is this love’s beloved. What matters to this beloved, to its truth and its grounding, is the will to foundational knowing-awareness. Be-ing, however, is the ab-ground.

What is Heidegger getting at in the broader context of his *Besinnung* [Appraisal] (GA66) when he speaks of the “philosophy” that once and for (first of) all inceptively “engulfs itself purely in its *essenz(ing)*” as “the love of wisdom”; and when he prevails upon us, accordingly, to let ourselves think this naming of philosophy “whence of the appraisal of the *essenz(ing)* [aus der *Wesensbesinnung*]”?

Is he perchance harking back to what he spoke of earlier [GA66, G49] and commending to us an inceptual re-thinking of *Besinnung* [appraisal] itself as *Wesensbesinnung* [appraisal of the *essenz(ing)*] and of *Besinnungslosigkeit* [wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal] itself as *Wesensbesinnungslosigkeit* [wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal of the *essenz(ing)*]?

[By the way, in this light we could slightly rephrase what Heidegger earlier anticipated of *Besinnung* (GA66) in a nutshell:

*Philosophy*: This singular grappling with the imageless word “of” beyng – in the age of debility of purpose and reluctance to mind the essential word.

*Appraisal of the *essenz(ing)**: in the age of the planetary wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal of the *essenz(ing)*.

I. Philosophy, as essential thinking, in the appraisal of the *essenz(ing)* unto itself.

II. Philosophy, as essential thinking, in the dis(cerning)–, or critical–engagement with its history proper (as meta-physics).<sup>b</sup>

*Both are one*: history proper of beyng, grounding appertenance thereto.]

When considering whether or not “the word *mindfulness* itself” (and cognates) is to be regarded as a *suitable* English rendition of ‘the (appreciable) meaning [der Sinn]’, i.e. the true (sense) [das Wahre] (ἀληθές), of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” (and cognates) in these selected passages, we must surely learn to appreciate what the thinker himself will likely have our thinkerly saying and thinking and translating [unser denkerisches Sagen und Denken und Übersetzen] bearing ‘mindfully in mind [besinnlich im Sinn]’ while engulfing itself purely in the *essenz(ing)* of its *inceptual* self-appraisal [*anfänglichen Selbstbesinnung*] and

finding its way to, and essenizing in, its own essen<sup>z</sup>(ing)<sup>156</sup> as an appraisively-appreciative apprising of beyng [besinnend-sinnendes Ersinnen des Seyns] in a manner befitting a thinker [denkerisch].

And, as we shall delve below in respect of Heidegger's *Heraklit* (GA55), this is likely to be true elsewhere in his thought as well as in *Besinnung* (GA66) where, as outlined above, Heidegger's appreciation for [Sinn für] what is essentially true to the inception of beyng-historic thinking itself as *Besinnung* [appraisal] — in his inceptively *deverbal* sense of the word — archessentially lays itself out for the interpretation befitting a thinker as inceptual occidental thinking (philosophy) “in the appraisal unto itself [ $\neq$  in mindfulness of itself]” and, all at once, “in the dis(cerning)—, or critical—engagement with [ $\neq$  in the dissociating exposition of] its history proper (as meta-physics)”.

Meanwhile, and now for something completely different ...

In an altogether different context and from an entirely different perspective, a google search of our English word *mindfulness* brings up a current Wikipedia entry on “mindfulness in the modern Western context” that offers little *philosophic* insight into the “thinkerly appraisal [denkerische Besinnung]” and “inceptual self-appraisal [*anfängliche* Selbstbesinnung]” and (in all of that) “appraisal of the essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) [Wesensbesinnung]” expounded by Heidegger in *Besinnung* (GA66) and that Emad and Kalary alternately call, respectively: “thinking mindfulness [denkende Besinnlichkeit ?]” and “inceptual self-mindfulness [*anfängliche* Selbstbesinnlichkeit ?]” and (in all of that ?) “foundational mindfulness [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?]”.

To define and explain what presently constitutes “mindfulness” or rather “mindfulness practice” *psychologically* as the modern Western *state of mind(fulness)* and “the psychological process” it has become “through the practice of meditation and other training”, the June 2020 Wikipedia article on “Mindfulness” finds it useful to rely upon a conceptual apparatus and interpretation derived from Buddhist traditions and the developing scholarship within empirical psychology, notably clinical psychology and psychiatry, chiefly since the 1970s.

Apart from the defining influence of “Buddhist insight meditation and its application in clinical psychology” to describe — in the evolving terminology also used “by scholars of religion, scientists, journalists, and popular media

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156  $\neq$  ‘... our thoughtful saying and thinking and translating ... while intertwining entirely with the ownmost of its *inceptual* self-mindfulness as it finds its way unto its ownmost and sways therein ...’, or the like.

writers” — “the movement of mindfulness “popularization” ” that is taking full hold of minds and hearts in the West, the article points to the growing popularity that psycho-therapeutic (healing-of-the-mind) mindfulness is enjoying as “a practice in daily life” and indeed “a mode of being” that can be practised “outside a formal setting” in “the many new contexts of mindfulness practice which have cropped up”, especially over the past two decades. We could probably add to the crop of new contexts mentioned in the article the increasing penetration (and intervention) of newfangled mindfulness theory and practice into the staid ‘academy’ and ‘discipline’ of philosophy itself in the form of daring scholarly endeavours toward a more palatable or pleasing (to the mind) ‘philosophy of mindfulness’. However the idea that, under the title of its authorised English translation *Mindfulness*, Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) might fall into (and prey to) this category of philosophy as a pioneering example of philosophy’s “self-mindfulness” (Emad and Kalary), or indeed ad infinitum (through the remnants of our neoteric age of reflection) of ‘a philosophy of mindfulness’ mindfulness of itself, is essentially question-worthy.

The following extracts (excluding actual hyperlinks and reference numbers to notes) drawn from the mid-2020 Wikipedia entry on “Mindfulness”<sup>157</sup> also suggest, perhaps unwittingly, almost as an insignificant blip on the radar, that mindfulness is gaining increasing popularity, as a *metaphysical* mode of being *and* time. That is to say, a yet-to-be-appreciated — an unthought-through in a manner befitting a thinker — mode of the epochal going-together of being and time where “being” as beingness = “presence” and ‘bestance (of the presenzing)’ is inconspicuously given and taken for granted in “mindfulness practice” and “meditation” from the horizon of “time” in the prevailing “present (moment)” or ‘now-time’ as ‘presentness’; ‘making present(ness)’; and so too: ‘letting–(the-)presence(-of-the-present-moment)–be’.

**Mindfulness** is the psychological process of purposely bringing one’s attention to experiences occurring in the present moment without judgment, which one develops through the practice of **meditation** and through other **training**. Mindfulness derives from *sati*, a significant element of **Buddhist** traditions, and based on **Zen**, *Vipassanā*, and Tibetan meditation techniques. Though definitions and techniques of mindfulness are wide-ranging, Buddhist traditions explain what constitutes mindfulness such as how past, present and future moments arise and cease as momentary sense impressions and mental phenomena. Individuals who have contributed to the popularity of mindfulness in the modern **Western** context include **Thích Nhất Hạnh** (1926– ), **Herbert Benson** (1935– ), **Jon Kabat-Zinn** (1944– ), and **Richard J. Davidson** (1951– ).

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<sup>157</sup> “Mindfulness – Wikipedia” accessed on 25 June 2020 at [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mindfulness#cite\\_note-Baer-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mindfulness#cite_note-Baer-3).

Clinical psychology and psychiatry since the 1970s have developed a number of therapeutic applications based on mindfulness for helping people experiencing a variety of psychological conditions. Mindfulness practice has been employed to reduce depression, to reduce stress, anxiety, and in the treatment of drug addiction. Programs based on mindfulness models have been adopted within schools, prisons, hospitals, veterans' centers, and other environments, and mindfulness programs have been applied for additional outcomes such as for healthy aging, weight management, athletic performance, helping children with special needs, and as an intervention during the perinatal period.

...

Mindfulness is gaining a growing popularity as a practice in daily life, apart from Buddhist insight meditation and its application in clinical psychology. In this context mindfulness is defined as moment-by-moment awareness of thoughts, feelings, bodily sensations, and surrounding environment, characterized mainly by "acceptance" – attention to thoughts and feelings without judging whether they are right or wrong. Mindfulness focuses the human brain on what is being sensed at each moment, instead of on its normal rumination on the past or the future. *Mindfulness* may be seen as a mode of being, and can be practiced [sic] outside a formal setting. The terminology used by scholars of religion, scientists, journalists, and popular media writers to describe this movement of mindfulness "popularization," and the many new contexts of mindfulness practice which have cropped up, has regularly evolved over the past 20 years, with some<sup>[which?]</sup> criticisms arising.

From the *ordinary historical* perspective of the λόγος of the ψυχή outlined in this Wikipedia entry, it would seem that in the 'presence of mind(fulness)' that pertains to the "psychological process" of "mindfulness practice" and "meditation", *mindfulness* is indeed gaining traction and increasing popularity in the hearts and minds of the West as a *psycho-logical (logic-of-the-mind-or-psyche)* "mode of being" where, from the perspective of a (*properly*) *historic* thinking-through of its history (proper), "being" is inconspicuously given and taken for granted without question in the *metaphysical* sense of beingness as (=) "presence" and 'bestance of the presencing' from the horizon of "time" in the prevailing "present (moment)" or 'now time' as (=) present(ness) and making present(ness), and letting-be-present(ness).

What would Heidegger have to say *philosophically*, in an *other-than-metaphysical* sense, concerning this unquestioned and yet most question-worthy understanding of the going-together of being and time in the 'state of mind(fulness)' and 'presence of mind(fulness)' called, in short, "mindfulness"?

In his lecture *Time and Being* (GA14), Heidegger embarks upon a venture to say and to think the hitherto unsaid and unthought belonging-together of time proper

and being proper as the gift of what is laid out for the interpretation through a thinkerly appraisal of how, in respect of that which is properly (i.e. enpropriatingly) historic, the enpropriation enpropriates [das Ereignis ereignet] the indicant going-together of being and time in the inceptual saying [GA14, G9]: “There is, It gives, being and there is, it gives, time.” [“Es gibt Sein und es gibt Zeit.”]. It is a matter of thinking pursuant to the interplay of being and time each according to their own proper [Eigenes], their appropriation [Eignis], in that properly historic conjunctural arrangement of the enpropriation of being and time, where, in *essenz(ing)*, being means: *presenz(ing)*, letting-(be-)*presenz(ing)*: *presenz* / *presence* [Anwesen, Anwesen-lassen: Anwesenheit]; and where being as *presence* [Anwesenheit], (the) present or (the) being present, [(die) Gegenwart] is characterized by a time-character and thus by time.

Indeed, like the taken-for-granted metaphysical conception of *mindfulness* expounded in the Wikipedia article as “a mode of being [and time MAH]” that “focuses the human brain [sic] on what is being sensed at each moment [of the present MAH], instead of on its normal rumination on the past or the future”, when it comes to time, we tend to characterize (the) present as the unifying one among three dimensions of time so that this one-dimension of ‘now-time’ [‘Jetzt-Zeit’] brings together present, past, and future in such a way that the past is understood (though not necessarily ruminated upon) from the prevailing present (moment), the now, as ‘the no-longer-presently / now-present’, while the future is likewise and otherwise understood (though not necessarily ruminated upon) from the prevailing present, the now, as ‘the not-yet-presently / now’ present.

And yet this characterization, among others, will not suffice to name what is truly at stake in the metaphysical representation of “being” in the sense of ‘beingness [Seiendheit]’ as ‘presence [Anwesenheit]’ and ‘bestance of the *presenz(ing)* [Beständigkeit des Anwesens]’ from the horizon of “time” as ‘presentness’ and ‘bestance of the rendering present(ness)’. For example in the Wikipedia article on “Mindfulness”.

In his appraisal of the historic belonging-together of (the sending of) being and (the reaching of) time, Heidegger will return to the unity of the giving (of the ‘It gives’) that is at play in the reaching (or extending or offering) of *presenz(ing)* in the present [in der Gegenwart], in the having been [in *essenz(ing)*: im Gewesen], in the future [in der Zukunft], and that we must call “time”, as nothing temporal [GA14, G18]: “For time itself is nothing temporal [nichts Zeitliches], just as little as it is somewhat (something) be-ing [etwas Seiendes]”. Nor can what we properly mean by the word “time” refer any longer to “the succession of the now-sequence” (nor indeed, per *Being and Time*, “even the ekstatic temporality



of Da-sein”): “Accordingly, time-space [Zeit-Raum] no longer means the distance between two now-points of the calculated time that we mean when we ascertain for instance: this and that occurred within the time-span of 50 years.”

In Heidegger’s thinkerly appraisal, the time-space that names the open(-reveal) that lights and clears itself giving free play-room (play-space) to its own *essenz(ing)* in the reciprocal reaching (or extending or offering) [Einander-sich-reichen] of advent [Ankunft], having-beenness [Gewesenheit], and present [Gegenwart] is the one that is properly at play in the epochal destiny(ng) of being [im epochalen Geschick des Seins] as *presenz(ing)* — including the *presenz(ing)* of *absenz(ing)* — from the horizon of what is proper to time. And, Heidegger points out in his lecture [GA14, G19f]:

The *presenz(ing)* at play in time proper cannot be identified with just one of the three dimensions of time, that is to say, what seems obvious, the present. Instead, the unity of the three time-dimensions resides in the interplay of any one in favour of any other [Zuspiel jeder für jede]. This [20] interplay turns out to be the reaching that is properly at play in what is proper to time, and that means, so to speak, as the fourth dimension — not just so to speak, but from the matter itself.

Time proper is four-dimensional.

However what we call the fourth in the count is, so far as the matter is concerned, the first, that is, the all-determinative reaching (or extending or offering). The latter brings about in the advent [in der Ankunft], in the having been [in *essenz(ing)*: im Gewesen], in the present [in der Gegenwart], the *presenz(ing)* that extends to each in its own while, keeps them openly-and-clear(ing)ly apart, one among another, and so keeps them in the near to each other, from which the three dimensions remain neared to one another. That is why we call the first, incipient, in the word-for-word sense in-ceptive [an-fangende]<sup>[(4)]</sup> reaching, wherein rests the unity of time proper, the nearing near, “nearness” — an early word still used by Kant. But it nears the advent, having-beenness, present to one another while it distances. For it keeps the having been [in *essenz(ing)*: das Gewesen] open while it refuses its advent as present. This nearing [Nähern]<sup>[(5)]</sup> of the near keeps the arriving [Ankommen] to come from the future open while it withholds the present in the coming. The nearing near has the character of refusal and of withholding [der Verweigerung und des Vorenthalts].<sup>[(6)]</sup> It holds good in advance the ways of the reaching of having-beenness, advent, and present to one another in their unity.

<sup>[(4)]</sup> Brauchen [using, behaving]

<sup>[(5)]</sup> die Nahnis [the near-approximation? — but seemingly untranslatable insofar as Heidegger is alluding here, with the ‘-nis’ of ‘Nah-nis’, to the ‘-nis’ of ‘Ereig-nis’ and analogously, with our English rendition of “Nah-nis [near-approxim-ation]” to that of “Ereig-nis”, i.e., if at all possible, to the ‘-ation’ suffix of ‘enpropri-ation’]

<sup>[(6)]</sup> gebraucht in die *Gelassenheit* ≠ *wartende* (nicht hoffende) Abgeschiedenheit [used / behoven in the *letting-be(ing)ness*) ≠ *(a)waiting / expectant* (not hoping) separateness]



In the mindfulness [*Besinnlichkeit* ?] conceived *psychologically* through the *given and taken for granted without question* epochal destiny(ng) of a ‘metaphysics of presence’ — to be “the psychological process of purposely bringing one’s attention to experiences occurring in the present moment without judgment”, one that is yet to be diligently appreciated and appraised and apprised of in the manner befitting a thinker as a time-honoured *metaphysical re-presentation* of a beyng-historic mode of occidental human being *and* time, “the human brain [sic !]”, in its presence of mind(fulness), apparently focuses on “what is being sensed at each moment” of ‘the here and now’ [‘das Hier und Jetzt’] of the present [der Gegenwart] “instead of its normal rumination” on ‘the no longer here and now (present)’ of the past [der Vergangenheit] and ‘the not yet here and now (present)’ of the future [der Zukunft]. That is to say, on a mode of the belonging-together of being and time where, *in absent-minded want of and oblivion to* “thinkerly appraisal” ( $\neq$  “thinking mindfulness”<sup>158</sup>), “being” as (=) beingness [Seiendheit] and presence [Anwesenheit] and bestance (of the presenzing) [Beständigkeit (der Anwesenung)] is taken for granted in “mindfulness practice” and “meditation” from the limited horizon of only one dimension of three-(to-four-)dimensional beyng-historic “time” and “the temporalization of time” [“die Zeitigung der Zeit”] in the respectively en-propriating time-space [im jeweilig er-eignenden Zeit-raum] of its essenz(ing) [Wesen(heit)], to wit, presentness [Gegenwärtigkeit] and making or rendering present [Gegenwärtigung] presently, in the present (moment) [gegenwärtig, in der Gegenwart].

So what are we to make of Emad and Kalary’s reliance upon the increasingly popular and ‘psycho-logically’ popularised word *mindfulness* [*Besinnlichkeit* ?] itself for Martin Heidegger’s word *Besinnung* [*appraisal*] in the title as well as throughout their English translation of his *Besinnung* (GA66)?

After all, it would appear from our considerations thus far, that the thinkerly appraisal of philosophy unto itself and its “time” in the dis(cerning)-, or critical-engagement with its occidental history proper (as meta-physics) inkled by Heidegger in *Besinnung* (GA66), as outlined above, bears little if any resemblance to anything contained in the Wikipedia entry on “mindfulness in the modern Western context”, be it seen as “a mode of being” that can be practised inside a formal setting or outside, the latter, potentially, on a daily psycho-therapeutic basis as a sought-after ‘self-mindfulness practice’ focusing, through meditation and other training of the mind / soul /

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158 pace Emad and Kalary’s English translation of Heidegger’s phrase *denkerische Besinnung* as *denkende Besinnlichkeit*.

spirit / animation / breath (ψυχή) on the mental in tune with the physical (e.g. “the human brain” ?); or indeed otherwise *psycho-logically*.

The same contrast can be drawn between this psychological conception of “mindfulness in the modern Western context” and Heidegger’s thinkerly appraisal of “‘the (appreciable) meaning [‘der Sinn’], i.e. the true (sense) [das Wahre]” (ἀληθές), of *Besinnung* in *Heraklit* (GA55), to be outlined below, where *appraisal* itself is inked by Heidegger as a (philosophic) mode of occidental human being in the sense of an appraisively-appreciative [besinnend-sinnenden] thinking *of* being, respectively beyng, whose cast of mind or temperament [Gemut] is such as to attemper itself to the human λόγος attempered to the Λόγος of being, a thinking proper, as befits an appreciative thinker, that may one day be granted a human being.

Anyone who reads the Wikipedia entry or other such internet offerings or publications on *Mindfulness* and then turns for *philosophic* inspiration of *that* ilk to *this* English title of Martin Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66), imagining that it, too, might be on topic as a philosophy dedicated to mindfulness, ‘a philosophy of *mindfulness*’, as it were, will soon be disappointed. To someone looking to Heidegger’s philosophy, and in particular to *Mindfulness* (2006), being the solely licensed English translation of his *Besinnung* [*Appraisal*] (GA66), not so much for the guiding advice of *t/his* German original on their ownmost essen<sup>z</sup>(ing) as a thinking human being through “the love of wisdom” in Heidegger’s sense of an essential knowing that worthingly lets beyng be in the essen<sup>z</sup>ing of its truth and its grounding, but rather: for further psycho-logical training of the human mind in “thinking mindfulness” [denkende Besinnlichkeit ?] and “*inceptual* self-mindfulness” [anfängliche Selbstbesinnlichkeit ?] and “foundational mindfulness” [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?] of *that* same ilk, the disappointment may well be experienced as *unfathomably* un-psycho-therapeutic, un-healing-to-the-mind, so to speak.

*Unfathomably*, because, in *that* same ilk, a Heideggerean ‘philosophy of *Mindfulness*’ may well be sought-after as a means to an end by mindfulness practitioners and theoreticians alike, for example, in the pursuit of happiness or at least an even more mindful less exoteric (less ‘popular, untechnical, ordinary’) ‘love of wisdom’ that promises to bring the esoteric teachings including the science (psychology) of mindfulness to (disciplined ? adept ?) philosophic life. Perhaps there will be an expectation (to disappoint) that, since the late Martin Heidegger, as an erstwhile university ‘professor of philosophy’, was undoubtedly daring to work within the faculty and discipline of philosophy itself to move the traditional practice and theory of mindfulness in the West from the sphere of (the social science of) psychology into philosophy, his (supposed) ‘philosophy of

mindfulness’ — the ideas around philosophy’s ‘thinking mindfulness’ of itself, its ‘*inceptual* self-mindfulness’, its ‘foundational mindfulness’, and more —, all ideas that might be viewed as likely aimed at enriching the abstract discipline of contemporary philosophy with a “new”, more philosophically-mindful, mode of human being-in-the-world that, so they say, Heidegger calls by the name of *t/here-being* [*Dasein*].

And yet, with such expectation decidedly in mind, the sought-after “wisdom” that Heidegger in *Besinnung* (GA66) associates with “the thinkerly appraisal [*die denkerische Besinnung*]” of philosophy unto itself, its “*inceptual* self-appraisal [*anfängliche Selbstbesinnung*]” in the critical-engagement with its history proper (as meta-physics), and, in all of this, its “appraisal of the *essen(z)ing* [*Wesensbesinnung*]” as ‘the love of wisdom’, a self-appraisively-appreciative thinking [*ein sich-besinnend-sinnendes Denken*] that engulfs itself purely in its own *essen(z)ing* as “the essential knowing, the stance-of-inabiding the truth of *beyng*”, is unlikely to arouse much interest.

If, as suggested above, Emad and Kalary’s nominally-partial rendition of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” with *mindfulness* is unable to translate-cum-transport us directly into the essentially deverbial wording of the German word as a nouning of *besinnen*, v. in the title and throughout Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66), how will the translators seek to overcome, or at least to circumvent such a glaring discrepancy between the respective wordings of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” in the English of *Mindfulness* and in the German original? How can this uneschewable shortcoming be made good? In particular, what does the absenting of an appropriately inrooted verb for *Besinnung* as ( = ) *Besinnlichkeit* mean for Emad and Kalary’s failure to properly embrace their reliance upon an *unsuitable* English rendition of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*”?

Take, most notably, their circumventive English rendition of Heidegger’s time word (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] in light of there being only an inrooted adjective (*mindful*) to draw upon but no corresponding verb for *mindfulness*, as indeed there is none for the latter’s more *commensurate* German counterpart *Besinnlichkeit* with its inrooted adjective *besinnlich*.

For, just as the ordinary English ear would likely balk at the word *mindfulness* itself being a nouning of the fictitious verb ‘to ?\*mindful’, so the ordinary German ear would no doubt similarly balk at the word *Besinnlichkeit* itself being a nouning of the fictitious verb ‘?\*besinnlichen’. In any case, Emad and Kalary are neither required to translate a word of the latter ilk, since Heidegger has no need to coin such a word, and nor are they inclined to improvise with the former

in the vein of ‘to ?\*mindful (itself)’ [‘(sich) ?\*besinnlichen’ ?] as their English rendition of Heidegger’s word (*sich*) *besinnen*.

So, in light of their nominally-partial choice of “the word *mindfulness* itself ... as the English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*”, how can Emad and Kalary find a good English approximation to the inrooted German time word of *Besinnung*?

The improvisation and ‘work-around’ devised by Emad and Kalary in the English of *Mindfulness* to circumvent this almost insurmountable translation difficulty inherent to their interpretation of the original German of *Besinnung* (GA66)] was addressed earlier, where it was noted that the word (*sich*) *besinnen* itself is mainly brought into English with the equivalent of either “to be mindful [besinnlich sein ?]” or “to become mindful [besinnlich werden ?]”.

But this brings us to an aspect of the abovenamed seemingly uneschewable translation difficulty that is only partly of Emad and Kalary’s own making to contend with: that of arriving at a suitable English rendition of the identity and difference in Heidegger’s beyng-historic language and thinking, not just in *Besinnung* (GA66) but elsewhere in his thought, between the time words (*sich*) *besinnen* and, incipiently, *sinnen*, the latter of course being inrooted in the former German compound of *sinnen*, v., a task of translation that cannot but be a formidable one, to say the least, for any English translator. Moreover this formidable task of translation is one that necessarily carries over to the pre-eminent verbal nounings of these essential words, to *Besinnen*, n. and *Sinnen*, n., *alongside and in conjunction with* the inceptively deverbal nouning of the time word (*sich*) *be-sinnen* that is, i.e. *essenzen* as, ‘the word *Besinnung* itself’ in the texts of Martin Heidegger.

My rendering of the latter with *appraisal* and, wherever possible, of *besinnen*, v. with *appraise*, v., of *sinnen*, v. with *appreciate*, v., of *Besinnen*, n. with *appraising*, n., and of *Sinnen*, n. with *appreciating*, n., to name an essential few of the cognates and compounds of *sinnen*, v. that are, in *essenz*(ing), always already at play in the beyng-historic interplay of thinkerly appraisal, is therefore in all respects a sur-rending, a concession [ein Entgegenkommen], to a formidable translation difficulty that cannot properly (enpropriatingly) be eschewed, not in *Besinnung* (GA66) nor anywhere else in Heidegger’s thought. At best, we can be grateful for an exceptionally, albeit *imperfectly*, good approximation to an essentially distinguishing language and thinking of the same whose full sway and holding sway as an integral whole must somehow be embraced if our ‘translating of Heidegger translating *Besinnung*’ is to be not just word for word but true to the wording of the word that is, i.e. *essenzen*, and shelters-conceals its

essenz(ing), *as*, thinking *itself* [*das Denken*], the kind of thinking in a manner befitting a thinker that, in *Heraklit* (GA55), Heidegger also names — in his sense of Heraclitus' word τὸ φρονεῖν — *das sinnende Denken*, the appreciative thinking, or, in other words, *der höchste Edelmut*, the best of the noble (in) temper.<sup>159</sup>

In this light, Emad and Kalary can be thankful that Heidegger's *essential* word *sinnen* [to appreciate / to acquaint / to ponder / ...], so hard to translate into English at the best of times *as* the archessential incipient of (*sich*) *besinnen*, prolific in Heidegger's *Heraklitus* (GA55) by comparison,<sup>160</sup> is a relatively infrequent occurrence in his *Besinnung* (GA66) where there would appear to be only three instances of the word.

Therefore, if I am not mistaken, the requirement for the English translators of *Besinnung* (GA66) to rack their brains — not just mindfully [*besinnlich*] but appraisively-appreciatively [*be-sinnend*] — over a suitable English rendition of the *distinctive* beyng-historic interplay of *sinnen* and (*sich*) *besinnen* (and their verbal nounings *Sinnen* und *Besinnen*) is by no means as taxing as it might otherwise be. It is noteworthy that in two out of (only ?) three occurrences of *sinnen*, v. in Heidegger's *Besinnung* (GA66), Emad and Kalary do make a concerted effort *to translate* his distinguishment of the incipient *sinnen* of (*sich*) *besinnen* from the latter into English, with some recourse to a closely associated agnate if not a cognate of the word *mindfulness* itself to the purpose. However, far from translating-cum-transporting into English in a manner beholden to the *essenz(ing)* the latent if not always patent distinction in Heidegger's German language and thinking between (*sich*) *besinnen* and its inrooted time word *sinnen*, Emad and Kalary's English translation of this distinction, an *essential* belonging-together of those that differ as an integral whole, can hardly be said, in their own words, "to retain and reflect the integrity of the German original".

And yet in their "Translators' Foreword" to *Mindfulness*, where Emad and Kalary profess a full and frequent commitment to their English translation of Heidegger's *Besinnung* (GA66), in so many words, "retaining and reflecting the integrity of the German original",<sup>161</sup> this robust *affirmation* of cognates of our English time word *to reflect* seems to be rather at odds with their equally robust *rejection* of the deverbal noun *reflection* itself as a suitable English translation of

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159 Heidegger *Heraklit* (GA55), G373.

160 See below for discussion of a dedicated thinkerly appraisal on Heidegger's part in *Heraklit* (GA55) unto the λόγος and the λεγέιν of *Besinnung* and its incipient time words (*sich*) *besinnen* and *sinnen*.

161 See "Translators Foreword" to *Mindfulness*, pp. xvi, xvii, xviii, xxii, xxxi.



“Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*”. That is because, on Emad and Kalary’s interpretation of his critical engagement with and disengagement from the history proper of this keyword of occidental (metaphysical) thinking, *reflection* [Reflektierung, Reflexion], especially “[r]eflection on the ‘self’, which sustains all psychology and psychiatry,” belongs to “the domain of thinking that is not being-historical”; as distinct, according to this interpretation, from the “being-historical” thinking that purportedly pertains to *mindfulness*, especially “being mindful of the ‘self’”, and thus to the suitability of “the word *mindfulness* itself” as “the English rendition of Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” [ibid. p. xxiii]:

Right from its onset, be-ing-historical thinking unfolds itself as *Besinnung* [ $\neq$  *Besinnlichkeit* MAH] and not as reflection [[Reflektierung, Reflexion ? MAH] since the latter belongs to the domain of a thinking that is not being-historical. Accordingly, it is of paramount importance in translating the word *Besinnung* to hone [sic] in on the foundational difference between *reflection* and *Besinnung*.

And [ibid. p. xxiv]:

One way of grasping the distinction that Heidegger draws between *Besinnung* and reflection is to consider their bearings upon the issue called ‘self.’ Reflection on the ‘self’, which sustains all psychology and psychiatry, attends to the empirical states of the ‘self’ [of the ‘mind’ or ‘psyche’ ? MAH] in order to render these states [e.g. the state of ‘mindfulness’, i.e. ‘*Besinnlichkeit*’, ? MAH] accessible to objectification. By contrast, in *Besinnung* on the ‘self’ [*appraisal* unto [auf] the ‘self’  $\neq$  *mindfulness* “on” the ‘self’ MAH] these states are bracketed out [! MAH] and what is at stake is the grounding of the ‘self’ via ‘temporality’, ‘linguisticity’, ‘historicity’, ‘mortality’, and so forth. Heidegger alludes to the distinction between *Besinnung* on [auf ? MAH] the ‘self’, as its grounding, and reflection on [“Reflexion auf” (Heidegger) MAH] the ‘self’ by first questioning whether the ‘self’ is accessible to reflection at all and then by alluding to the necessity of grounding the ‘self’. He says:

[*Besinnung*] is ... so originary that it above all asks how the *self* is to be grounded ... Thus it is questionable whether through *reflection* on ‘ourselves’ we ever find our *self* ... (*Contributions*, xxxii)<sup>162</sup>

Here we see that while Heidegger endorses a grounding of the ‘self’ via mindfulness [? ‘*Besinnlichkeit*’]  $\neq$  “[*Besinnung*]” MAH] of the ‘self’ he questions the very possibility of accessibility of the ‘self’ to reflection.

In order to obtain in English an approximate rendition of the word *Besinnung*, we took our bearing from the distinction that Heidegger draws between reflection on the ‘self’, and being mindful of the ‘self’, and rendered the word *Besinnung* with *mindfulness*.

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<sup>162</sup> See Emad and Maly *Contributions*, ibid. xlv where in end note [20] to this passage of their Translators’ Foreword to *Contributions* Emad and Maly write: “Ibid. p. 47 Emphasis added.” Cf. Heidegger *Beiträge* (GA65), G67.



But what if right from its onset, *and before anything else*, beyng-historic thinking unfolds itself *as* “appraisal of the *essenz(ing)* [*Wesensbesinnung*]” of beyng [*des Seyns*] and an “appraisal of philosophy unto itself [*Besinnung der Philosophie auf sich selbst*]” that, in the while of “*inceptual* self-appraisal [*anfänglichen Selbstbesinnung*]”, engulfs itself purely in its *essenz(ing)* while finding its way to, and *essenzing* in, its own *essenz(ing)*, and *not*, pace Emad and Kalary, *as* “foundational mindfulness [*grundlegende Besinnlichkeit ?*]” of be-ing and “philosophy’s mindfulness [*Besinnlichkeit ?*] of itself” while intertwining entirely with the ownmost of its *inceptual* self-mindfulness [*anfänglichen Selbstbesinnlichkeit ?*] as it finds its way unto its ownmost and sways therein?

Why “*not*”? Perchance because the ‘mode of being’ and ‘state of mind’ and ‘presence [*Anwesenheit*] of mind’ named “mindfulness” belongs, ‘in essence [*in der Wesenheit*]’, to a thinking of being as beingness that, while steeped in philosophy as metaphysics, cannot accomplish the requisite leap of thought into a beyng-historic appraisal of the *essenz(ing)* [*Wesen*] whence of itself as the *essenzing* [*Wesung*] of being as beyng.

If this were so, it would, accordingly, be of paramount importance in translating the word *Besinnung*, to home in on and hone the *essential* difference in Heidegger’s beyng-historic language and thinking between *Besinnung* as *appraisal*, and *Besinnlichkeit* as *mindfulness*, since the latter is *essentially* ‘bracketed out’ by the former as ‘a mode of being(ness) and ‘a state of mind(fulness)’ in wantedness of and oblivion to philosophy’s appraisal unto its ‘self’ *as* a thinking of beyng. In this light, we might wonder whether it is true to say *only* that while Heidegger endorses a grounding of the ‘self’ via the *appraisal* [*Besinnung*] of philosophy / philosophic Da-sein unto the *essenz(ing)* of its own ‘self’, he questions (or would likely question were this even in his radar, which it is not) the very possibility of accessibility of the ‘self’ (of philosophy / philosophic t/here-being ?) *in essenz(ing)* [*im Wesen*] to *mindfulness* [*Besinnlichkeit*]. On what ground? Perhaps for the same reason that he questions the very possibility of accessibility of the ‘self’ even to mindfully self-conscious reflection *insofar as* reflection reflects (in its own way) just as mindfulness is mindful (in its own way) *in wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal* [*in der Besinnungslosigkeit*].

Here is a passage in *Besinnung* (GA66) where Heidegger suggests that it is only in appraisal as properly historic that we can truly appreciate how question-worthy was the decisive enactment of a metaphysics of “reflection” in the age of German idealism, so oblivious as philosophy in this age of reflection was, to the wont of its own reflecting on itself so as to remove itself and the horizon of its thinking upon itself (including its ‘thinking mindfulness’ of itself ?) from any possibility of

thinkerly appraisal unto the truth of being as worthwhile (en)livening-thinking [G303]:

Now the thinking-upon<sup>163</sup> of the thinking in the sense of the enquiring of the clearing in which it bestirs itself as the en(livening)-thinking of being is of course no “reflection [Reflexion]” that could be reduced to the set phrase “thinking of thinking”; for the history (proper) of metaphysics in the age of German idealism has surely enacted this “reflection” in great style so decisively that even the “reflection” was once more mirrored and taken back into the absolute concept of unconditional knowing; but then this happened in such a way that the appraisal unto [Besinnung auf] the horizon of thinking became ever more impossible, having become ever less necessary, since absolute knowing knows itself as the truth of the being in respect of the whole itself, and thus excludes any and all questionworthiness. It can be gathered from this — in appraisal as properly historic — that with the thinking of thinking, metaphysics sooner removes itself from the appraisal unto the truth of being as worthwhile en(livening)-thinking.

The question concerning the “(appreciable) meaning” of beyng [dem “Sinn” des Seyns], as the question concerning the domain of the casting-open of the en-quiring of beyng, is therefore its inaugural opening and foundation, never a matter of “reflection” on the thinking and the “I think”; rather, the more [G303] ineptual question of being calls for an out-of-bounds leap (of thought) from the human being as “subject” and that means all at once from the relationship to the “object” and from the latter itself. With a change of direction towards the “object”, “subjectivism” is not only not overcome, but is left all the more to its peace and stability.

It may not be *expressly* within Heidegger’s radar in the English of “foundational mindfulness [grundlegende Besinnlichkeit]”, but our preliminary appraisal of the essen(z)ing [Wesensbesinnung] of philosophy’s mindfulness of itself in wantedness of and oblivion to its appraisal unto itself, may well be a prerequisite for homing in on and honing the *essential* difference [den *wesentlichen* Unterschied] — *not*, pace Emad and Kalary, “the foundational difference [den grundlegenden Unterschied]” — in Heidegger’s *Besinnung* (GA66) between the diligence to care [die Sorgfalt] for the σοφία that imbues the primordial *appraisal* of philosophy unto itself [*Besinnung* der Philosophie auf sich selbst] in the while of appreciative thinking [des sinnenden Denkens] and its mindfully self-conscious *reflection* upon itself [*Reflexion* ... auf sich selbst] while inconspicuously and absent-mindedly reflecting its own wantedness of and oblivion to appraisal [Besinnungslosigkeit]. In this way, by way of thinkerly appraisal, we may learn, perchance, to home in on and hone our ‘translating of Heidegger translating *Besinnung*’ and thus the appreciable meaning and true sense of his critical engagement with and disengagement from the history proper (meta-physics) of *reflection* [Reflektierung, Reflexion].

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163 or giving-of-thought-(un)to; literally: bethinking: das Bedenken.

It is precisely because, in their “Translators’ Foreword” to *Mindfulness*, Emad and Kalary so vehemently reject the word *reflection* itself as a suitable English rendition of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*”, that their (admittedly isolate) translation of his time word *sich besinnen* [to appraise itself (“appraising itself”)], in the main body of the text, with a word-for-word English variation on the German time word *reflektieren* “to reflect” (“reflecting [Reflektieren]”) instead of their preferred rendition “to be mindful” (“being mindful [*besinnlich sein* ?]”), might seem to be counterintuitive on Emad and Kalary’s part. Their anomalous translation “reflecting” is apparently limited to Heidegger’s use of the words *sich zu besinnen* [“appraising itself”] in the following passage of *Besinnung* (GA66) [G208f]:

Und wo noch ein metaphysisches Denken des Seins versucht wird, da bleibt es außerstande, auch nur darauf noch sich zu besinnen, daß es selbst einst, in seinem Anfang, das, was es jetzt nur noch als Leere des Generellsten vorstellt, allein deshalb zu er-denken vermochte, weil das Denken seine Bestimmtheit (Richtung und Weise des Entwurfs und die Art der ersten Verwahrung des Entworfenen) noch errang und besaß aus der Gestimmtheit durch die Grundstimmung des Er-staunens.

In a tentative alternate to Emad and Kalary’s English rendition (see below) of the above German passage and in particular of the words “sich zu besinnen”:

And wherever a metaphysical thinking of being is still being tried, it remains incapable of even appraising itself thereunto that once, in the while of its inception, it itself was able to en(liveningly)-think that which it now only ever represents as the void of the most general, solely because the thinking still achieved and possessed its determinateness (direction and mode of the casting-open and the way of the first safekeeping [G209] of what was cast-open) from whence it came of the moodedness to the tune of the grounding mood of be-wondering.

Compare *Mindfulness*, p. 184 where { ... } *darauf noch sich zu besinnen, daß es selbst einst, in seinem Anfang, { ... } [ {remains incapable} of even appraising itself thereunto that once, in the while of its inception, { ... } ]* becomes “{remains incapable} of even reflecting that once, in its beginning, { ... }”:

And wherever one still tries to think being metaphysically, such a thinking remains incapable of even reflecting that once, in its beginning, this very thinking was capable of en-thinking what this thinking now represents as the emptiness of the most general, because this thinking still obtained and possessed its determinedness (the direction and the manners of projecting-opening and the style of the initial preserving [G209] of the projected) out of the attunedness to the grounding attunement of wonder.

Leaving in abeyance this rare abandonment of a variation on “to be mindful” in favour of a variation on “to reflect” for Heidegger’s essential word (*sich besinnen*), let us turn more closely to Emad and Kalary’s approach to the English

rendition of his equally-essentially *distinguished* word *sinnen* [to appreciate / ... ] in the following three occurrences:

First occurrence: *sinnen* [to appreciate] as (=) “to be mindful”, thus conflating (rather than translating) the differentiation in the German original of *sinnen* from (the deverbal nouning of) (*sich*) *besinnen* [GA66, G55]:

Dagegen sinnt die Besinnung auf das Erste: daß der Mensch sich selbst ein unaussetzendes Geheimnis sei, ohne das »Ich« und das »Wir« im geringsten wichtig zu nehmen.

In a tentative English rendition of this German passage:

Whereas the appraisal unto what is first and foremost<sup>164</sup> appreciates: that (the) human being is an unceasing mystery unto itself without considering the “I” and the “we” to be important in the slightest.

Compare *Mindfulness* [p. 45] where vis-à-vis their rendition of *Besinnung* [appraisal] as “mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit ?]”, Heidegger’s word *sinnen* [to appreciate] is compositely read (i.e. English-use-interpreted on Emad and Kalary’s terms) as (=) *besinnen* [to appraise] in *their* sense of ‘to be mindful [besinnlich sein ?]’:

By contrast, mindfulness — giving least importance to the “I” and the “we” — is primarily mindful of the fact that man is an interminable mystery unto himself.

Second occurrence: *sinnen* [to appreciate] as (=) “to ponder”, thus translating-cum-transposing Heidegger’s essential distinction between *sinnen* and (*sich*) *besinnen* but not, it has to be said, even to Emad and Kalary’s own standard of “retaining and reflecting the integrity of the German original” [GA66, G243]:

... alle, die auf das Einrichten von “Religionen” *sinnen* ...

In a tentative English rendition of *sinnen* as “to ponder appreciatively”:

... all those who ponder appreciatively upon the establishing of “religions” ...

Compare *Mindfulness* [p. 214] where at least “to ponder” for Heidegger’s word *sinnen* distinguishes itself from “to be mindful” as a composite reading of both *besinnen* and *sinnen*, but not altogether *transparently* and *discerningly*. Why not?

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<sup>164</sup> “the appraisal unto what is first and foremost”, i.e., for Heidegger, the appraisal (≠ mindfulness) of philosophy unto itself as the thinking of beyng [die Besinnung (≠ Besinnlichkeit) der Philosophie auf sich als das Denken des Seyns], an “appraisal [Besinnung]” that, so Heidegger, “reaches into the sphere of the grounding of the essenz(ing) of (the) human being ...” [GA66, G55] (≠ a “mindfulness [Besinnlichkeit ?]” that “reaches into the sphere of grounding what is ownmost to man ...”, pace Emad and Kalary [ibid. p. 45]).

For one thing because, in the English of *Mindfulness*, the word *ponder* itself doubles for *sinnen* on this rare occasion and on other occasions as the usual rendition of Heidegger's word *bedenken*; which means that the distinction in the German original between *sinnen* and *bedenken* together with the essential connection of the former to (*sich*) *besinnen* is lost in translation:

[all] those who ponder upon organizing "religions"; ...

Third occurrence: *sinnen* [to appreciate, to ponder appreciatively] as (=) "to deliberate", once again burying in translation the essential connection between *sinnen* and (*sich*) *besinnen* and the appreciable meaning and true sense of their essential distinguishment as an integral whole in the German original [GA66, G345]:

Das metaphysische Denken ist Gegenwärtigung des Seienden auf seine und in seine Anwesenung; und die höchste Form der Gegenwärtigung wird notwendig und erreicht im »dialektischen« Denken, dessen »Unruhe« und »Bewegung« einzig auf die un-bedingte Gegenwärtigung alles Bedingten als eines solchen im Un-bedingten und dessen sich selbst Vorstellen sinnt.

My tentative English translation of this German passage again ventures "to ponder appreciatively" for *sinnen* ("sinnt"):

The metaphysical thinking is a making or rendering present(ial) of the being unto its and in its presencing; and the highest form of the rendering present(ial) becomes necessary and will be attained in the "dialectical" thinking whose "unrest" and "movement" ponders appreciatively and singularly unto the un-conditional rendering present(ial) of all that is conditional as one such (as it is) in respect of the un-conditional and its own representing of itself.

Compare Emad and Kalary's alternate interpretation of the German passage and, in particular, the translation of Heidegger's word *sinnen* [to appreciate, ponder appreciatively] with "to deliberate" [ibid. p. 307]:

The metaphysical thinking renders beings present with respect to their presencing and in their presencing. And the highest form of rendering present becomes necessary and is reached in the "dialectical" thought, which, "restive" and "dynamic", solely deliberates on the unconditioned rendering present of all that is conditioned as such in the unconditioned and on the unconditioned's own representing of itself.

To summarise: Aside from Emad and Kalary's isolate rendition of *besinnen*, v. with a variation on "to reflect", in the English of *Mindfulness*, there are vis-à-vis their most trusted rendition of Heidegger's word (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] with "to be mindful", three alternate renditions of three instances of this German word's incipient time word *sinnen* [to appreciate / to ponder

appreciatively] in the German original: (1) “to be mindful”; (2) “to ponder”; and (3) “to deliberate”.

Whilst, as far as I can tell, Heidegger makes no mention in *Besinnung* (GA66) of the verbal noun *Sinnen*, the question-worthy character of Emad and Kalary’s rendition of his verbal noun *Besinnen* with “being mindful” was raised earlier. It was noted that insofar as they pay heed in the English of *Mindfulness* to the distinction in *Besinnung* (GA66) between deverbal and verbal nounings of *besinnen*, v. through their English rendition of Heidegger’s distinguishment of *Besinnung* [appraisal] from *Besinnen* [appraising], Emad and Kalary mainly have resort to their corresponding distinction of sorts between “mindfulness” for *Besinnung* and “being mindful” for *Besinnen*; most notably, in their translation [p. 271ff; G307ff] of the section heading “XXVI Eine Sammlung des Besinnens [A gathering of the appraising]” with “A gathering into being mindful”.<sup>165</sup>

It is, however, not in his 1938 / 39 title *Besinnung* (GA66), but in his 1942 / 43 title *Heraklit* (GA55), that Heidegger undertakes a dedicated thinkerly appraisal [denkerische *Besinnung*] of ‘the word *Besinnung* itself’ and of *Besinnung*, i.e. *appraisal*, itself as an appreciative thinking [ein sinnendes Denken] that, in hearkening unto the primordial forgathering [Versammlung] (λόγος) of an essential saying and knowing of being through the gleaning of its incipient time words (*sich*) *besinnen* and *sinnen* in conjunction with their respective (verbal) nounings *Besinnen* and *Sinnen*, is a commensurate (because attuned to the Λόγος of being) gathering [Sammlung] of the appraising of philosophy unto itself and in the dis(cerning)-, or critical-engagement with its history proper (as meta-physics); and as such, for Heidegger, “the best of the noble (in) temper [die höchste Edelmut]”.

Let us therefore turn to this dedicated appraisal of the word *Besinnung* itself on Heidegger’s part to venture still further into our own thinkerly appraisal of ‘the word *appraisal* itself’ as *a suitable, indeed the most suitable*, alternate to Emad and Kalary’s English rendition of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*”. And not just in the titles *Besinnung* (GA66) and *Heraklit* (GA55), on which the present consideration is focused, but, perchance, throughout the texts of Martin Heidegger.

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<sup>165</sup> An exception to their translation of the distinction is their composite reading of both *Besinnung* and *Besinnen* as “mindfulness” on p. 216; G244.



The full German title of *Heraklit* (GA55) is as follows:

Heraklit  
Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens  
Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos

Below is my English rendition thereof:

Heraclitus  
The inception of occidental thinking  
Logic. Heraclitus' teaching of the Logos

The two-part German subtitle of *Heraklit* [*Heraclitus*] (GA55) reflects the fact that volume 55 of the *Gesamtausgabe* on the inceptual thinking of the early Greek thinker Heraclitus comprises the two lecture courses delivered by Heidegger during the summer semesters of 1943 and 1944 titled, respectively, as recorded in the full German title of *Heraklit* (GA55): 1. “Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens” (1943) and 2. “Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos” (1944).

From our consideration of *Besinnung* [*Appraisal*] (GA66) thus far, it should come as no surprise that Heidegger refers to the thinking (of being) in which he is engaged throughout *Heraklit* [*Heraclitus*] (GA55) as, essentially, an appraisal [*eine Besinnung*]: an appraisal unto the pioneering inception [*Anfang*] of occidental thinking through select essential fragments of Heraclitus in the first lecture course, also in the latter's hitherto barely observed or heeded ‘head start’, as an inceptual thinker, on the later beginning or ‘origin’ of ‘philosophy’, i.e. metaphysics, in the occident, as founded by Plato and Aristotle; and, in the second, under the title ‘logic’, an appraisal of Heraclitus’ teaching of (learning from) the Logos’, also in critical engagement with and disengagement from the metaphysical logos of logic.

Commensurate with the word *appraisal* itself as the English rendition of “Heidegger’s word *Besinnung*” in *Besinnung* (GA66), and elsewhere, his phrases *besinnende Denken*<sup>166</sup> and *sinnende Denken*<sup>167</sup> in *Heraklit* (GA55), and elsewhere, can be rendered “appraisive thinking” (≠ “mindful / reflective thinking” per Emad and Kalary) and “appreciative thinking” (≠ “mindful / ponderative / deliberative thinking” per Emad and Kalary) respectively.

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<sup>166</sup> Heidegger (GA55), G156.

<sup>167</sup> *ibid.* G373ff.

When it comes to Heidegger's appraisal of " 'the (appreciable) meaning', i.e. the true (sense) ['der Sinn', d.h. das Wahre']" of the word *Besinnung* itself in *Heraklit* (GA55), what lays itself out for the interpretation in the second lecture course as such that is worth(while)-thinking, is a self-appraisively appreciative thinking [ein sich-besinnend sinnende Denken] that is intent on an attempt to learn to think through a 'logos'; more precisely, through a (human) λόγος (λέγειν, ὁμολογεῖν) of the mind (cast of mind) or soul [Sinn (Gemut) oder Seele] (ψυχή) in the sense of an appreciative [sinnenden] "glean-ing" ["Lesen"; λέγειν as »lesen«: »to glean«] of "the glean / the gleaning" ["der Lese / der Lesung"] (λόγος / Λόγος), one that is *enabled through the logos* to glean the like of what the glean / gleaning gleans (ὁμολογεῖν) in order to say the like of what the say / saying [Sage / Sagen] says (ὁμολογεῖν) in a way that is not just word for word but true to the word [the logos] of being itself [des Seins selbst] in essenz(ing) [im Wesen].

A hint along the way to Heidegger's attempt to articulate — pursuant to and purveyor of select essential fragments of the early Greek inceptual thinker Heraclitus — the essenz(ing) of the human being, i.e. the ψυχή, as the homological connection of the λόγος of the human (cast of) mind or soul to *the* Λόγος, i.e. to being itself (in the sense of the being of the being), can be gleaned from his thinkerly appraisal of the word *Besinnung* itself in a passage from the midst of the second lecture course, "Logic. Heraclitus' teaching of the Logos".

The passage in question is drawn from his *Recapitulation* of "§5. Three ways of responding to the question: What is the Λόγος?" under the heading, "1) Extended reappraisal unto the λόγος within the horizon of the meta-physical teaching of ideas and unto the premetaphysical essenz(ing) of the Λόγος that is worth(while)-thinking as naming of being" [GA55, G274f]:

What we are attempting under the title 'logic' in these lectures [?\*aforegleanings: Vorlesungen] is an appraisal [eine Besinnung]. To ap-praise itself [Sich be-sinnen] – this signifies: to hold out to itself the address of the appreciable meaning [des Sinnes] and to tarry awhile under its cover; 'the (appreciable) meaning', i.e. the true (sense) ['der Sinn', d.h. das Wahre], where all is at rest and in sway [worin alles ruht und schwingt]. The appraisal intends to be nothing other than an attempt to learn thinking by way of a 'logic'.

In the Addendum [pp. G391-402] to *Heraklit* (GA55), being a provisional continuation of the text on page G282 of §5 of the second lecture course under the heading, "c) Third way: Access via the λόγος of the ψυχή. Fragment 45. The question concerning the ὁμολογεῖν", Heidegger's appraisal turns to how the German rendition of Heraclitus' word τό φρονεῖν in the first part of Saying B112 as "das Denken", "(the) thinking", is to be interpreted in connection with the

rendition of Heraclitus' word λέγειν in the second part as “lesen”, “to glean”; and to how, appreciatively thought, “the thinking” as essenizing [als wesend] in knowing proper that the appraisal is intent on learning through a ‘logic’ in the appreciable meaning and true sense of a ‘glean-ing [Lesen]’ and a ‘gather-ing [Sammeln]’, becomes “thinking *itself*” [“das Denken”], “as “the appreciating and appraising of itself [das Sinnen und Sichbesinnen]”; or in other words: “the gather-ing itself in respect to the gathering [das Sichsammeln in die Sammlung]” – “to glean [lesen]” (λέγειν) [Addendum G399]:

Now for the first time we can think pursuant to the whole Saying<sup>168</sup> of Heraclitus, i.e. also pay heed to the pivotal first words that are placed at the beginning of what has been elucidated thus far. They read: τό φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη. Thinking is the best of knowing-how, the best can-do [Das Denken ist das höchste Vermögen] ... thinking *itself* [das Denken], thought here not in the sense of the ‘logic’ that was later to begin forming and taking on a shape of its own, but rather, the thinking [das Denken] as the appreciating and appraising of itself [das Sinnen und Sichbesinnen]: the gathering itself in respect to the gathering [das Sichsammeln in die Sammlung] – λέγειν. In this manner Heraclitus already knew that because they are the thinking being [der Denkende] the curving back and return to their ownself as the one thinking pertains to the essenz(ing) of the human being (fragment 116):

ἄνθρωποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

To the human being alone it is apportioned to discern their ownself, and that means to think knowingly.

To think, φρονεῖν, is here not [G400] yet intended in the sense of the ‘logic’ that was later to begin forming and taking on a shape of its own, for which the λέγειν scarcely signifies more than: to state and to recite [aussagen und hersagen].

The horizon of Heidegger's critical-engagement with and disengagement from ‘the logic’ that pertains to psychological conceptions of the λόγος of the ψυχή is honed in “§6. The absent(ing) being present of the Λόγος for the human being and an indication of the objectless environ of the primordial Λόγος: a) The

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168 Heidegger is here (in the Addendum comprising a continuation of the text on page G282 of the second lecture course) anticipating his subsequent interpretation of the appreciable meaning and true sense of fragment B112 *as a whole*: τό φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας (τοῦ Λόγου). See below for two versions of his German translation (and interpretation) from the Greek and my English rendition thereof at *Heraklit* (GA55), G373f and G375. With regard to his respective ‘sequential enumeration’ of select essential fragments of Heraclitus in the two lecture courses of volume 55 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, the author points out [G37f]: “We will naturally retain the numbering of the fragments given by Diels.” [Heidegger is referring to the numbering provided by the philologist Hermann Diels in his 1903 title “Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker” [“The Fragments of the Presocratics”].] “But we will not follow the sequence laid down by this numbering. The fragmentary piece supplied with the number 1 by Diels [G38] is by no means the first essential one for us.”

congruence of fragments 50 and 45. The homological connection of the λόγος of the soul to *the* Λόγος. The ὁμολογεῖν as the gather-ing itself unto the primordial forgathering of the Λόγος of being”.

Heidegger’s *Recapitulation* of §6, including his thinkerly appraisal of the more primordial essen(z)ing of the λόγος of the ψυχή that distinguishes itself from ‘the logic’ that pertains to psychological conceptions thereof, begins under the heading “1) The λόγος of the ψυχή as the gathering unto the primordial, all safekeeping gathering. The ineptitude of psychological conceptions. Fragments 45 and 50. Pointers to fragments 101 and 116,” as follows [GA55, G307f]:

During the course of the lecture(s)<sup>169</sup> [Die Vorlesung; essentially untranslatable ! MAH] concerning ‘logic’ it is a matter of biding the while in an interpretation of what Heraclitus says of (and from) the [vom] Λόγος [von der Lesung, of (and from) the glean-ing ! MAH]. That is how we think the essen(z)ing of the λόγος in a more primordial way. In so doing, we pursue a more primordial ‘logic’. We thereby learn to think in a more primordial way.

In closing: Here is my translation of what Heidegger himself has to say in *Heraklit* (GA55) of (and from) the Λόγος — in primordial ‘pre-, and post-metaphysical’ essen(z)ing — concerning the thinking *itself* [*das Denken*] he names *Besinnung* [*appraisal*] in a manner beholden to the essen(z)ing of its incipient time words (*sich*) *besinnen* [to appraise (itself)] and *sinnen* [to appreciate / to ponder appreciatively]. For, therein resonates and resides, in Heidegger’s appraisal, all essential saying of the German words *Besinnen* [appraising] and *Sinnen* [appreciating] as another way of essentially saying *das (be)sinnende Denken* [the (appraisively-)appreciative thinking] that, by way of a ‘logic’, to wit, a ‘gleaning [Lesung]’ and a ‘gathering [Sammlung]’, is, i.e. *essenzen* (and shelters-conceals its essen(z)ing) *as*, philosophy — the befriending of that which is essentially worthwhile-thinking [die Befreundung des *wesentlich Zu-denkenden*] — in the appraisal unto itself and in the critical engagement with its history proper as metaphysics. And that means all at once: in appreciation of the inception of (occidental) thinking *itself* as the appreciating and appraising of itself as a homological thinking of beyng at-tempered to the environing-wise being present of being, of the Λόγος, “in the primordial pre-metaphysical sense” of Heraclitus’ Greek word φρονεῖν that, so Heidegger, we best translate by “*das sinnende Denken*”, “(the) appreciative thinking” [GA55, G372ff]:

We have heard that the human λόγος is that which is (the) far-flung-wise far-reaching. In thinking, ‘the soul’, i.e. the fetching-wise extracting, becomes en-tempered with the grace of the primordial forgathering [aus der ... an-gemutet]. The environing-wise being present [Gegenwart] of being, of the Λόγος, attempts

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169 “the lecture(s)”: “the ?\*aforegleaning(s)”.

itself to [mutet sich ... zu] thinking, to the λέγειν as ὁμολογεῖν. – On the strength and by the grace of this primordial entemperation of human being by the Λόγος all temper –, i.e. that (of spirit) in the cast of mind, or temperament, of human being that is inmost and furthest, is at-tempered to being.<sup>170</sup> In thinking proper, assuming it will some day be granted a human being, there is a temper that is in temper with the spirit of anticipating [der Mut, der das ... vermutet] that which, environing of its own accord and reposing in itself, is (the) primordially all protecting and incipiently maintained. Such that is (the) sheltering-recovering of itself while returning to itself as (the) primordially all protecting, is the noble par excellence. The thinking as essenizing in knowing proper is the best in the spirit of anticipation of the noble and the noble-minded [die höchste Vermutung des Edlen und des Edel-[G373]mütigen]. That is why Heraclitus imparts the first sentence of Saying 112 thus: τὸ φρονεῖν ἄρετή μεγίστη. φρόνησις, φρονεῖν, φρήν is thinking [das Denken] providing that we afford it the signification that is yet to be truly exhausted of our German word “sinnen” [“to appreciate” / “to acquaint” / “to ponder”] – to appreciate, or ponder, something, to ponder-appreciatively-in-pursuance thereof and with an appreciation so far extracting of acquaintance as, to at-temper itself to an entemperation, and, all at once, to appraisively-appreciate itself and to commune appreciatively with its own essen(ing), an essen(ing) whose own proper consists precisely in belonging to that whereunto all listening is intent.<sup>171</sup> In ‘Sinnen’ [‘appreciating’] lies the awhiling-abiding extracting, a drawing out of the lingering-dwelling kind that is also meant by the Greek φρονεῖν that we best translate by “das sinnende Denken” [“(the) appreciative thinking”]. The first sentence of the Saying can then be rendered thus: “Appreciative thinking is the best of the noble (in) temper”. The ensuing καί does not merely append the sentence about the σοφία to the sentence about the φρονεῖν; the καί associates here by saying: and so it is because indeed the σοφία whose attendant diligence is the φρονεῖν has the essen(ing) that is now worthwhile saying and affirming. The φρονεῖν is the diligence to care [die Sorgfalt] for the σοφία, is the caresomeness, to wit, the propensity to care [die Sorgsamkeit] – φιλία τῆς σοφίας – is philosophy in the primordial pre-metaphysical sense.

Only when we have once again learned by the experience of practised acquaintance to inkle the essen(ing) proper of the knowing, of the σοφία, will we then again understand a little of the diligent propensity to care for this knowing. Only then will it dawn upon us what the thinking propensity to care that attends knowing proper, what the φιλία τῆς σοφίας, what ‘philosophy’ is all about. Philosophy is not a ‘department’ or ‘subject’ [kein ‘Fach’], neither a ‘major subject’ [ein ‘Hauptfach’] nor a ‘minor subject’ [ein ‘Nebenfach’]. It is a *fitting juncture* [eine *Fuge*] whereby beyng ac-cords or ad-justs or ad-jointures itself [sich ... zu-fügt] to the thinking human being, providing it be the (tempering) arrangement by accordance / by

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170 “Aus dieser ursprünglichen Anmutung des Menschen von dem Λόγος her ist aller Mut –, d.h. das Innerste und Weitestе des Gemütes des Menschen, zu-gemutet dem Sein.”

171 “... “sinnen” – auf etwas sinnen, ihm nach-sinnen und bei diesem weitausholenden sinnenden sich zu-muten einer Anmutung, zugleich sich be-sinnen und sinnend in das eigene Wesen einkehren, dessen Eigenes ja gerade besteht im Hingehören zu dem, worauf alles Hinhören geht.”

adjustment / by jointure [die Fügung] that is this fitting juncture amongst human beings.

To convey through an amplification that is unspoken of, albeit vitally worthwhile speaking of so far as we are concerned, Heraclitus' Saying 112 reads:

τὸ φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μέγιστη, καὶ σοφίῃ ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας (τοῦ Λόγου).

Appreciative thinking is the best of the noble (in) temper and is thus because knowing is: to gather the unconcealed (from whence of the concealment [G374] therefor) in the bringing-forth thereof commensurate to the arising / dawning – (yes all of this) in the hearkening unto the primordial forgathering.<sup>172</sup>

Heidegger's *Besinnung* [appraisal] in *Heraklit* (GA55) unto *das sinnende Denken* [the appreciative thinking] (τὸ φρονεῖν) that, by way of a 'logic' in the sense of a (homological) 'glean-ing' and 'gather-ing' from *the* Λόγος (*the* primordial forgathering) of beyng itself, essences (and shelters-conceals its essenizing) as philosophy — in the sense of the befriending of such that is essentially worth(while)-thinking — also allows room for an alternative articulation of (t)his translation (and interpretation) of “ ‘the (appreciable) meaning’, i.e. the true (sense)”, of Heraclitus' Saying 112 as follows [G375]:

Appreciative thinking is (the) noble in temper and thus it is because knowing is: to gather the unconcealed (from whence of the concealment into the unconcealedness) in the manner of the bringing-forth into the set-forth and set-up from the prospect of the arising / dawning – (yet all of this) in regard of the extracting-fetching connection unto the primordial forgathering.<sup>173</sup>

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172 “Das sinnende Denken ist der höchste Edelmut und dies, weil das Wissen ist: das Unverborgene (aus der Verbergung für diese) zu sammeln im Hervor-bringen seiner gemäß dem Aufgehen – (all dies doch) im Hinhorchen auf die ursprüngliche Versammlung.”

173 “Das sinnende Denken ist (der) Edelmut, und es ist dies, weil das Wissen ist: Das Unverborgene (aus der Verbergung in die Unverborgenheit) sammeln in der Weise des Hervor-bringens in das Her- und Aufgestellte aus dem Hinblick auf das Aufgehen (all dies jedoch) im ausholenden-einholenden Bezug auf die ursprüngliche Versammlung.



**List of symbols used**

Volumes of the Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*:

- GA2 *Sein & Zeit* [*Being and Time*]
- GA4 *Erläuterung zu Hölderlins Dichtung* [*Elucidations with regard to Hölderlin's poetizing*], citing the (1939 / 1940) lecture(s) / (1941) essay:  
 “Wie wenn am Feiertage ... [As on a holiday ... ]”
- GA6.2 *Nietzsche, Zweite Band* [*Nietzsche, Second Volume*]
- GA7 *Vorträge und Aufsätze* [*Lectures and Essays*], citing the lecture / essay:  
 “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50) [Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment 50)]” (1951)
- GA9 *Wegmarken* [*Pathmarks*], including citations from the following lectures / essays:  
 “Vom Wesen des Grundes [Of the essenz(ing) of ground]” (1929)  
 “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit [Of the essenz(ing) of truth]” (1930; 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. 1949; 5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1967)  
 “Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit [Plato's teaching of truth]” (1931/32, 1940)  
 “Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1 [Of the essenz(ing) and concept of Φύσις. Aristotle, *Physics* B, I.]” (1939)  
 “Nachwort zu “Was ist Metaphysik?” [Afterword to “What is metaphysics?”]” (1943)  
 “Brief über den »Humanismus« [Letter concerning »humanism«]” (1946)  
 “Kants These über das Sein [Kant's thesis concerning being]” (1961)
- GA33 *Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 1–3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft* [*Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ 1–3. Of the essenz(ing) and actuality of force*]
- GA14 *Zur Sache des Denkens* [*To the matter of thinking*], citing the essay:  
 “Zeit und Sein [Time and Being]” (1962)  
 “Protokol zu einem Seminar über “Zeit und Sein” [Protocol to a seminar on “Time and Being”]” (1962)
- GA40 *Einführung in die Metaphysik* [*Introduction to Metaphysics*]
- GA54 *Parmenides* [*Parmenides*]

GA55 *Heraklit* [*Heraclitus*], comprising the two lecture courses:

1. “Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens [The inception of occidental thinking]” (1943)
2. “Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos [Logic. Heraclitus’ teaching of the Logos]” (1944)

GA65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* [*Contributions to philosophy (From enpropriation)*]

GA66 *Besinnung* [*Appraisal*]

GA67 *Metaphysik und Nihilismus* [*Metaphysics and Nihilism*], comprising the two texts:

- “1. Die Überwindung der Metaphysik [The overcoming of metaphysics] (1938-1939)”
- “2. Das Wesen des Nihilismus [The essenz(ing) of nihilism] (1946-1948)”

GA78 *Anaximander* [*Anaximander*]

Also by Martin Heidegger:

WD *Was Heisst Denken?* [*What calls for thinking?*]

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